Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1991

James F. Redmond: An Urban Superintendent’s Response to
Selected Challenges (1966-1975)
John P. Reilly
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Reilly, John P., "James F. Redmond: An Urban Superintendent’s Response to Selected Challenges
(1966-1975)" (1991). Dissertations. 2922.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2922

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1991 John P. Reilly

JAMES F. REDMOND:

AN URBAN SUPERINTENDENT/S RESPONSE TO

SELECTED CHALLENGES <1966-1975)

by

John P. Reilly

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the School of
Education of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Education
May

1991

John P. Re 111 y
Loyola University of Chicago
JAMES F. REDMOND: AN URBAN SUPERINTENDENT/S RESPONSE TO
SELECTED CHALLENGES <1966-1975)

The purpose of this study was to give a historical
review of four challenges that were faced by James F.
Redmond during his tenure as General Superintendent of
Schools in Chicago.

The study presents a brief review of

challenges met during prior superintendencies in Chicago in
the first chapter.
Chapter II discusses the rising discontent for
Redmond/s predecessor, Benjamin Willis, and the community's
demand for a more empathetic leader.

Redmond/s previous

tenure in Chicago and his superintendencies in New Orleans
and Syosset

~re

also reviewed.

Chapter III reviews the first challenge that Redmond
encountered as superintendent.

Upon his arrival in Chicago,

Redmond immediately began to take part in Chlcago/s first
collective bargaining with a recognized bargaining agent,
the Chicago Teachers Union.

The development of the Teachers

Union as a powerful bargaining agent ls reviewed.

The

chapter then summarizes the difficulties encountered in the
negotiating process through Redmond/s years as
superintendent.
Chapter IV gives a historical perspective of the
development of the segregated school system that existed
upon Redmond/s arrival.

The remedy designed by the Redmond

administration and the gains that were made in integrating
the schools are discussed.
Chapter V reviews the decentralization, both
administratively and politically of the Chicago Pub! ic
Schools.

The Booz. Al Jen. & Hamilton Study is discussed

with its impl !cations for the administration of the school
system.
Chapter VI discusses the Shared-Time Experiment that
existed during the Wi 1 lis and Redmond administrations.

This

program offered private/parochial students the opportunity
to attend certain classes in the public school.
Chapter VII gives an assessment of the leadership style
of Redmond as noted by his subordinates, an adversary, his
Board of Education members, three leadership theorist, and
Redmond himself.

Chapter VII discusses how Redmond/s ideas

and decisions have fared with the test of time.
VIII is a summary and conclusions.
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CHAPTER I
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE CHICAGO SUPERINTENDENCY
The purpose of this study is to explore the tenure of
James F. Redmond as General Superintendent of Schools in
Chicago.

We wil I study four challenges Redmond faced during

his years in off ice and investigate his solutions to the
four chal Jenges.

In order to better understand the

difficulties that arose for the Redmond and his predecessors
we shal I take a brief look at the administrations of
previous superintendents.

In the history of the Chicago

public school system, the individuals who served as
superintendent have had to face educational. social, and
political problems.

To provide examples of the problems

they faced, Chapter I reviews the superintendencies in
earlier administrations.

Actually controversy arose in

the school system prior to the appointment of the first
superintendent of schools.

In 1841, two years after the

creation of their office, the seven school

inspectors hired

a music teacher at $16.00 per month, "because the children
like to sing.' 11

But in 1842 some parents suggested that

this was an unnecessary extravagance and the teacher was
dismissed.

It was not unti 1 1854 that the school inspectors

determined that it was necessary to hire a superintendent of
Mary J. Herrick, The Chicago Public Schools: A Social and
Political History (Beverly Hi 1 ls: Sage Publications, 1971),
1

p.32.

2

schools "who would act as a kind of secretary to the school
inspectors and bring order and unity to the school
districts." 2

The first superintendent, John Dore, served

for only two years <1854-1856).

With his appointment as

superintendent, he found no system of record keeping.

His

accomplishments included the introduction of school records
and a daily attendance record for each child.

He introduced

common textbooks and asked the school inspectors to
establ lsh a high school.

Dore remarked that if the pub! ic

now had a duty to provide public schools, then certainly
parents had a responsibi 1 ity to see that their chi Jdren
attend.

Dore left the school system to enter business but

later returned to public service as a state senator and as
president of the fifteen-man Board of Education which had
replaced the seven inspectors.
Dore was succeeded by WI 11 lam Harvey Wei ls.

Wei Is is

referred to as "one of the most effective administrators in
the early history of public education." 3

Upon his

appointment Wells found i 11 prepared teachers in an ungraded
system.

His administration <1856-1864) enhanced the

training of teachers by offering Saturday morning classes in
teaching methods.

He noted the important Job assigned to

primary teachers and Insisted that they be paid equally with
teachers of upper grades.

21.Qj_Q,
SThi~

~··

39

p .•

Under his leadership a graded

3

system of elementary and high schools was initiated and a
complete graded curriculum was established.

According to

Herrick, "Wells' book, A Graded Course of Instruction with
Instructions to Teachers, gave detal led instruction on
materials to be covered in each grade." 4

Wells was forced

to resign his position as superintendent because of fai I ing
health.

His service to schools was acknowledged by a warm

reception given in his honor by George Howland, principal of
the high school, who read a resolution stating ''that his
uniform kindness and encouragement have contributed very
greatly to the pleasure as well as the success of the
teachers in the public

schools."~

Wei Is, I ike Dore, later

returned to serve as president of the Board of Education
between 1872 and 1874.
Wei ls was succeeded in the off ice of superintendent by
Josiah Pickard <1864-1877).

Pickard's tenure was difficult

in that he had to try to manage a school system through the
end of the Civil War, a post-war depression, and a fire that
nearly destroyed the city.
Doty <1877-1880).

Pickard's successor was Duane

Doty had difficulty establishing rapport

with his teachers because of a murder case related to his
appointment as superintendent.

He did, however, manage to

gain approval for a plan to simplify the records that
teachers were required to keep.

4

Ibid., p.42.
46

~Thl~

~··

p ••

4

George Howland/s tenure as superintendent <1880-1891>
was noted for the increased demands for vocational education
and for ethnic control.

Each immigrant group wanted

concessions for their chi 1dren.

The po I it i ca 1 I eadersh i p

counted on these ethnic groups for support so their power
had to be reckoned with.

Howland gave examinations to

teachers to qua! ify them and recommended that they be
appointed by the Board of Education.

Howland, also a

political realist, suggested that teachers also get letters
of recommendation from their ward committeemen.·'-'·
Superintendent Albert G. Lane C1891-1898) had a history
as an effective school administrator from his service as
county superintendent of schools in Cook County.

Lane

welcomed input from outside agencies 1 ike the Chicago
Woman/s Club, the Women/s Christian Temperance Union, School
Children/s Aid Society, and Hui I House.

Lane increased the

teaching of manual arts in the elementary schools,
incorporated kindergartens, and extended night school
classes.

His administration required training sessions

for teacher cadets in the elementary schools.

Later the

problem of teacher training was solved when the Board of
Education acquired the Cook County Normal School
appointed Colonel Francis W. Parker as its/ head.

in 1896 and
Lane s
1

most dramatic confl let over schools was completely outside
his authority of control.
6

.l.bl.Q. , p . 56 .

It dealt with the disposition of

5

the increasingly valuable remaining section sixteen school
lands.

The sale and leasing of school lands at favorable

rates to politically connected people or companies was
common but the public was just becoming aware of it.
Following the superintendencies of E. Benjamin Andrews
and Edwin G. Cooley, came a woman in a profession
traditionally dominated by men, El la Flagg Young
<1909-1915).

Young began her career in Chicago in 1865.

She was educated in the Chicago public schools and later
studied under John Dewey and received her doctorate at the
University of Chicago. 7

As a district superintendent, she

established a teachers/ council to give teachers a voice in
what happened in the schools.

Herrick in The Chicagg

Schools: A Social and Political History gives current school
administrators a chance to laugh when she mentions that El la
Flagg Young "is the only recorded principal

in Chicago

schools who ever dismissed an incompetent school engineer,
and was able to keep him dismissed."e

Herrick continues:

Mrs. Young/s greatest contributions to the Chicago
schools lay in her efforts to give teachers pride in
participation and improvement of the schools of which
they were a part. There is no evidence that she
supported - or that she approved - al 1 of the
Federation activities. But there is no doubt that she
sought to establish a close and sympathetic
relationship with the teaching staff and to impart a
sense of involvement in school decisions. 9

Joan K. Smith, El la Flagg Young. Portrait of A Leader <Ames,
Iowa: Educational Studies Press, 1979), p.64.
9
Herrlck, Joe.cit., p.115.
9
.lJ2l.d,, p.120.
7

6

During Young's tenure as superintendent, high school
attendance grew and in 1910 reached 25,000.

One reason for

the rise was the opening of commercial courses in the high
school so that the students learned ski 1 ls that made them
employable.

She also offered "prevocational courses'' to

seventh and eighth graders to keep children from leaving
school after the sixth grade.

One of the programs that she

initiated, sex education for high school and normal school
students, was later deleted by the Board of Education after
several groups protested the program.

10

Young's career

as superintendent ended with her resignation in December
1915.

Her last year was marked by a series of conf I lets

with local politicians, especially newly elected mayor
Wl lliam Hale Thompson.

A story circulated that Thompson's

dislike of El la Flagg Young began when he, as a seventh
grader, was sent home to his parents from the Skinner School
where Young served as school principal.

Thompson never

returned to the school with his parents and never forgave
her.

11

Superintendent John D. Shoop succeeded El la Flagg
Young and held his office for three years <1915-1918).

He

held no influence over the Board of Education and was
generally overlooked by them.

He was succeeded by Charles

E. Chadsey who had the shortest tenure of any

1

o

Th;
p .117.
~·· p. 138.
,..j

1 1 Th;

,..j

~··

7

superintendent.

He was hired by the Board of Education in

March 1919, and due to problems with the new Board appointed
by William Hale Thompson, he resigned on 26 November
1919.

12

Peter A. Mortenson (1919-1924> succeeded Chadsey

and tried to placate teachers by suggesting that the
Board reinstate the Teachers/ Councils previously
established by El la Flagg Young.

Corruption continued to

flourish in the Thompson appointed Board unti 1 State/s
Attorney Robert Crowe exposed the scandalous behavior and
brought forth indictments on the main characters.

13

The corruption of the Thompson administration of city
government led to a cal 1 for reform and Thompson announced
that he would not run for mayor in 1923.

The candidate of

the Democratic party was William E. Dever, a judge with an
impeccable reputation.

Dever felt that it would be best for

the Board of Education to be free from political
interference, so he appointed seven competent and concerned
citizens to the school board.

14

The new Board was split on

its/ vote for the new superintendent between William Owen of
the Normal School and William Bogan of Lane High School.
a compromise the Board settled on William A. McAndrew who
was at the time an assistant superintendent in New York
City.

McAndrew had served as principal of Hyde Park High

School in Chicago earlier in his career but was dismissed
1 2

1

.l..Q.lQ.

s .l..Q.lQ. ,

14Thirl

p • 142 .

~··P·

143 .

As

8

when he refused to pass a pol itician/s

son.

1

~

With his big

city experience and independence from political pressure,
McAndrew seemed to be an excel lent candidate.

McAndrew was

warmly received by the Chicago Teachers Federation CCTF> but
quickly turned their welcome into conflict with his plan to
create junior high schools.

As McAndrew/s plans for the

junior high school became known, the leadership of the
Chicago Teachers Federation began to realize the threat that
junior high schools would have on their organization.
Younger members of the CTF took the certification test for
Junior high and upon certification left the CTF and Joined
one of the high school unions.

McAndrew ignored the

questions regarding the junior high schools which had been
brought up by teacher councl ls.

He stated that he saw no

need for teachers' meetings on school time and that they had
no business tel ling the superintendent what to do.

1

•

The

Elementary General Council asked the Board to consider
further study and discussion of the junior high school plan
but the Board ignored their request and recommended the
adoption of the plan.

Rumors were spread that McAndrew had

been brought to the city to subdue teachers, and to support
the domination of the schools by business interests.

Both

the Federation of Women High School Teachers and the
Federation of Men Teachers favored the establishment of

p. 145 .
Ibid., p.146.

l!i5Th;d~.,
~
16

9

junior high schools, but with restrictions that they be
monitored closely for abuses and be on an experimental basis
only.

Margaret Haley and the Chicago Teachers Federation

opposed the plan from the beginning to the end and this
opposition had an effect on McAndrew/s career as
superintendent.

The junior high school system was born in

Chicago in 1924 and ceased operation in 1933.
McAndrew also introduced the uplatoon system'' for the
elementary schools.

This system proposed to use the school

plant for a long day, with a half-day of classroom
instruction and a half-day of supervised play and other
non-academic activities, so that a bui !ding could be used to
accommodate a larger number of students at one time.

17

The

"platoon system" had been tried earlier during El la Flagg
Young/s administration but only as a stop-gap measure.
McAndrew's "platooning" was to be permanent and would reduce
overhead costs, require fewer bui Jdings, and less
equipment.

19

The "platooning" became the target of

criticism from national and local labor movements as a way
of short changing children and pleasing tax cutters.

19

On

8 April 1925 the Board approved McAndrew's plan for a
council of organizations who would act as his advisors when
he needed their help.

1 7
1 9

The new council

included four

.lQj_Q. , p. 148.
.LJ:U.Q, , p. 149.

Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the Schools CNew
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961>, p.155.
19

10

principals and a superintendent who could outvote the three
large teacher groups.

McAndrew/s disregard for teachers

served to unify their efforts against him. 20

In 1927

McAndrew and the Board lost control over non-teaching
employees, that is, clerks, firemen, janitors, etc.; when
the courts ruled that stationary firemen should become civil
service positions under the city government.

McAndrew

became an issue in the election for mayor in 1927.

Wi I l iam

Hale Thompson accused McAndrew of using textbooks that were
overly sympathetic to the British and did not paint the true
picture of the American Revolution. 21

After the election of

Thompson in 1927, this controversy cost McAndrew his job.
The pro-British textbook controversy was later refuted and
this, combined with the civil service problems and evidence
of underworld control of his administration, ended up
costing Thompson his power and he lost the 1931 election.

22

William J. Bogan took office as acting superintendent
in

August 1927, and was formally selected superintendent in

June 1928.
in

Bogan had served as a teacher and a principal

Chicago for years.

He had become principal of Lane High

School and developed it into an institution whose reputation
for high standards in vocational and general education are
still recognized nationwide. 23

As superintendent, he

Herrick, Joe.cit., p.165.
George S. Counts, School and Society in Chicago <New York:
Arno Press, 1971), p.13.
22
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.172.
23
lbid., p.226.
20
21

11

created an advisory council that included experts in health,
welfare, psychology, and social problems.

These experts

could help devise plans to assist the schools in meeting the
needs of their students.

With this advisory council. Bogan

divided the city into forty-one areas and established local
community-school advisory committees in each area. 24

Bogan

continued to battle the Thompson appointed board and
attempted to defend the educational department.

Bogan, who

was an expert in school finance, knew that figures presented
to the Board were rigged.

He was sure that the businessman

who refused to distinguish between expenditures for
education and for patronage was quite willing to reduce his
own taxes at the expense of youth.

Bogan was considered a

friend to all of the education related union groups and to
community groups like the Citizens Schools Committee
<1933).

2

~

Bogan refused to permit the schools to be used to

disseminate Thompson?s political propaganda.

The influence

of the underworld over the Thompson regime again was evident
when Bogan and several parent groups tried to get the police
to close down speakeasies that sprang up around the high
schools but received no support.

The influence of political

patronage was not new to the school system but what was
alarming was the growth in control of jobs by known criminal
elements. 2 6
24
2

Ibid.
p.227.
!bid., p.175.

~Ibid.,

26

The only change that took place with the

12
election of a democratic mayor in 1931 was that the
patronage army had become Cermak Democrats rather than
Thompson Republicans. 27
The next superintendent was William H. Johnson
<1935-1946).

Johnson/s career prior to Chicago included

government work in Washington, D.C., a college instructor,
dean of a junior college, and finally a teacher at Lane High
School.

While at Lane, he received his doctorate from the

University of Chicago in Educational Administration.

He

taught briefly at the Chicago Normal School unti 1 he passed
the principal/s examination.

He served as an elementary

principal in three schools prior to his appointment as an
assistant superintendent. 2 8

This appointment was made by

the Board of Education over the objections of Superintendent
Bogan who considered Johnson

~an

opportunist without much

concern for the children he taught.

112

<;>

Studies of the administration of the Chicago Public
Schools during this time period <1935-1946) generally refer
to the "McCahey-Johnson" administration because of the close
ties between the superintendent and the president of the
school board.

James B. McCahey was elected president of the

Board of Education in 1933 and served until May 1947.

Kip Sullivan, "Politics and Educational Policy: The Control
of the Chicago Public Schools during the Administration of
Mayor Anton J. Cermak" <unpublished Ed.D. dissertation,
Loyola University of Chicago, 1985), p.86.
28
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.224.
27

:291Qld.

13
During this administration, there were many charges that the
leadership of the Chicago public schools was subservient to
the partisan will of the city administration.

Specifically,

the McCahey-Johnson administration was charged with
personnel practices based upon political or personal
favoritism, the unethical administration and grading of the
principals/ examination of 1936-1937, the failure to restore
rapidly the salary cuts made during the depression of the
1930/s and the use of public office by Board members and
the superintendent for private financial gain. 30
During the McCahey-Johnson administration several civic
groups confronted the Board of Education for their unjust
practices.

One of the most vocal of these groups, that

eventually led to the resignations of McCahey and Johnson,
was the Citizens Schools Committee.

The committee was

founded in 1933 to protest a drastic cutback in school
programs which McCahey insisted was a result of the
depression.

The Citizens Schools Committee became a

watchdog group for the city schools and tried to
unsuccessfully influence the selection of Bogan/s successor.
The Citizens School Committee included members of other
groups such as the Woman/s City Club, the League of Women
Voters, the Parent Teacher Association, certain University

°Kay Hodes Kamin, "A History of the Hunt Administration of
the Chicago Public Schools, 1947-1953" Cunpubl ished Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of Education, University of
Chicago, 1970), p.3.
3

14
of Chicago faculty members, and Chicago public school
teachers. 31

The committee was fortunate to have as advisors

school Board Members Helen Hefferan and James Mullenbach as
well as University of Chicago Professor Charles E.
Merriam. 3 2

The Citizens Schools Committee continued to

monitor appointments, expenditures, and business activities
of the Board of Education and the superintendent and
strongly opposed William H. Johnson/s reappointment in 1940
and 1944. 3 3
Superintendent Johnson caused so much anguish among the
various teacher union groups that a movement began to unite
the separate bodies into one group.
new organization was formed.

On 28 October 1937 a

The four teacher unions

surrendered their charters and received a new charter from
the American Federation of Teachers as Local One.

The major

issues confronting the union were adequacy of funding for
the schools and the appointing of unqualified temporary
teachers while 800 qualified teachers waited for
appointments. 3 4

Lower level administrators and school

principals were also treated unfairly.

Many were

transferred or demoted for offering opinions different from
those of the superintendent or the school

board.

3

~

In 1943 Edward E. Keener, president of the Illinois
Ibid., p. 3.
Herrick, Joe.cit., p. 235.
33
Ibid., p. 237.
34
Ibid., p.246.
~Ibid., p.250.

31

32

3

15

State Teachers Association, urged the National Education
Association to investigate the activities of the Chicago
Board of Education and Superintendent Johnson.

The results

of the N.E.A. investigation suggested:
1) That the superintendent control all employees and
activities of the school system, not just instruction.
2> The Board of Examiners should be disbanded as it
exists presently, and a new Board created with a
person knowledgeable in school personnel problems.
3>The superintendent should not have the examining
system as his personal province, with the right to
disregard the examiners he appointed and control Jed if
he so chose. 4> Before any teacher or principal
demotions, he/she should be given a hearing and a
statement of the reasons for the action. 5> Teaching
positions should be opened to any qualified instructor,
not just graduates of the Normal Col Jege. 6) The
superintendent should provide channels of communication
so that teacher/s ideas could be given his careful
consideration. 3 6
The event that caused the overthrow of the
McCahey-Johnson administration was the threat from the North
Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools to
withdraw the accreditation of the city/s public high schools
unless specific reforms were made.

This denial of

accreditation would stigmatize the city/s public high
schools as being sub-standard and would make it difficult
for graduating seniors to be accepted into regularly
accredited colleges. 3 7

On 1 April 1946, Mayor Kelly

appointed a school advisory committee composed of the
presidents of area universities and asked them for their
recommendation to avoid the interdiction of the North
36
37

lbid., p.272.
Kamin, Joe.cit., p.4-5.

16
Central Association.

The committee/s recommendations,

announced on 18 June 1946, were difficult for the mayor to
accept.

It flatly stated that the superintendent and the

entire Board of Education should resign and a completely
new Board be selected on the advice of civic agencies. 3 8
Johnson and one board member resigned immediately and by
September three more board members had resigned, leaving six
vacancies on the Board.

Kelly had no real recourse but to

accept the recommendation of the committee and appoint an
advisory commission to screen Board

nominees.

3

~

The

mayoral e;ection of 1947 was won by Martin J. Kennelly who
had promised the Citizens Schools Committee that he would
reform school governance.
In late 1946 the school board began to search for a new
superintendent.

The Board found that many candidates were

refusing to be interviewed because the Board had retained
its direct management over a large part of the school
system.

The Board control led contracts as wel I as personnel

and budget making, excluding the superintendent from any
control in these areas. 4 0

The Heald committee was joined by

the Chicago Teachers Union, the Chicago Division of the
Illinois Department of Education, the Regional PTA, and the
Citizens School Committee in lobbying for legislation to

38

Herrick, Joe.cit., p.274.

39

.llli..Q.' p. 275.

40

Ibid.
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create the off ice of General Superintendent of Schools. 41
After much lobbying, a bill was passed that created the
office of General Superintendent but exempted the off ice of

Board Attorney from the control of the superintendent.

Once

the bill was signed by the governor, the Superintendent of
Schools in Kansas City, Herold C. Hunt, was chosen to
replace William Johnson.

Hunt accepted the appointment as

General Superintendent and assumed his off ice in August
1947. 4 2

Hunt was welcomed to his new superintendency like none
other before him or since.

The Citizens Schools Committee

Publication, Chicago Schools, praised Hunt/s appointment.
Former Committee President William C. Reavis of the
University of Chicago and its current President Dr. John A.
Lapp, wrote:
You have been summoned to heavy duty.
It is probable
that no educator in America ever faced problems more
intricate. All who know the difficulty of your task
wil 1 give sympathetic understanding to your efforts.
The Citizens Schools Committee and associated groups
will stand guard over the gains which have been made
and will be in readiness to support progressive
advances .... We pledge our cordial support in redeeming
Chicago/s schools and placing them in the forefront. 4 3
Hunt was given several welcoming receptions, including one
by the Citizens Schools Committee where he met
representatives from over one hundred organizations, several
Board of Education members, ten aldermen, and Mayor
4 1

I bi d . , p . 278 .

·~ 2 Ibid.
43

Ibid., p.279.
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Kennelly.

He spoke at a meeting of the union teachers at

Orchestra Hal 1 and met with the new Regional Parent Teachers
Association. 4 4

Hunt assumed his position but to

t~e

surprise of some was not vindictive toward Johnson/s staff.
Two of Johnson/s assistant superintendents were retained but
new faces did arrive on the scene.

The new Department of

Personnel was headed by Edward E. Keener, whose department
included both instructional staff and non-teaching civiri
service employees.

When George Cassell retired from his

position as assistant to the superintendent, his successor
was James F. Redmond. who had been on Hunt/s staff in Kansas
City.

4

~

Hunt took further steps to insure the integrity of

the principals/ examination which was to be administered in
November 1947.

Hunt hired the American Council of Education

to grade the written examinations and conduct oral
examinations.

The Board also extended the opportunity

to take teacher certification examinations and other
examinations to all citizens of the United States. 4 6

To

resolve problems in the purchasing department, Hunt
reorganized and placed it under the direction of Redmond.
Textbooks would now be selected by committees of principals
and teachers in each area and no book company could approach
a committee member individually. 4 7

lbid., p.280.
p.281.
46
lbid.
44
4
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Hunt stated that he wanted advisory councils so that
the public and teachers could participate in planning
improvements for the schools.

He wanted to establish

workshops for teachers and conferences with principals and
administrators.

In helping to develop a philosophy for the

public schools, Hunt identified nine functions of living
that should be reflected throughout the curriculum.

He

continually asked for public support to obtain social,
psychological, and health services for the school system. 48
Hunt/s public statements consistently stressed the basic
American philosophy of equality of educational opportunity.
Paul H. Douglas, later an U.S. Senator, noted in 1951 that
"there was a kinship between Ella Flagg Young and
Superintendent Hunt in the wideness of their vision of the
place of public education in a democratic society. 49
Hunt/s relationship with the teachers union was
generally good.

In 1948 Superintendent Hunt, Board

President Charles Whipple, and Union President John Fewkes
appeared before the city council to demand an increase in
the school

levy.

The council had no legal control over the

levy voted by the Board of Education but had refused to
approve the levy.

Confronted by the Superintendent, Board

President, and the Union, the council reluctantly approved
the
49
49

~0

levy.~ 0

Hunt and the union disagreed in two areas:

Ibid., p.283.
Ibid., p.285.
Ibid., p.291.
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salaries and the relationship between the superintendent and
teacher organizations.

Hunt;s attempt to revive the

Teachers; Council met with some opposition from the union.
When election for the counci Is were held, the majority of
members elected were active members of the teachers union.
The council served no real purpose not already met by the
union, but gave the superintendent a neutral stance among
the teacher organizations.
the council and it

In 1953 no election was held for

disappeared.~

1

The salary issue might

have been avoided if more money were available but it was
not.

A single salary schedule was introduced with

elementary teachers getting five-sixths of a high school
teacher/s salary because elementary teachers worked five
hours per day to the high school

teachers six hours.

The

union had its say on these two issues and was not
antagonistic toward Dr. Hunt.
on his second contract in

They congratulated him

1951.~ 2

Hunt announced in the

spring of 1953 that he was accepting the post of Eliot
Professor in the Harvard Graduate School of Education.

The

Chicago Teachers Union newspaper carried a front page
farewell and thank you to Hunt for his leadership and said
that his report card grades were A for effort, A for
accomplishment, and A for sincerity and fair

play.~ 3

Hunt/s unexpected resignation concerned the Citizens
~

1

Ibid.

~

2

Ibid.,

~ 3 Ibid.,

p.292.
p.299.
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Schools Committee.

In a telegram to the Board of Education,

the Committee urged that no one in the system be chosen to
replace him, unless Dr. James F. Redmond could be released
from his commitment to become superintendent of the New
Orleans schools.

It further urged that, if necessary, a

canvass of the entire country be made for Hunt/s
successor.~ 4

Redmond kept his word to the Orleans Parish

Board of Education and moved onto his first superintendency.
The nationwide search for a new superintendent resulted in
the selection of Dr. Benjamin Coppage Willis who was then
the Superintendent of Schools in Buffalo, New York.
administration of Dr.Willis

wi

The

11 be discussed later in this

dissertation.
As we have seen in our presentation of past
superintendencies, each superintendent faced problems, some
unique and some similar.

The administration of the public

schools in Chicago has been a challenge throughout our
city/s history.

It is the purpose of this dissertation to

discuss some of the major problems and their solutions that
faced James F. Redmond during his tenure as superintendent
from 1966-1975.
During an interview with Dr. Redmond, it was noted that
Herold Hunt was both a mentor and a personal friend.
Redmond considered Hunt a

mentor,~~

Since

I will use Hunt/s eight

p.300.
interview with Dr. James Redmond, Benton Harbor,
Michigan, 28 July 1989.
~ 4 Ibid.,

~~Personal
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functions of administrative responsibility of a school
administrator as an indication of Redmond/s ability to meet
his responsibilities in solving the problems discussed.
According to Hunt, these functions include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Cooperative development and direction of a program
that is custom-made for the community and its
children.
Organization of an administrative framework to
implement and facilitate the program.
Service as the adviser, as well as the executive
officer, of the Board of Education.
Democratic leadership of the activities of al 1
school personnel.
Observation of legal educational and administrative
requirements.
Eevelopment of working relations with homes and
other community agencies.
Adequate instructfon and guidance in the values and
practices of loyal American citizenship.
Regard to healthful, humanized and satisfying
living for pupils and teachers in the course of
school work.~
6

This study wil 1 discuss James F. Redmond/s approach to
the fol lowing challenges he met during his administration:
desegregation of the schools, decentralization of the school
system, collective bargaining with a recognized bargaining
unit, and the concept of dual enrollment or as it was known
in Chicago, "shared time."

It is a goal of this study to

provide a historical narrative of a previously unexplored
period of the Chicago Public Schools/ administrative
history.

It is hoped that this study wi 1 l provide readers

with information about possible solutions to problems that
occurred and in some cases are still occurring in urban

~ 6 Kamin,

Joe.cit., p.11.
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CHAPTER II
WILLIS LEAVES AND REDMOND RETURNS
In order to fully understand the atmosphere within the
school system that James F. Redmond encountered upon his
appointment as superintendent, we will discuss the volatile
situation which occurred during the last years of the Wil 1 is
administration.

One of the first problems that Redmond

faced was the need to end the poor relationship that had
developed between the African-American community and the
superintendency.

Redmond needed to respond to demands of

the African-American community and at the same time attempt
to convince the white community that integrated education
could work.

Redmond returned to Chicago with an image as

"the cone i 1 i a tor" . 1

Redmond, un 1 i ke his predecessor,

welcomed the input from community action groups on both
sides of an issue.
their views.

He would talk to the groups and solicit

By studying the different approaches to the

superintendency exhibited by Wi 1 lis and Redmond, we

~~n

gain

further insight into Redmond/s style of leadership and his
approaches to the four challenges chosen for discussion in
this study.
Dr. Benjamin Coppage Willis succeeded Harold Hunt after
a nationwide search.

Willis, who had been superintendent in

Ridgely Hunt, "Redmond the Conciliator," Chicago Tribune
Sunday Magazine, 13 September 1967, pp.8-19.
1
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Buffalo, New York, arrived to a warm welcome in September
1953.

In his first year Dr.Willis and the Teachers Union

worked out a new salary schedule that created a six-hour day
for all teachers, and salary increments for additional
degree work beyond a bachelor/s degree.

Willis attempted to

increase the number of seats and the number of teachers and
thereby reduce the average elementary class size. 2

Wil !is/

administration expanded services in vocational education,
programs for trainable mentally handicapped children and
socially maladjusted children, and recognized gifted
children as a group to be given special education.

Special

help was also given to children in low income areas through
after-school speech and reading clinics, and through
after-school remedial reading classes for some students. 3
Wil 1 is became known as "Ben the Builder'' because of the
great number of schools that were built during his
administration.

Wnek, in her study of the Willis

administration, credits Willis with building one hundred
thirty-two new schools, making eighty-one new additions, and
acquiring sixteen buildings. 4

Willis met his first

controversy in June 1955, when residents of the North
Lawndale area complained of badly overcrowded conditions in
their schools.

People of the area voiced the opinion that

Herrick, Joe.cit., p.308.
Jbid.
4
Cynthia A. Wnek, "Big Ben the Builder: School Construction
--1953-66" <Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago, 1988), p.236.
2

3
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preference was being shown to Hyde Park with new schools,
building additions, and new

teachers.~

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People <NAACP) and the Citizens Schools Committee became
vocal against Willis when he was offered his second
contract.

In January 1961 the Chicago Committee on Racial

Equality <CORE> released a statement sent to the II linois
School Problems Commission, asking thelr help in solving
problems that existed in Chicago.

CORE questioned half-day

sessions, maximum class size in elementary schools, bus
transport~tion,

the use of experienced teaching staff. and

inferior education and racial segregation in schools that
were predominantly Black. 6

In March 1961 the NAACP issued

a statement to both the Board of Education and Mayor Daley
that present board policies resulted in separate and unequal
schools for most Black pupils in the city.

They charged

that it was the responsibility of the school board to
equalize all schools, and they urged that school districting
be used to achieve integration and equal opportunities. 7

By

August, CORE and the NAACP had joined forces to demonstrate
their position.

In October the Chicago Urban League and

its executive director, Edwin C. Berry, issued a statement
regarding the "unequal education In Chicago's public

p.99.
Ibid., p.158.
Ibid., p.157.

~Ibid.,
6
7
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schools." 0

It now seemed that every Black organization was

opposed to Willis and the Board of Education.
In January 1962 the first mobile classroom units were
set up in Chicago.
White schools.

Units were assembled at both Black and

At first the units were acceptable, but by

May 1962 protests began to arise in regard to the use of
mobile units in certain sections of the

city.~

Protests

began to multiply and the units were referred to as "Willis
Wagons."

Although many teachers and children found the

units to be comfortable and by necessity class size was
limited to thirty, community groups like the Woodlawn
Organization refused to see anything good about the
classrooms.
On 22 October 1963 the Coordinating Council of
Community Organizations CCCCO), an umbrella organization of
seventeen civil rights groups under the leadership of Al
Raby, called for a boycott of the Chicago Public Schools.

10

Raby was a thirty-two year old teacher from the Hess Upper
Grade Center on the West side.

He was the CCCO delegate

from Teachers for Integrated Education.

He later gained

more prominence in the area of civil rights when he joined
the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in marches through
the Southwest side, Austin, and Cicero. 11

The boycott was

Ibid., p.178.
Ibid., p.171.
10
Ibid., p.191.
11
"Who is this man Raby?" Chicago Daily News, 6 June 1965.

9

9
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successful to the extent that forty-seven percent of

ceca

Chicago/s students were absent.

presented a list of

thirteen demands to the school board, first was a demand for
Wi 1 J is~ resignation.

12

ceca

sought the removal of Sterling

McMurrin and Lester Nelson from the Hauser Panel and
suggested they be replaced by Kenneth Clark who had
testified in the Brown v. Board of Education

case and Dan

Dodson who was director of the Center for Human 'Relations
,
and Community Studies at New York University.

They further

sought information about the racial make up of each school
and their achievement levels.

CCCO demanded that Robert

Havighurst be given complete control, rather than shared
with Wll lis, of the report he was conducting for the board.
Other demands cal Jed for changes in personnel policies and a
reconstitution of the board that would include appointment
of members who "were publicly on the record for overcoming
de facto segregation in Chicago."

13

In September 1961 the Board of Education authorized
the first survey of the public schools in thirty years.
Board member Fairfax Cone and his committee were to narrow
the focus of the survey and to choose a director.

Dr.

Willis was in full support of the need of a survey.

14

The

board searched for a director for over a year and a half and
Wnek, Joe.cit., p.191.
James Sullivan, "School Demands Listed", Chicago Tribune, 21
October 1963, p.1-2.
14
Larry Cuban, Urban School Chiefs Under Fire. <Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1976), p.21.
12

13
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was rejected by such well know educators as James Conant,
Herman B. Wells, and Francis Keppel.

In January 1963 Dean

Eldridge R. Mcswain of Northwestern University/s School of
Education agreed to lead the survey.

He later

withdrew.'~

On April 22 Cone announced that he had persuaded Professor
Robert J. Havighurst of the University of Chicago to head
the survey.

Havighurst took a leave from his duties at the

University to conduct the study.

He is the author of more

than three dozen books on the sociology of education and
particularly urban education.

He is noted for his study of

all the components that affect education in metropolitan
areas.

16

This appointment did not sit well with Willis.

He objected to Havighurst because he felt that this
indicated a switch in the Board/s policy of the neighborhood
school.

Willis did not like the fact that Havighurst had

supported integration and the creation of regional high
schools rather than district high schools. 1 7

In order to

pacify an irate Willis, Board President Claire Roddewig
appointed a troika of Willis, Havighurst, and Dean Alonzo
Grace of the University of Illinois, to oversee the survey.
It was not until 27 November 1963 that the Board formally
approved the areas to be surveyed and its $190,000.00
budget.

The vote was unanimous (8-0) with board member

p.23.
Robert J. Havighurst and Daniel U. Levine, Education in
Metropolitan Areas. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971),
1

~Ibid.,

16

p.x.
17

Cuban, Joe.cit., p.23.
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Adams, who also supported the survey, being unable to vote
due to an il lness.

16

A year later in November 1964 the

five hundred page report was released.

The report cal led

for action from the Board of Education in the face of its
current crisis.

Havighurst cal led upon schoolmen to take

"an active participation in making and practicing of pol icy
for social urban renewal."

19

Fifteen of the twenty-two

recommendations could be put into effect within months
through board action without any cost to the system.
Havighurst recommended that teachers should receive
additional in-service training and that specialists should
be available to faculties to help them adapt the curriculum
to the local school.

Additional resource and auxi 1 iary

staff members should be added so that all the services
needed at a school are available.

He also suggested the

expansion of programs to meet the special needs of the poor
and disabled.

The areas of vocational and adult education

needed to be upgraded and expanded.

Finally Havighurst

noted the need for a decentralization of the administration
of the schools into three regions, each with its own
curriculum specialist who could help local staffs adapt the
curriculum to meet their needs.

These regions could also be

organized in a way that would assist in a community-wide

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27
November 1963, Chicago, Il ., p.746.
19
Robert J. Havlghurst, The Public Schools of Chicago.
<Chicago: Chicago Board of Education, 1964), p.30.
16

31
policy of stable integration and community development. 20
Havlghurst considered three issues "most important":

one

involved different ways to further integration in the
elementary schools, a second involved improving education of
the poor, and the third was to reorganize administration so
that more decisions could be in the hands of principals and
teachers. 21

We shal I see later that most of Havighurst

recommendations are part of

Redmond~s

programs to

desegregate and to decentralize the schools.

They are two

of the four challenges discussed in this study.
The second survey, authorized by the Board on 28
August 1963, was originally known as the Five Man Panel
of Educators but later became known as the Hauser Report. 2 2
This report was chaired by Dr. Philip Hauser of the
University of Chicago.

The Board unanimously (9-0) approved

the budget of $50,000.00 to fund the new survey. 23

The

report was the outgrowth of a judge-negotiated out of court
settlement of the Webb v. Board of Education CCiv. No.
61C1569 D.C., N.D. II 1 .) reached in August 1963.

The suit

charged the Board of Education with the operation of a de
facto segregated school system. 24

The report discussed

Ibid., p.403-04.
Ibid.
22
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 August
1963, Chicago, Il ., p.332.
23
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September 1963, Chicago, Il ., p.432.
24
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the impact of segregation on the quality of education in the
Chicago schools.

The report summarized the court decisions

as to the responsibility of the Board on school segregation
caused by residential segregation and stated:
The neighborhood elementary school, which has served
this nation well historically, operates now to retard
the acculturation and integration of the in-migrant
Negro in Chicago and in metropolitan United States as a
whole.
Earlier in the century, the neighborhood school
actually helped to bring persons of diverse ethnicity
and culture together, because foreign immigration was
on a smaller and more gradual scale than in recent
in-migration of Negroes ... The public school must do
its share in breaking down the walls of segregation and
paving the way for the exercise of free choice on the
part of the Negro, as for all citizens, in respect to
his rife pursuits. 25
The report suggested methods to enhance the integration
of elementary and high schools.

Suggestions were made for

the integration of faculties of all schools, and a more
equitable distribution of experienced teachers.

Other

suggestions included in-service training and further
educational opportunities for teachers so that they could
better understand the students with whom they were
working. 26

The recommendations of this panel were similar

to those of the Havighurst study but were limited to the
integration of the schools and improvement of in-service
for teachers.

Redmond/s response to the challenge of

desegregation of the schools made many of the same

2

~Report of the Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public
Schuols.
<Chicago: Chicago Board of Education, 31 March
1967), p.12.
~Herrick,
lee cit., p.325.
2
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recommendations that were raised by these reports.
The summer of 1963 brought a series of sit-ins and
protests at the Board headquarters as wel I as local high
schools.

After the Board approved boundary changes on 7

July 1963, members of CORE began a ten day sit-in that
ended with the arrest of protestors.

Two weeks later CORE

began to picket construction sites where mobile classrooms
were to be installed.

Picketing at school sites began to

turn ugly when protesters began to throw rocks at workers
and at pol ice officers.
arrested.

More than 170 pickets were

Later in the month protestors began to march

around the homes of Board President Roddewig, Mayor Daley,
and Superintendent

Willis.?~

In September 1963 Superintendent Willis resigned over
a conflict with the Board over duties of his office and the
Board.

Many groups rejoiced over his resignation but the

more influential groups, businessmen, home-owners
associations, teacher and principal groups, and the state
chairman of the North Central Association demanded that the
Board not accept his resignation. 29

The Board refused to

accept his resignation and at its/ October meeting
established a committee to negotiate with the
superintendent.

This committee met with the superintendent

and set up ground rules for future board-administration

27

Cuban, Joe.cit., p.15.
Joe.cit., p.19.

~scuban,

\
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relationships. 29

In April 1964 a three page resolution was

introduced and passed by the Board that stated the
principles and procedures for cooperation between the Board
and the General Superintendent.

The resolution defined the

role of the Board as policy maker and the superintendent as
the implementor or executor of Board policy.

The resolution

reminded the Board that they should refrain from intruding
into the administration of policy by the superintendent.,
The Board also reaffirmed its legal responsibility to reject
or accept any recommendations of the superintendent and the
right to revise its policies, rules and regulations to meet
changing conditions. 3 0
Willis/s contract came up for renewal
1965.

in the spring of

Community groups led by the CCCO marched on city hal 1

urging Mayor Daley to pressure the Board not to re-hire
Willis.

However, the Board, after a heated debate, voted

7-4 to renew Willis/s contract at a meeting on May 28.

The

Board agreed on the package only with an oral stipulation
that Willis would retire at age 65, a year later. 31

Board

President Frank Whiston shortly thereafter commented to the
press that the Board had asked seven college presidents to
serve as a screening committee to produce a list of
candidates for the superintendency and that such a list

z·;>Ibid.

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 23 April
1964, Chicago, Il ., p.2212-14.
31 lQl.Q. '
p. 28.

30
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should be ready by October 1965. 32

These comments created

much concern for the American Association of School
Administrators CAASA) who responded with a letter of protest
to Whiston and the Board.

The AASA also objected to

the hiring of a successor to Will is as his executive
assistant until
superintendent.

the successor could legally be hired as
The association noted that "these actions

would be a serious breach of ethical procedures for a board
in its dealing with its chief administrator."

The

association urged the Board to reconsider its actions at its
next meeting and defer such action to a more appropriate
time. 3 3

Beginning in May 1966 the Chicago newspapers began

to speculate on a successor for Willis.

The Chicago Tribune

on 11 May 1966 reported that Redmond was the choice of a
six-man Board committee.

The article mentions that a

committee of three educators, John J. Corson of Princeton,
Roa Id F. Campbell of the University of Chicago, and Herold
C. Hunt of Harvard, had screened candidates and had arrived
at a list of six finalists.

The list included:

Sidney P.

Marland of Pittsburgh, Gregory C. Coffin of Darien,
Connecticut, Robert Jenkins of Pasadena, Paul W. Briggs of

Letter from Forrest E. Conner, Executive Secretary of the
American Association of School Administrators to Frank M.
Whiston, President, Chicago Board of Education, 21 June
1965. From personal collection of David Heffernan,
Assistant Superintendent of Schools.
33
lbid.
32
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Cleveland, and John B. Davis of Worcester. 3 4

Editorials

emphasized the fact that James Redmond was a public
relations expert. and stated that:
some think it is more important for the superintendent
to be a public relations expert that a gifted educator.
Certainly a superintendent needs the patience to suffer
fools gladly, along with the courage to oppose them
when he thinks they are wrong.
This is an area in
which Supt. Willis faltered ... ~
3

At the meeting of the Board of Education in May 1966, Dr.
Willis announced his resignation effective 31 August 1966.
At this same meeting the Board voted to ask James F. Redmond
to be his successor. 3 6

REDMOND - A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
James Francis Redmond was born on 13 September 1915 in
Kansas City, Missouri to James Timothy and Gertrude Shwarz
Redmond.

He was educated in the Kansas City Public Schools.

His first career choice was that of law but due to the
financial

burdens on his family resulting from the Great

Depression he was unable to pursue law school.

His

educational pursuits were then channe 1 ed in to teach er__
training, a field for which he was able to receive financial
assistance in the form of a Federal Education Relief Act
grant.

34

The grant covered the entire cost of his tuition

"Redmond Selected to Succeed Willis," Chicago Tribune, 11
May 1966, p.1.
~"Criteria for New Superintendent," Editorial, Chicago
Tribune, 11 May 1966.
86
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.338.
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which amounted to $18.75 per quarter.

He studied at the

Kansas City Teachers College for two years and in 1935
accepted an appointment as an elementary school teacher.

In

the previous three Teachers College classes no teaching
appointments were made so he considered himself fortunate to
get a position.

He continued his studies for the Bachelor

of Arts degree in the evenings and on Saturdays and was
awarded his B.A. from Teachers College in 1937.

His

teaching experiences in the public school system of Kansas
City and his observation that there were opportunities for
men in elementary school administration helped persuade him
to change his career plan to that of public school
administration. 3 7
On 3 June 1939 Redmond married Mary Edith Adams.
Redmonds have one child, James Leonard.

The

The Redmonds

decided that their child would be educated in the public
schools wherever Dr. Redmond served, rather than in Catholic
or private schools.

The Redmonds are extremely proud of

their son who received an appointment to the United States
Military Academy at West Point.

James Leonard is now an

executive with Commonwealth Edison.se
Early in their marriage the Redmonds agreed that James
would pursue his graduate degrees as soon as possible.
Redmond attended Teachers College of Columbia University in
Personal interview with Dr. James F. Redmond, St. Joseph,
Michigan, 28 July 1989.
36
Ibid.
37
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New York during the summers of 1939-1940.

He received a

Master of Arts degree from Columbia in 1940.

The Redmonds

returned to Kansas City where Redmond left his elementary
teaching position to assume the duties of Assistant to the
Superintendent.

This first position in school

administration was the result of his recommendation by the
Superintendent of the Kansas City Schools, Herold Hunt.
Hunt had known Redmond since his interview for his first
teaching position.

Hunt was both a mentor and a close

friend of Redmond and encouraged his pursuit of further
education,.-=-.;The Redmonds had discussed pursuit of a doctorate and
decided that it would be achieved before Redmond reached
thirty.

However, this plan was interrupted by World War II.

Redmond served four years in the United States Army and rose
to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Adjutant General/s
Department at Camp Wolters, Texas.

His duties included

supervision of the testing of soldiers, the assignment of
these men to specialty training based on their tested
abilities, and the assignment of these men according to unit
needs. 40
After the war Redmond returned to his post as Assistant
to the Superintendent in Kansas City.

He continued in this

position for only six months before taking a leave to return

39

to Columbia University to pursue his doctorate.

During this

stay in New York, Redmond was chosen to serve his only
tenure as a school building principal.

In 1947 Redmond

served as the director of the experimental/demonstration
school, Horace Mann Lincoln School, on Columbia University/s
campus.

This assignment had added challenges because

Columbia had decided that the school would close after
Redmond/s term as director.

Columbia had decided that they

would become involved with school districts throughout the
country rather than just in their own experimental school.
Redmond/s job was to insure that the closing of the school
would be done in a manner that would be least disruptive
to the students and faculty, and assist the students and
faculty in finding future placement.

Upon completion of the

school year Redmond was awarded his Doctor of Education
<Ed.D.) degree from Columbia University in 1948. 41
Redmond/s dissertation was entitled "Administrative Factors
Affecting Teacher Strikes", a topic which he would learn
even more about during his tenure as Superintendent in
Chicago.

His dissertation committee included Daniel R.

Davies, Willard S. Elsbree, John K. Morton, and the renowned
George S. Counts.

His study focused on teacher strikes in

three East Coast towns and the administrative factors that

40

Jed to a strike rather that an agreement. 42

FIRST TENURE IN CHICAGO
The relationship that existed between Redmond and
Herold Hunt came into play again in 1948.

Hunt had accepted

the superintendency in Chicago in 1947 and had made an
agreement with the Chicago Board of Education that he would
be able to hire Redmond as an Assistant to the

Superintendent when Redmond had completed his doctoral
studies.

Hunt therefore enabled Redmond to move around the

building principalship (except for his year at Horace Mann
Lincoln> to the level of superintendent.

As Assistant to

the General Superintendent Redmond administered the Bureau
of School Clerks, Bureau of Lunchrooms, and the Public
Relations Department.

Later when problems arose in the

Purchasing Department, Hunt appointed Redmond as Director of
Purchasing and asked him to put things in order in the
department.

Redmond returned to school at Northwestern

University to learn more about purchasing.

As a result of

his work at Northwestern, Redmond was able to meet and hire
competent assistants who helped reorganize the purchasing
department.

Redmond continued to be a confidant to Hunt

during his four years as Director of Purchasing.

It

was from this position that Redmond later moved to the
James F. Redmond, "Administrative Factors Affecting Teacher
Strikes" (Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Teachers College,
Columbia University, 1947>, p.1.
42

41
superintendency of New Orleans in 1953. 4 3

THE FIRST SUPERINTENDENCY - A BAPTISM OF FIRE
Although there is much speculation that Redmond could
have stayed in Chicago and become superintendent upon Hunt/s
resignation, Redmond remained a man who kept his word.
Prior to Hunt/s decision to accept a position at Harvard,
Redmond had accepted a contract offer from the Orleans
Parish School Board.

The parish boundaries are identical

the boundaries of the city of New Orleans.
must be made, however,

to

The distinction

that the parish school board is

responsible directly to the state, not to the city.
Upon his arrival

in New Orleans, Redmond was faced with

the problem shared with many other superintendents at the
time.

As a result of Brown v. Board of Education 347 US 483

(1954) the United States Supreme Court ordered school
districts to end racially segregated schools and nullified
the doctrine of separate but equal.

The local case filed in

the United States District Court in New Orleans was known as
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board 138 F Supp. 337, 342
(1956). 4 4

Of the many decisions in the case the first was

delivered on 15 February 1956 by Judge J. Skelly Wright of
the Federal District Court in New Orleans.

43

Among other

Ibid.
Morton Inger, Politics and Reality in an American City - The
New Orleans School Crisis of 1960 CNew York:
Center for
Urban Education, 1969), p.17.
44
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things his decision enjoined the Orleans school board from
requiring and permitting racial segregation and directed the
board to "make arrangements for admission of children ... on
a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate
speed ...

4

~

Judge Wright used as a reference both Supreme

Court Brown cases, however, as we wi 1 l

learn,

the Orleans

Parish School Board seemed to have a very liberal
interpretation of the term "with all deliberate speed."
Inger tells us about a New Orleans in the 1950/s that
was expected to be a
south.

leader in peaceful

desegregation in the

"Although there were inequalities, whites and

Negroes had lived in apparent harmony for decades, and New
Orleans had perhaps less residential segregation that any
large American city, North or South."

46

The city had

peacefully added African Americans to its police force, and
had desegregated its public libraries, buses, and
recreational

facilities.

An article in the New Republic in

February 1959 was perhaps the first report to bring the
surprising news that no leadership for peaceful school
desegregation had yet emerged in New Orleans.

.-

There is no organized effort - as in Atlanta - to
encourage people to think in advance of what the loss
of the public schools would mean to them and to make
their views known ... There is no organized defense of
the public schools by Protestant clergy or professional
men and women, and most Negro leaders in New Orleans
seem more interested in their personal political
organizations than in matters of principle.
The press
45
4

Ibid.
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- an anemic force in New Orleans life - gives its
readers no hint that there is cause for concern
about the future of the schools. 4 7
One of the largest groups of citizens in New Orleans
was the Catholic Church.

Nearly two-thirds of the

population of the city was Roman Catholic.

The diocese had

the reputation of being liberal on race relations and at one
time the diocese seemed to be leading the way for acceptance
of desegregation.

The church leader, Archbishop Joseph

Francis Rummel, had earlier ordered the "white" and
"colored" signs removed from church pews.
following Judge Wright/s ruling,
a pastoral

On the Sunday

the Archbishop issued

letter stating that racial segregation was

"morally wrong and sinful because it is a denial of the
unity and solidarity of the human race as conceived by God
in the creation of man in Adam and Eve." 4 8
Support for Archbishop Rummel waned after his pastoral
letter and some priests refused to read it to their
congregations.

Five months later Rummel announced that he

had planned to have the parochial

schools integrated on a

grade by grade basis beginning in September 1957.
Contributions to the church dee] ined seriously and pledges
to capital projects were not honored.

47

When September 1957

Helen Fuller, "New Orleans Knows Better", New Reoubl ic,
16 February 1959, p.16. cited by Morton Inger, Politics and
Reality in an American City - The New Orleans School Crisis
of 1960, <New York:
Center for Urban Education, 1969), p.9.
48
Newsweek, 5 March 1965, p.51, cited in Morton Inger,
J oc . c i t . , p . 22 .
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arrived Rummel, who had not referred to his school
desegregation statement since it was made, was unable to
desegregate the parochial schools.

In July 1959, Rummel

announced that the parochial schools would integrate at the
earliest possible opportunity and definitely no later than
the public schools. 4 9
Redmond refers to cooperation between the Catholic
school system,

its Superintendent/Monsignor Henry Bezou,

and the public schools.

The archdiocese had reached an

agreement with Redmond and the Orleans Parish School Board
to

desegr~gate

both systems at the same time.

Unfortunately, before it could take place, the archbishop
became ii l and the plan never came to fruition.

Without

Archbishop Rummel/s leadership, the group of priests who
were making decisions for the diocese decided that they
would postpone the desegregation of the Catholic schools
until after the public schools had successfully integrated
their

schools.~ 0

The leaders of New Orleans made no attempt to prepare
the community for desegregation of the schools.

They al I

believed that their schools would not be forced to
desegregate, even after the federal courts ordered it.

It

must be remembered that New Orleans is not a small
Bible-belt town but is the nations/s second largest port,

49
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the home of liberal French Catholicism, and one of America/s
most cosmopolitan cities.
In 1959 a group cal led Save Our Schools, Inc. <SOS)
was organized.

The group was composed of social workers,

Tulane professors and their wives, some lawyers and
businessmen, many Jews, and pro-integration Catholics.

None

of the members of SOS were in the elite; they were New
Orleans liberals and could not attract the moderates of the
city.

SOS emphasized open schools rather than integrated

schools. 51

The city/s elite, the influential bankers,

attorneys, and businessmen did not become involved in the
decisions that led to the desegregation of the schools.
They remained silent through the days of violence and
boycotts.

The elite eventually spoke out for a peaceful

solution, but only after the city/s reputation had been
tarnished.
In an interview, Superintendent Redmond recalled his
view of the situation in New Orleans.

Like other southern

cities, the neighborhoods of New Orleans were not
segregated.

African-Americans and whites lived in the same

area and even on the same block.

The segregated

neighborhoods that existed in Chicago did not exist there,
with the exception of the lakefront area which was developed
in the post-World War II era.

These housing patterns did

not have an effect on the schools, however, because by law
51

Inger,

Joe.cit., p.25.
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the races could not attend school together.
further to your school
a different racial

You may walk

than your neighbor because he was of

group.~ 2

Redmond felt and his feelings are generally supported
in the literature that he was hired by "a reform board. a
very progressive board."

He felt an advantage in that he

and the entire Board were within five years of age of each
other. and this added to their cohesiveness. 5 3

'He felt that

even though the board was elected by popular vote. they did
not necessarily represent the popular attitude on the
race issue.

Redmond stated that the board. their attorney.

Sam Rosenberg. and he decided as a group that it was
necessary to fight the court order to desegregate in every
legal way possible. and push every legal angle of law that
was available and honorable.
years 1956 to 1959.

These actions spanned the

The case was appealed to the United

States Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court both of which
affirmed Judge Wright/s decision In district court.

On

15 July 1959 Judge Wright ordered the board to file a
desegregation plan by 1 March 1960.
date to 16 May 1960 at the board/s

He later changed the
request.~~

Prior to the

next court appearance the board surveyed the parents of
children in the schools and asked whether they would rather
see the schools open with some Integration or not open at
52

Redmond Interview.

Joe.cit.

~ 3 Ibid.

~ 4 Inger.

Joe.cit .• p.18.
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all.

To the board's amazement over 80 percent of the white

parents responded that they would rather see the schools not
open at al 1.

On 16 May, the board told the court that it

had no desegregation plan, and Judge Wright responded by
supplying his own plan, ordering the desegregation of all
first grades at the opening of school

in September. 5 5

On

17 August 1960, additional support for desegregation was
gained when a suit <Wi 1 liams v. Davis 187 F. Supp. 42
<1960)) was filed by thirty white parents asking the court
to issue and injunction restraining the governor and other
state officials from obeying the state court injunction and
the state statutes with respect to segregation.

It is

speculated that the four moderates on the school board gave
encouragement and support in the fil lng of this suit.

There

ls even some evidence that Board Attorney Rosenberg and
Judge Wright may have been instrumental
of the

sult.~ 6

in the preparation

On 31 August 1960 the four moderates on the

board asked Judge Wright for another delay to al low the
staff time to prepare a desegregation plan.

He granted

their request and set 14 November as the day desegregation
would

start.~ 7

Redmond then prepared a plan and presented it to Judge
Wright.

Wright approved the plan and ordered Redmond and

the Board to carry out the plan.
55
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The plan developed was

48

designed to place some African-American children in white
schools.

The board refused to consider such political

considerations as:

who would support what plan, where would

support most likely arise, and where would the opposition
be.~ 9

The board established a four-step administrative

procedure for considering applications for permits to
transfer.

The board wanted a "scientific selection" that

would be completely objective, thus freeing the board and
the superintendent from personal responsibility.

The first

step was a review of the application by four assistant
superintendents.

The second step was the review of the

applicants scholastic aptitude and Intelligence by
psychologists and the acting director of guidance and
testing.

The next review was performed by the assistant

superintendent for instruction and other staff members who
tried to consider what effect the new program would have on
the transferred child and what effect the transferred child
would have on the existing program.

The final review was

held by the superintendent, his first assistant, the medical
director, and other staff members.

Their job was to

evaluate the information previously collected and present
the results to the board who would direct the superintendent
to issue or not to issue a transfer to the

student.~~

Redmond refers to the process as "not scientific, the

p.34.
Q!bid., p.36.

~ 9 Ibid.,
5
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screening was based on hunches.

This kid can make it.

This

kid has what it takes to go into a rough situation and

make

1 t • .,sn

On 26 September 1960 the board formally announced the
integration plan described above.

In the weeks after the

plan was announced, a total of 137 African-Americans applied
for permits to transfer."'· 1

While awaiting the transfer

applications members of the board actively sought out
support for the integration plan from the community/s elite.
Although it appeared that some headway was being made, some
of the elite said that they could support only a plan that
kept first graders separated by sex and that the toilets
would remain segregated.

Board attorneys felt that Judge

Skelly Wright would accept separation by sex because it had
a board policy at one time but there was little doubt that
segregated washrooms would be permitted. 62
At the same meeting the board also established as a
guideline that any student whose application was accepted
must have test scores equal
school

to or above the median of the

to which they are applying. 63

This decision made it

more difficult to place the transferring students because it
was necessary to find a school

that had first grade median

scores low enough to admit the African-American children .

Redmond interview, Joe.cit.
Inger , 1oc . c i t . , p . 36 .
62
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People within and outside of the board tried to convince
Redmond and the board members, as a first step, to find
schools where white parents and their children would be more
accepting of the African-American children and then find
students who could fit

in those schools.

Redmond and the

board rejected this suggestion because they felt that
selection would then be too subjective.

The result of the

board using its "scientific" method was that it chose to
desegregate the schools that gave every appearance of being
the worst possible ones. 6 4
Only.two schools were chosen to participate in the
p;an, William Frantz and McDonogh No.19, both in the same
neighborhood.
city,

Located in the most neglected part of the

the ninth ward,

the proximity of the two schools to

each other made it relatively easy for segregationists to
cause disturbances at each school.

The ninth ward bordered

St. Bernard's Parish, the county control Jed by
archsegregationlst, Leander Perez, from which it was easy
to send pickets to protest at the school

sites.

6

~

On 27 October the school board announced that it had
granted transfer permits to five African-American pupils,
all girls. 0 0

The board refused to Identify either the

children or the schools into which they would transfer.
This action convinced Governor Jimmy Davis that the Orleans
04
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Parish Board was going to follow through on its
desegregation plan and he cal led for a special session of
the legislature to discuss the state's next move. 6 7

The

special session was used by Governor Davis to try to stop
the school board from complying with the federal
to desegregate.

court order

The governors' allies in the state

legislature voted to suspend the rules and introduced
twenty-seven bills that cal Jed for various state actions
that would happen if a local school board tried to integrate
their schools in opposition to state law.

The entire

legislative package depended on Bil 1 Number Two, which
purported to interpose the sovereignty of the state between
the federal

government and the school board. 6 8

On 14 November 1960 four frightened African-American
girls Cthe fifth had withdrawn her application), three at
McDonogh No. 19 and one at Frantz, became the first of their
race in the Deep South since the end of Reconstruction to
attend classes with whites below the college level . 6 9

Since

the board's plan had been kept a secret there were no
demonstrations upon the students arrival at school.
However, as word spread in the morning, many white parents
came to school and took their children home.

By the end of

the week every white child had withdrawn from McDonogh No.
19, and all but two white children withdrew from Frantz.
67
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White parents boycotted class at McDonogh 19, for the entire
school year, except for a short period of time in January
1961.

The parent who broke the boycott was fired from his

job at Walgreen;s and was forced to leave town because no
one would hire him.

Two families at Frantz kept their

children in school and later other families also returned
their children to school and the boycott was never total . 70

.

The state legislature again met for a special sessjon
on 15 November 1960.

This time the lawmakers declared

illegal all acts of the "now defunct New Orleans School
Board" and warned all banks and businesses not to do
business with or honor checks of or make loans to the "old"
school board. 71

Other actions by the legislature included:

directing the transfer of the Orleans School Board funds to
the legislature; provision for education expense grants to
parents of children attending non-prof it, nonsectarian,
non-public schools; and the firing of Superintendent Redmond
and board attorney Rosenberg.
school system.

72

Turmoil continued in the

On 22 November Redmond announced that the

school board would be unable to meet its teacher payroll
because it was unable to secure a

loan.

The next day the

legislature authorized pay for all Orleans Parish school
employees except for the administrative staff and the
teachers at the desegregated schools.
701QJ_Q.
7

1
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The boycott became more intense as time went on.

The

number of white children attending class at Frantz had
increased to twenty-three by early December but a new wave
of threats, stonings, and other harassments reduced the
number of white students to eight.

Eventual Jy, federal

marshals were brought in to transport the white children who
wanted to attend FrantZ. 7 8

The continued boycott hurt

businessmen and reports around the country noted that New
Orleans was feeling financial repercussions.

Tourism was

definitely down and even the Mardl Gras was threatened.
Finally on 14 December a group of 105 business and
professional men ran a three-quarter page ad in the
newspaper appealing for an end to threats and street
demonstrations and for support for the school board. 74
The financial crisis continued and the teachers were
again victim to the legislature's attempts to defeat
integration.

The legislature adjourned on 22 December

without releasing funds for the salaries of the teachers and
other employees of the Orleans school system.

Some of the

funds were released in January but again the administrative
staff and teachers at the desegregated schools were not
included.

7

~

The turning point in the attempt to gain public support
for the school board came in January 1961.
Ibid., p.57.
Ibid., p.62.
75
Ibid., p.63.
78
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Several women/s
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groups sponsored a testimonial dinner to honor the four
board members and Superintendent Redmond.

On 30 January

1961 a dinner was attended by 1650 citizens who came to pay

tribute to the board members and superintendent for the
sacrifices they had made to preserve public education in New
Orleans. 7 6

At the dinner, the attendees were reminded of

the need for them to provide public displays of confidence
and support.

From that point on, although the boycott

continued and financial problems sti 11 existed, the Board
and the superintendent knew that their problems would become
more manageable.

Public support began to grow and the

crisis was on a downswing.
advertisement

On 31 August, a full-page

listing 315 civic and business leaders ran in

the Times-Picayune that called for a peaceful desegregation
of the schools.

The ad demanded that "public education ...

must be preserved; ... and the dignity of our city
upheld .... " 7 7

In addition to the public statements, there

were private assurances to the school board of the support
of some of the top civic leaders.
Redmond recalled the period of time after the
announcement of the plans to desegregate as a time "when the
legislature and part of the population of New Orleans lost
their rationallty."
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During this period of time Redmond

notes that he was fired fourteen times by the state
76
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legislature only to be reinstated by Judge Skelly Wright.
The faculties of the two schools that were the object of the
boycott remained at their schools and "they developed
in-service type programs,

instructors came in to work with

them, we kept those schools going." 7 9

Redmond noted that

70-80 percent of his budget revenues came from the state,
so that when the state began to withhold funds from the
schools,

it had a great impact on the operations of the

system.

Redmond was gratified that during this time of

financial

crisis some groups offered assistance.

"One union

official from Chicago offered to put four mil lion dollars in
the bank so that we could meet our payrol 1.

Another rich

individual offered a million dollars for the same
purpose•

II SO

Redmond remembered the New Orleans experience and
said:
we didn/t teach school that year, we were Jiving the
desegregation problem.
We did desegregate the schools.
We did have problems but we didn/t have soldiers in the
street. We didn/t have riots, we did have
demonstrations.
Hindsight tel ls us that the schools
selected were in the worst section of town.
Hindsight
tells you that you should not have put it on a
voluntary basis. You should have selected parts of
town you knew would have accepted it better.
OK, but
that would have been maneuvering but at least at that
point in time we were purist.
It probably would be
better in a more liberal part of town. We probably
could have swung it with Jess problems. 91
Redmond related that as the school year was ending his
79
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contract was expiring.

The board was willing to offer him

another contract but he was also offered a contract by a
consulting firm at a smal I increase in salary.

Redmond

stated:
I was thinking, it sounds altruistic, but I was
thinking it/s time for me to move out and take a lot of
the heat and hate away with me. As I look back now,
sure, Bishop Cody had lowered the boom on the White
Citizens Council Catholics. A good number of the
people of New Orleans came to their senses and things
settled down real quick.
I don/t think my moving did
much good.
I think that i f I would have stayed, it
would have been the same. New Orleans is not redneck
or reactionary, it has a liberal undertone to it. 8 2
A MOVE TO THE EAST COAST
•

After leaving New Orleans,
New York.

Red~ond

moved his family to

He was hired as director of school administration

services by Boaz, Al Jen, and Hami !ton Management
Consultants.

He stayed in this position for two years but

left because he did not enjoy the sel I ing aspects of the job
that a consultant must do in order to get work.

He enjoyed

the consulting because he was able to work with smart people
who wanted to study their schools to be sure that they were
functioning to the best of their ability.

In addition to

the selling, Redmond did not appreciate the travel that was
necessary in the business.e?Redmond left the consultant business in 1963 to return
to the superintendency of the Syosset Public Schools on Long
Island, New York.

Redmond refers to the Syosset

57
superintendency as "probably an ideal situation.

There were

10,000 students, you prepared your budget and it was
accepted by popular vote after a New England-type town
meeting.

"The Syosset area developed mostly after World

1184

War II and was settled by young families who did not mind
paying higher property taxes to provide a good education for
their children.

The per pupil expenditures in Syosset were

three times as much as in New Orleans and twice as much as
in

Chicago.

118

~

The district paid its teachers well.

There

were ten elementary schools, two junior highs and one senior
high school

in the district.

Redmond jokingly referred to

it as "a job you could do from ten to four.

1186

Redmond

enjoyed his stay in Syosset but left to return to Chicago in
August 1966.

"I'd had other offers while ln Syosset,

it was

ideal, but Chicago was something special so I returned." 8 7
The president of the Chicago Board of Education, Frank
Whiston, called and he arranged to talk about the
superintendency in Chicago.

Redmond recalled:

I'd known Frank because he was on the board for about
a year before I left for New Orleans.
I met with a
board committee at a hotel for an Informal meeting.
I
was not offered the job at that time but I returned to
Syosset with a very good feeling about it.
Months went
by and I did not hear anything until I was invited back
to talk things over and I was offered the job.
I came
aboard in a very favorable sltuatlon.
The vote was
10-1 to offer me a contract.
The only "no" vote was
Mrs. Green who later told me she voted "no" only
84
8
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because she had never met me before the voting took
place. 8 8
We have reviewed the experiences that helped make James
F. Redmond the choice of the Chicago Board of Education to
succeed Benjamin Willis.

We have followed the development

of his career from its' beginnings in Kansas City, through
his big city experience in Chicago and New Orleans, his
"ideal situation" in Syosset, and to his return ,to Chicago.
We have gained an understanding of the situation that
existed in Chicago's schools in 1966 and the need for a
superintendent that could relieve the antagonism that
existed in many communities.

Redmond projected a fatherly

image and had a calm demeanor about him.

His previous

tenure in Chicago was a definite advantage to his
superintendency because he knew many of the personnel under
his supervision and was familiar with the decision makers in
the city.

He was able to begin assessing the challenges

that existed and offer solutions to them.

Upon his arrival

in Chicago in October 1966 Redmond faced the long standing

challenges of desegregation of the schools and a response to
the demands of the civil rights movement.

He would also

need to carry out a decentralization plan developed by the
Booz. Al Jen. and Hamilton Report.

Later, he would decide

the fate of a shared time program with parochial schools.
However, a more immediate challenge quickly became his first

59

priority, he was to be the first superintendent to negotiate
a collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Teachers
Union.
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CHAPTER III

A FIRST: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WITH THE TEACHERS UNION
James F. Redmond began his first term as General
Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools on 3 October
1966.

He was not availed the

~honeymoon

period'' that many

administrators meet when they enter a new position.

Instead

he walked into a situation that would effect
employer-employee relationships within the school system for
years to come.

Although the challenge of finding a solution

to the problem of desegregating the schools was a priority,
it had to be deferred until RedTiond and the school board
could negotiate the first collective bargaining agreement
with the Chicago Teachers Union as the sole bargainer for
Chicago/s teachers.

The only action that the Board had

taken was to appoint a negotiating committee.

Red~ond

offered to work with this committee and spent many days
doing so.

Redmond realized that teachers would be demanding

a salary increase which he believed they deserved.

His job,

however, was not only to administer the educational program
and create a good working environment for the teachers, he
had to be fiscal Jy responsible to the Board and the
taxpayers and not spend more money than the Board had.
In this chapter we shall discuss the contract
negotiations which took place during the Redmond
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administration.

We shall discuss contracts negotiated for

the years 1967 through 1974.

The reader will

learn about

problems that arose in early negotiations with an emphasis
on the negotiations for the 1969 contract.

This particular

contract created several scenarios that were not encountered
before,

including the first strike.

We shall discuss the

four phases of the negotiations examined by Francis M.
Landwerermeyer, S.J.,
Chicago Style: A

1937-72".

1

in his dissertation "Teacher Unionism,

Histo~y

of the Chicago Teachers Union,

We conclude with summaries of the negotiations

through the 1974 contract.
But first,

in order to get a better understanding of

the development of the Teachers Union to the point that they
were able to win an election to become sole bargaining agent
for the teachers, we shall

take a brief look at the history

of teacher organizations in Chicago.

TEACHERS ORGANIZE TO SEEK COMMON GOALS
The first teachers to organize in Chicago were the
elementary school

teachers, mostly women, who met to take

action against their common grievances:

low salaries, no

tenure protection, and a pension system that was falling
apart.

A small group of teachers met on 16 March 1897 at

the Central Music Hall and began an organization that became
Francis M. Landwerermeyer, S. J., "Teacher Unionism, Chicago
Style: A History of the Chicago Teachers Union, 1937-72."
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978)
1
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known as the Chicago Teachers Federation CCTF).

By December

1897 the CTF had grown to a membership of 2,567, more than
one-half of all the teachers in the public schools.

?

In

its/ earlier years, the CTF had as its major objective the
securing of a stable pension fund.

Under the leadership of

Catharine Goggin and Margaret Haley, attempts to secure the
help of the Board of Education in lobbying for better
pensions were considered successful.

In 1907, I l l in G is

enacted legislation that contained a compulsory pension
contribution clause and established a pension board of
trustees .• The board of trustees consisted of two school
board members, the board secretary as an ex officio mewber,
and six elected teacher representatives.

3

The desire to increase the salary of the average school
teacher Jed to the next crusade for Goggin and Haley.

Haley

had overheard a conversation concerning the fact that
certain large corporations had failed to pay property
taxes. 4

Since the property tax was the basis for funding

the schools, any additional funds col Jected could possibly
be used for pay increases.

Haley sought and received the

support of Board President Graham H. Harris to pursue the
collection of these taxes through the courts.

The dogged

persistence of the CTF and their attorneys finally won the
suit and the taxes were eventually paid to the Board of
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.96.
Joan K. Smith, Joe.cit., p.137.
"I bi d . , p • 1 27 .
2

3
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Education.

The Board, however, decided to use the money

collected to pay bll ls and perform building maintenance.
Finally,

in June 1906, the new mayor, Edward Dunne,

appointed new board members who voted to use the delinquent
tax money for teachers back salaries. 5
The election of William Hale Thompson as Mayor in April
1915 led to the disintegration of the relationship between
the Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers Federation.
Thompson/s desire to bring more politics into the Board
angered the Federation.

On 1 September 1915, the

Thompson-appointed Board of Education added more friction to
the bad feelings between the two groups.

Board member Jacob

Loeb introduced a board policy that forbade "Membership by
teachers in organizations affiliated with a trade union, or
a federation or association of trade unions, as wel 1 as
teacher organizations which have off leers, business agents,
or other representatives who are not members of the teaching
force."

6

After much criticism regarding the "Loeb Rule,"

the Board limited the restrictions to membership in the
Federation.

The Chicago Teachers Federation appealed the

rule to the court and it was eventually found to be 11 legal
but the Board found a way to circumvent the rule.

At the

Board meeting of 27 June 1916, the Board refused to renew
the contracts of sixty-eight teachers all of whom were
p.132.
Proceedings of the Board of Education, 1915-16, p.734, cited
in Herrick, Joe.cit., p.122.

~Ibid.,
6

64
either past or present members of the Federation.
refused to give a reason for the f irings. 7
appealed the firings but the

co~rt

The Board

The Federation

ruled that the Board had

the absolute right to deny employment to anyone for any
reason whatsoever or for no reason. 8
In April

1916 the Chicago Teachers Federation, having

previously In 1902 Joined the Chicago Federation of Labor,
decided that it would further increase its ties to organized
labor.

The Federation Joined with the Men's Teachers Union,

the Federation of Women High School Teachers, and four
smaller unions and petitioned the American Federation of
Labor <AFL) to charter a new national

labor organization,

the American Federation of Teachers <AFT>.

As the oldest

and largest local of the AFT, the Federation became Local
One.""
The efforts of the CTF to obtain a protected teacher
pension fund and higher salaries had been successful.
next goal was to obtain the protection of tenure.

Their

In 1917 a

combined effort by the civic groups, board members, and the
Federation resulted in sufficient pressure on the
legislature to pass legislation known as the Otis Law which
reorganized the school system and granted tenure to teachers
after a three year probationary period.

Membership on the

Board of Education was decreased to eleven members and their
';""Herrick, loc.clt., p.128.
I b I d. , p • 1 29 •
.,,, I bi d. , p • 1 27.

e
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appointment was for five year terms.

po~ers.

additional taxing and borrowing
eminent domain.

The Board was given
and the right of

10

In the spring of 1917 the Federation began to lose its
power.

On 21 May 1917 the Federation withdrew its

affiliation with the American Federation of Teachers and
the Chicago Federation of Labor.

Many reasons for the

disaffiliation were speculated including the rumor that
Haley had made a deal with Loeb that he would make peace
with the Federation if they left the labor affiliations.
Other reasons for the move were a depleted treasury due to
the cost of suits and salaries of the suspended teachers,
and the Joss of half of its membership during the 1915-16
period.

11

THE CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION IS FORMED
The economic depression of the 1930/s brought new
problems to the teachers in Chicago.

In Apri 1 1931 the

Board of Education/s financial resources were depleted.
April salary came in late May.

The

The July and August salaries

were paid in scrip or tax warrants.

These warrants could be

used to pay taxes at their face value but would only bring a
percentage of their face value when teachers tried to sell
them or pay a debt with them.

1 0

Ibid. , p. 134.

1 1

I bi d . , p . 1 35 •

From March 1930, to September
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1934, there were only eight paydays on time, and seven in
the four years were paper, not cash.

12

In 1933 the

Volunteer Emergency Committee was formed and headed by John
Fewkes.

The purpose of the Committee was to unite several

organizations in a protest until pay days were restored
properly.

On 21 March 1933 the Committee planned a march on

city hal 1 to protest the lack of regular paydays.

The

Committee also researched and found businesses that were
delinquent

in payment of

business with them.

taxes and suggested that no one do

13

In May 1936, the Men Teachers Union elected John Fewkes
of the Volunteer Emergency Committee to the office of
president.

His election platform cal led for the immediate

amalgamation of the teachers

unions.

1

~

Letters were sent to

every teacher organization to meet and discuss the
possibility of uniting into one organization.

After months

of discussion, a meeting was held on 28 October 1937 and the
four teacher unions <Men Teachers Union, Federation of
Women High School Teachers, Playground Teachers Union, and
the Elementary Schoo 1 Teachers Uni on) surrendered the.Ir
charters to the AFT and John Fewkes as their president
received a charter for their new union.

The new

organization was cal led the Chicago Teachers Union and was

1 2

I bi d . , p • 1 90 .
=·Ibid. , p. 239.
14
1.Ql.Q.' p.241.
I
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issued the charter as Local
and by April

One.

1

~

The Union grew steadily

1938 total led 8,200 teachers- more than

two-thirds of the entire teaching staff.

16

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
It is difficult to separate the process of collective
bargaining from the development of unions.

Prior to the

formation of the AFT in 1917, other labor organizations
had tried to gain wages and benefits for their members.

We

know the legal status of collective bargaining was
established in 1935 with the National

Labor Relations Act

which set down conditions and requirements for
employer-employee bargaining in the private sector.

17

According to the United States Constitution teachers have a
right to join labor organizations as part of the right of
association.

However,

legal control of labor organizations

is reserved for the states through the tenth amendment.

The

issue of collective bargaining in the public schools was not
addressed before 1959, when Wisconsin passed the first
bargaining Jaw for the public sector.

16

The first

collective bargaining contract for public school

teachers

was an agreement between the American Federation of Teachers
15

"History of the Chicago Teachers Union," Chicago Teachers
Union Collection, Chicago Historical Society, Box 51.
16
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.243.
17
Anthony M. Cresswell and Michael J. Murphy, Teachers,
Unions. and Collective Bargaining in Pub! le Education.
CBerkeley: Mccutchan Publishing Corporation, 1980), p.19.
18
Ibid., p.20.
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Local of Cicero, Illinois and the Cicero Board of Education
in 1944. 1 9

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO CHICAGO
In an article In the Chicago American on 22 January
1965, Marty O'Connor reported that "organized labor will ask
the legislature to permit government employees to bargain
col lectively.

1120

The Sun Times later reported that Governor

Otto Kerner promised organized labor that he would fight for
the collective bargaining bill . 21
support

f~r

the bill.

Kerner later withdrew his

The Chicago Board of Education

decided to collectively bargain in 1966 even though there
were no state laws regarding col Jective bargaining for
public employees.
On 30 October 1963 President Claire Roddewlg reported
that the General Committee of the Board of Education had
considered the matter of a collective bargaining agreement
with representatives of teacher organizations and that the
Committee recommended that the Board not enter into such an
agreement. 22

On 8 January 1964 Board member <and labor

union official) Thomas J. Murray introduced a resolution
that would have al lowed the Chicago Teachers Union to become
""'Ibid., p.21.
Marty O'Connor, "Labor Wil I Seek to Bargain for Public
Employees," Chicago American, 22 January 1965.
21
Bernel l Heinecke, "Kerner Vows Fight for Bargaining Bi 11,"
Sun Times, 25 February 1965.
22
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 30
October 1963, Chicago, II., p.605.
1

20
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a collective bargaining agency for the teachers and
educational personnel who had indicated a desire to have the
Teachers Union represent them.

The vote on the motion was

deferred to 26 February 1964 whereupon it passed by a vote
of seven to one. 23

At this same meeting Board member

Raymond Pasnick asked for a deferment. until

the meeting of

11 March 1964, of a resolution that would grant collective
bargaining rights to the Chicago Education Association
CCEA), a division of the Illinois Education Association.
Pasnick noted that if the Board recognized the union as a
bargainer for its members, it was only sensible that other
groups be allowed to bargain for their members.
resolution passed by a six to two vote with two

This
passing.~

4

At the very next Board meeting President Roddewig notified
the Board that he had received a letter from John M. Fewkes,
the President of the Chicago Teachers Union, asking the
Board to conduct an election among the teacher organizations
to determine whom they would want to represent them as an
exclusive bargaining agent. 2 5

The Board deferred discussion

of the issue at thls meeting and at subsequent meetings
until 23 September 1965.

At the Board meeting on 23

September 1965, after three hours of discussion. the Board

23

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 26
February 1964, Chicago, Il .• p.1952.
24
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 11 March
1964, Chicago, Il., p.2013-14.
25
Mintues of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 March
1964, Chicago, II., p.2116.
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passed by a vote of six to two a resolution that called for
an election by the members of the various teachers
organizations to select a sole col lectlve bargaining
agent. 26

Union President John M. Fewkes wrote to Board

President Frank Whiston and suggested that the election be
held on 28 or 29 October and offered the Teachers Union
help ln determining who should vote and who shouJd conduct
the election. 2 7

.

While considering the possibility of

ar

election for the right to serve as sole col lectlve
bargaining agent, the Board entered into Memorandums of
Understanding with both the Chicago Teachers Union and the
Chicago Education Association.
The Chicago Education Association CCEA) ti led suit in
the Circuit Court of Cook County on 18 October 1965 seeking
a temporary lnJunctlon against the collective bargaining
election.

The CEA filed on the grounds that the election

resolution breached the Board's agreement with the CEA and
gave preferential treatment to the Chicago Teachers Union.
Judge Cornelius Harrington requested that the CEA pursue
such administrative remedies as were provided In the
Memorandum of Understanding and continued the case until 28

26

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting of 23
September 1965, Chicago, Il .• p.725-746.
~ Letter from President John M. Fewkes of the Chicago Teachers
Union to Board President Frank Whiston, Chicago Teachers
Union Col Jection, Chicago Historical Society, Chlcago,Il .,
Box 51, File 5.
7
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October 1965. 2 8

The Board met in General Committee on 4

November 1965 to hear the complaint of the CEA regarding the
election.

After listening to the presentation by the CEA,

the Board denied the complaint and reaffirmed its resolution
regarding the election.

The Board did amend the resolution

to make it clear that they did not intend to discriminate in
any way between the

organizations.

2

~

In a Jetter from John

Fewkes to President Frank Whiston, Fewkes told Whiston
that the Union would welcome the CEA/s participation in the
election for collective bargaining. 3 0

On 23 February 1966

Judge Harrington ruled that the Chicago Board of Education
had the right to authorize a referendum for a sole
collective bargaining agent, but that no new bargaining
agreement could be entered into until after 12 November 1966
when the current agreements expired.

He further ordered

that any items in a new agreement applied to both union and
non-union members, and that the agreement include a no
strike and no picket clause. 31
The committee established to oversee the collective

28

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27
October 1965, Chicago, Il ., p.829-30.
29
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 4
November 1965, Chicago, II., p.939.
30
Letter from John Fewkes, President of the Chicago Teachers
Union, to Board President Frank Whiston, 20 October 1965,
Chicago Teachers Union Collection, Chicago Historical
Society, Box 51, File 5.
31
"Court OK/s Single Agent for Teachers," Chicago Tribune, 24
November 1966.
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bargaining election selected 27 May 1966 as election day. 8 2
The guidelines for the election were accepted by the Board
on 18 May 1966.

They included: eligibility for voting

Cassistant principals, elementary and high school teachers,
and truant officers), notice of voting and eligibility in
schools and offices, method of casting ballots (mailed),
ballot form, supervision of the election by the Statlstica1
Tabulating Corporation, and that the winner would
simple majority of the votes cast. 83

need a

The election was held

on 27 May 1966 and Statlstlca! Tabulating Corporation
reported the results to the Board shown in flgure 3.1.
RESULTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ELECTION 3 4
Bal lots mailed
23,455
No/Wrong Address
1,267
Postmarked late, not counted
587
Chicago Education Association
364
Blank
781
Chicago Teachers Federation
16
Miscellaneous
111
Chicago Teachers Union
10936
Total Votes Cast
Could not be counted
Grand Total
Figure 3.1

12208
587
12795

Since the Chicago Teachers Union won more than fifty

.-

percent of the votes cast, they were declared the winner of
the election.

At the Board meeting of 13 July 1966 Thomas

Murray moved that the Board of Education officially
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 Apr i 1
1966, Chicago, I 1 . , p.3078.
88
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 18 May
1966, Chicago, I 1 . , p.3158-59.
4
Mi nutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 22 June
1966, Chicago, I 1 . , p.3534.
82

$=
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recognize the Chicago Teachers Union as the sole bargaining
agent for assistant principals, teachers, and truant
officers.
o~e

The motion carried by a seven to two vote with

abstention. 3

e

THE FIRST CONTRACT - BOTH SIDES LEARN ABOUT NEGOTIATING
The stage was now set for the first collective
bargaining sessions between the Board of Education and the
Chicago Teachers Union.

Chicago, fol lowing New York, became

the second large city to col lective]y negotiate.

At the

f lrst negotiation session on 4 October 1066, the Board was
represented by Superintendent James F. Redmond and his
staff, Board members Judge Edward S. Scheffler, Mrs. Lydon
Wild, and Mr. Thomas Murray; while the Union was represented
by President John E. Desmond, Ms. Vivian Gal Jagher, Robert
Healey, and other union staff members.

At this first

session the Union refused to negotiate because there were
members of the press in attendance. 2 6

Board member and

acting chairman of the Employee Relations Committee, Thomas
Murray, acknowledged at a later Board meeting that the
Union/s position was indeed correct and that a negotiations
meeting did not constitute a public meeting because no legal
actions would be taking place.

3

Mr. Murray referred to his

~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 July
1966, Chicago, Il ., p.593-594.
~"CTU begins negotiations," Chicago Union Teacher 32
COctober 1966): 1.

3
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experience as a labor leader who had been through
negotiations before. 3 7

At the fourth meeting the Union

presented to the committee the preliminary wording of their
preferred labor contract.

The document was presented in

several parts containing proposals concerning wages, working
conditions, fringe benefits, and a grievance procedure.

The

Board committee suggested that discussion of all union
demands be carried out in a systematic and orderly manner,
subject by subject. 3 8

In a Jetter to Union members on 14

October 1966 President Desmond notes that there had been no
progress rn negotiations but that the Union was continuing
to negotiate for them in good faith. 3

Q

On 30 November 1966, the Board of Education presented a
list of its demands to the Union leadership.

The Board

demanded that the negotiated agreement include a clause that
cal led for no strikes or picketing.

The Board also demanded

that any item negotiated for one employee be negotiated for
all employees.

The Board also insisted that they have the

authority to assign any teacher to any position as they see
fit as long as it

expertise. 4 0

is based on aptitude, talents, and

Additionally, the Board noted that non-union

members must be granted the same grievance procedure as
37

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13
October 1966, Chicago. II., p.594.
38
Ibid., 593.
39
ttLetter to the Membership from President John Desmond,u
Chicago Union Teacher 32 <October 1966): 1.
40
''Negotiations 1967 Contract," Chicago Teachers Union
Collection, Chicago Historical Society, Box 52, Folder 4.
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union members. The Board noted that if they feel that the
Chicago

Teachers Union does not represent the majority of

the members of the teaching force they, the Board, can call
for a collective bargaining

electlon.~

1

Negotiations

continued throughout December without much progress.
Teachers were sent home for a Christmas vacation with little
hope for a settlement.
On 5 January 1967, Union President John E. Desmond
cal Jed for a strike to begin on Monday, 9 January 1967.
This announcement and its approval by union delegates sent
the Board into closed door sessions to discuss its options.
Negotiations even took place over the phone with Board
President Whiston and Union President Desmond discussing the
possibility of diverting money from educational programs to
meet union demands for salary and benefit increases.
Board rejected Desmond/s proposal • 4 2

The

The Board also

considered seeking a court injunction to halt the strike but
the majority decided that they would wait until the strike
actual Jy took place before seeking help through the
courts. 43
The Citizens School Committee asked the Board of
Education and the Teachers Union to joln forces with them to
ask the state legislature for emergency financial

411..Qj_g.

"School Strike Stil I On; Delay Injunction Move,"
Tribune, 7 January 1967, p.1.
42

431..Qj_g.

Chicago
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Mayor Daley also noted "that there can be help

assistance.

and assistance from the legislature, and that eventually is
the place I suppose they wll 1

go.''·~ 4

Robert J. Ahrens of

the Citizens Schools Committee suggested that the Union
postpone the strike and support a proposed referendum of 28
February 1967 for a fifteen cent property tax

increase.

4

~

Superintendent Reduond had earlier noted that the schools
would remain open under the supervision of

non-s~riking

teachers, principals, and other supervisory personnel.
Redmond also urged parents to volunteer to help care for the
children.

The Illinoia Congress of Parents and Teachers

refused to take an official role in keeping the schoo!s open
in the event of a teachers strike.

Mrs. Arnold Streigh,

Chicago Region president of the PTA, noted "it is up to the
individual PTA's, the individual
help to keep the schools open." 4 6

pa~ents

, whether they will

The Chicago Education

Association denounced the strike and announced that their
3,000 members would report to work on Monday. 4 7
The Chicago Tribune in an editorial on 7 January 1967
chastised all parties in the predicted strike.

Although the

editorial noted sympathy for teachers as individuals and
agreed that there was a need for better pay and working

441.Q.j_Q.,
4

p.2.

~Ibid.

"PTA Avoids Stand on Strike," Chicago Tribune, 7 January
1967, p.4.
47
"Teacher Pay Plan Rejected," Chicago Tribune, 7 January
1967, p.2.
46
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conditions, it denied that the teachers union had as much a
right to strike as did teamsters, janitors, or
steelworkers. 4 8

It criticized the Board of Education for

not fol lowing the advice of their attorney, James W. Coffey,
who told the Board that it would be illegal to grant
exclusive bargaining rights to one teachers/ group.

The

editorial noted that the legislature had refused to approve
bargaining rights to unions representing public employees.
The

editorial repeated the words of the Il llnols Supreme

Court that ttthere ls no Inherent right in municipal
employees to strike against their governmental emp;oyers ..
and that a strike of municipal employees for any purpose ls
lllegal." 4

"'

As the eleventh hour approached, both sides said that
they were stil 1 open to further negotiations but they each
huddled in their own meeting places.

Finally on Saturday,

7 January 1967, Mayor Richard J. Daley cal led for a meeting
of school and union officials in his city hall office for
Sunday at 1:00 p.m.

Mayor Daley invited Superintendent

Redmond, President of the Board Frank Whiston, Board
attorney James W. Coffey, and Harold Ash of the AFT, CTU
f lnancial secretary Vivian Gal Jagher, CTU attorney Martin
Burns, and CTU President John Desmond. 50

At 5:30 p.m.,

•sttstriking the Publis Schools," Chicago Tribune, 7 January
1967, p.8.
491.Q.l_g,

"Board, Union Representatives O.K. 20-Million-Dollar Pact,"
Chicago Tribune, 9 January 1967, p.1.

50
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Daley summoned reporters to announce that the Board and the
Union had "reached a meeting of the minds."

Daley refused

to be specific but noted that the Board and the Union would
meet separately to

disc~ss

the proposed settlement. 51

Ten

and one-half hours after Daley had called the meeting, the
strike was over.

CTU President

Des~ond

statement announcing an agreement
strike on Monday.

~nd

made the first

said there would be no

In his announcement, President Frank

Whiston noted that the agreement had been approved by a f lve
to four vote with new Board member John D. Carey driving In
from out of town to cast his vote for the package.
stated, "We have agreed to increase our

b~dgetary

Whiston
estimates

of Income from state and federal ald ln the amount of twenty
million dollars in

1967."~ 2

This first agreement between the Chicago Board of
Education and the Chicago Teachers Union contained the
fol lowing provisions:
1. A raise of $500.00 for all teachers.
2. A new medical plan.
3. Two personal business days for each teacher.
4. A re-opener to the contract if excess funds e~ist
after the fiscal year, with the Union having input
on how these excess monies are spent.
5. A transfer and assignment pol icy for teachers ~as
established.
6. A grievance procedure was established.~
3

At 10:40 p.m., the Board voted to accept the agreement by a

p.2.
Ibid., p.1.
~ "List of Union Gains," Union Teacher CSpeclal Issue), March
1967, p.1-2.
~'Ibid.,
52
3
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five-four vote.

Voting for the agreement were:

John D.

Carey, Mrs. Wendell Green, Thomas J. Murray, Mrs. Lydon
Wild, and Frank Whiston.

Voting against the pact were:

Bernard S. Friedman, Warren H. Bacon, Cyrus Adams, and Mrs.
Louis Malis.

Once the vote was passed, the executive board

of the Union adopted a resolution that "all teachers report
to their schools tomorrow and conduct class in a normal
manner." 54
The contract was formally accepted by the Board of
Education on 10 May 1967 by a nine to one vote. 5 5

The

re-opener clause of the contract was put into effect in
August 1967.

The only new monies that surfaced were

generated from the fifteen cent local levy approved on 28
February 1967.

The Employee Relations Committee and the

Union agreed to use the money to hire 375 new teachers, 1200
teacher aides, pay teachers for extra-curricular activities,
and pay for a five day Christmas vacation for all full time
teachers and personnel

.~ 6

In November 1967, school clerks, school

library clerks,

vision testers and hearing testers asked the Board for the
right to select a collective bargaining agent.
request was granted. 5 7

Their

The election for bargaining agent

"Board-Union Pact", p.2.
of the Chicago Board of Edcuation Meeting, 10 May
1967, Chicago, II., p.2985.
56
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27
September 1967, Chicago, II., p.590.
57
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 8
November 1967, Chicago, II., p.831.
54

~ 5 Minutes
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for school clerks was held on 30 January 1968.

The Board

was notified of the results which showed the Chicago
Teachers Union winning by a two-one margin over the
Educational Secretaries of Chicago, Inc.

The Board accepted

a motion by a nine-one vote that Chicago Teachers Union
would become the bargaining agent for school

clerks.~ 8

By

the time the 1968 contract was signed, the Chicago Teachers
Union was the representative for teachers, ful I-time truant
officers, assistant principals, school library clerks,
hearing testers, vision testers, and school clerkS. 5 9
•

ROUND TWO - NEGOTIATIONS 1968
The first negotiations for the 1968 contract took place
on 13 November 1967.

At this meeting the Board presented a

list of sixty demands, including modifying or deleting
articles already in the

contract.~·c•

When serious

negotiations began in late December, the Union demanded a
$150.00 per month increase in salary, a ten-step salary
schedule, a paid spring vacation, and three personal
business days.

The Board responded with a two percent

increase in salary, a weakening of the grievance procedures,
and elimination of transfer rights.

After John Desmond

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 14
February 1968, Chicago, Il., p.1481.
~·"Agreement Between the Board of Edcuation of the City of
Chicago and the Chicago Teachers Union," Article 1.1, 1968.
0
•
"Negotiations Begin", Chicago Union Teacher, November 1967,
58

p. 1
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referred to the Board's counter proposal as an insult, he
down graded the salary increase request to $125.00 per month
but the Board refused to change. 61

The Board and the Union

continued to make proposals and counter proposals into
January 1968.

Finally on 4 January 1968 the Union's House

of Representatives set a strike date of 9 January 1968.

The

representatives directed the president to announce the
strike date to the membership at a meeting at the Opera
House on 6 January

1968.

6

~

The scenario is similar to the previous year.

The

Board and the Union appeared on a course of no compromise
until Mayor Richard J. Daley again entered the picture.
With negotiations going on at Board headquarters only two
blocks from City Hall, the Mayor was notified by the Board
that no progress was being made.

Both parties had agreed to

use the Mayor as a court of last resort, so the Mayor cal led
both sides to meet with him.

The Mayor was informed by both

groups of the status of the negotiations and then sent the
union officials to another room. 6 3

Daley promised the Board

that he would muster his political forces to seek a fifteen
cent
61

Increase per $100.00 of assessed valuation and that the

Stewart Weinstein, "Collective Bargaining: The Quest for
Power in the Chicago Publ le Schools" <Ph.D. dissertation,
Loyola University of Chicago, 1988), p.125.
02
"Notes from the Chicago Teachers Union House of
Representatives Meeting", 5 January 1968, Box 54, Folder 25,
Chicago Teachers Union Col lectlon, Chicago Historical
Society, Chicago, II.
63
"How Daley Averted Strike,'' Chicago Daily News, 8 January
1968, p.1.
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Board could count these new monies.

He also promised to

seek more local school ald from the state legislature that
would meet !n Mar-ch.·',

4

He then ·,.;ent to the Union and told

them he would work to get the money that they deserved and
the assistance to cope with the needs of inner-city
students.

He stated to both groups that his primary concern

was for the school children of Chicago. 6 5

It was another-

case of Mayor Daley making promises that both groups felt he
could fulfill.

After six hours of negotiations with Daley

as mediator, the Mayor, Board President Whiston and Union
President Desmond announced that with the Mayor?s help a
strike had been averted.
The settlement of these negotiations included:

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

A salary increase of $40.00 per month immediately
for teachers. and an additional increase of $60.00
in September.
Civil Service personnel received an immediate raise
of five per cent.
An additional week of paid vacation.
One additional personal business day.
Severance pay equal to one-third of accumulated sick
leave.
Hiring of 600 teacher aides for elementary schools.
Hiring of additional teachers in September 1968 in
order to provide elementary teachers with two
preparation periods per week.
The Union agreed to discuss changes in transfer
policy with the Board so that there would be an
equalized assignment of certified teachers
throughout the city.e 0

The Mayor had a perfect record.

His two attempts to

·""'41..Q.iQ., p.6.
'-"·~Ibid.

·"",-:'"Here/s How Teachers Fare in New Contract", Chicago Daily
News, 8 ·January 1968, p. 5.
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mediate disputes between the Board and the Union resulted in
settlements without losing one school day due to teacher
strikes.

Daley had shown his ski 1 ls as a mediator, his

power to influence the Board of Education, and his ability
to influence the state legislature.

NEGOTIATIONS 1969 - A DIFFERENT SCENARIO
PHASE ONE:

Negotiations for the !969 contract did not reflect the
previous two negotiations.

There was no last minute

settlement orchestrated by city hall.

Francis M.

Landwerermeyer, S.J., discussed the four phases of the 1969
contract

negotiations.~ 7

He notes that the first steps in

preparation for negotiations began on 10 August 1968 with
the Union Steering Committee meeting and ended with the
Union House of Representatives accepting the final package
on 2 September 1969. 6 8

The Union presented it's "package"

of demands to the Board negotiators on 8 October 1968
but did include it's salary proposals, fringe benefits, or
certification demands.

These later proposals were finally

presented on 4 November 1968.

At the beginning of the

negotiations, Union president John Desmond commented that in
order to get a good contract for his membership it would be
necessary for the legislature to

67
68

Landwerermeyer,
Ibid., p.454.

incre~se

Joe.cit., p. 361.

state aid to the

84
Chicago schools.

He also noted that "future contract

settlements wil 1 no longer be reached in the mayor/s
office." 6 9

These comments and others by both sides of the

bargaining table led reporters and the public to believe
that the possibility of a strike was great.
Desmond/s leadership within the Union was opposed by
the Teachers Action Committee CTAC).

TAC president John

Kotsakis voiced the organization/s priority demands for a
maximum c1ass slze of twenty-f lve. a duty free preparation
period. ful 1 implementation of the 1968 agreements about
in-service programs. and revision of the teacher
certification policy.

TAC would support Desmond if he

negotiated these items as priorities but vowed a organized
opposition if he did not. 7 0

In a speech to the Citizens

Schools Committee CTU president Desmond mentioned all of
TAC's demands except revision of the certification policy.
He also mentioned an effort to move the starting salary of
teachers to $8500.00. 71
In the early stages of negotiations both the Board and
the Union received favorable comments from the newspapers.
All

four daily papers noted the needs of the teachers and

the financial problems of the Board.

Each paper urged the

Henry De Zutter. "School Strike Possible Here Next January,"
Chicago Daily News. 12 September 1968. p.5.
70
Stewart Weinstein. "Collective Bargaining: The Quest for
Power in the Chicago Publ le Schools" <Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. Loyola University of Chicago. 1988>. p.136.
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"Ralse for New Teachers Sought," Chicago American. 20
November 1968, p. 3.
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Union to concentrate on educational

salary increases.

improvements rather than

Each of the four papers editorialized

that the solution to the problems of the Board and the Union
could only be found with help from the state legislature.
The first negotiation session between the Board and the
Union took place on 22 November 1968.

The Board/s

negotiating team was headed by Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, with
Thomas Murray and John Carey, both union leaders, serving as
team members.
Red~ond,

The Board team were joined by Superintendent

Deputy Superintendent Manford Byrd, Jr., Board

Attorney James Coffey, and several members of Redmond/s
staff.

John Desmond headed the Union team with

Vice-president Vivian Gallagher, Attorney Joseph Jacobs,
Recording Secretary Jacqueline Wright Clater Vaughn>,
Financial Secretary Robert Healey, and Treasurer Glendis
Hambrick.

72

Desmond opened this first session with a

statement that the first topic on the table would be the
ful 1 implementation of the 1968 contract.

Mrs. Wild

responded by asking the Union to consider the financial
problems of the school system and to review and prioritize
their demands.

Desmond/s response to Mrs. Wild/s request

was that he could prioritize but that he owed it to his
membership that al 1 items be

dlscussed.

7

~

The last item of

business for discussion in the first session was Mrs. Wild/s

72
""

8

Landwerermeyer,
Ibid. , p. 373.

1oc. cit. , p. 372.

86
request that Redrnond/s place at the negotiation table
could be taken by his deputy. Manford Byrd, and that Board
members would not have to attend every negotiating session.
Desmond agreed to permit Byrd to sit at the table but he
insisted that the Union would not negotiate without at least
one Board member present. 7 4
One of the agreements reached at this first session was
that President Desmond and Deputy Superintendent Byrd would
meet in order to clarify the Union's demands.

The Board

needed this clarification so that they could develop an
estimate

~f

the cost of the Union,s package and to prepare

its response to the proposal

.

7

~

As a result of these

meetings, the Board was to prepare written responses to the
Union demands and establish a set of demands of their own.
During this period of negotiations,

it was necessary

for the Superintendent to present his budget statement to
the Board of Education.

In his presentation, Redmond

prepared three alternative plans he had for submitting the
budget. One was to prepare a balanced budget that included
reduced programs to absorb a $33 mi Ilion shortfall.

The

second was to anticipate monies that would come from state
and federal

governments and prepare a budget on that basis.

The third approach, and the one adopted. was to cut the
present educational programs beginning in September 1969.

74
7

Ibid.

~Ibid.,

p. 373.
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This last plan would make the public aware of the need for
additional assistance from the legislature and he could
solicit their assistance in getting the help. 7 6

In his

statement to the Board, Redmond was trying to galvanize
support for additional school funding from the legislature.
Redmond noted "we are presentlng this Tentative Budget in a
manner which we trust wil 1 be bring home to the citizens of
this city the stark reality of the fiscal problems facing
the Chicago Board of Education in 1969." 7 7

Redmond

continued in his address to announce class size Increases to
45,

less paid vacation and personal business days, and a cut

in extra-curricular compensation. 7 8
On 27 November 1968, the Board submitted proposals and
corr~ents

to the Union negotiators.

This was a first for the

Board/s negotiators who had never before submitted proposals
for inclusion in the contract.

In a sense this innovation

showed that the Board was beginning to understand that
contract negotiations involved a give-and-take process, with
compromises and concessions on both sides relative to the
needs of both

parties.

7

~

The new Board proposals contained

thirty-three new Items and forty proposed changes in the
contract.

Most of the proposals tried to lessen the

influence of the CTU in school affairs.

This new

Ibid., p. 376.
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, November
27, 1968, Chicago, II., p.11.
'7e!bid., p.23.
~Landwerermeyer, loc.clt., p.378.
76
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7
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understanding of the negotiation process was in part due to
hiring of a consultant, Dr. Wesley Wildman.
Director of

Labor-~anagement

Wildman was the

Studies at the Industrial

Relations Center of the University of Chicago. 80
At the next negotiation session on 29 November 1968,
Union President Desmond and his attorney, Joseph Jacobs,
both expressed surprise over the number and types of changes
that the Board was seeking.
the Board

WctS

These leaders complained

t~at

trying to re-write the whole contract and no

issues were agreed upon.

Issues discussed included

representation by the Union of certain teacher certified
positions that the Board considered administration,
scheduling of professional problems committee meetings, and
a requirement that the Union president inform the school
principal when he intended to visit a school . 81
During the morning session of 29 November, Desmond
became frustrated by Dr. Byrd/s hand! ing of negotiations and
asked the Deputy Superintendent, "Can you make decisions at
this table today or are we just talking?"

This question of

whether Dr. Byrd had authority to negotiate would complicate
the negotiation sessions. 8 2

The afternoon session continued

to be very adversarial and the CTU protested the Board/s
attempt to re-write the grievance procedure that had already
existed for two years.
80.l.l;;U_Q.
81

82
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Talks lasted nine hours on 29

89

November and the only item agreed upon was one that limited
the materials that could be placed in teacher/s mailboxes in
the schools to official Union materials. 8 3

Negotiations

continued but no serious discussions took place untl 1
mid-December.
The Union announced Its demands to the public on 12
December.

Peter Negronida of the Tribune noted that the

Union demands Included ''substantial progress toward a goal
of a salary schedule beginning at $8500.00, reduced class
size. reduced teaching loads for high school teachers. more
teacher aides, FTB certification. and no reduction in the
teaching force." 84
The major difference between the Board and the Union
was not that they disagreed on how much revenue was
avai Jable from current sources, but the Union wanted the
Board to consider budgeting with revenue gains that were
anticipated.

The idea of considering anticipated revenues

from an increase in the school formula was encouraged by
state legislators.

The Union was notified by the Chairman

of House Committee on Education that the formula would be
raised by $100.00.

Both the Board and the Union encouraged

parents to contact their legislators regarding the suggested
increase.

9

~.l.Ql.d.

A Chicago American editorial suggested that

p.381.

Peter Negronida. "Teachers Ask $285Mil1 ion from
Board/Demands Cal led Impossible," Chicago Tribune. 12
December 1968, sec. 1, p. 1.
84

90
the Board put the responsibility for the budget right where
it belonged,

in the hands of the state

legislature.

9

~

Board

member Marge Wi Jd reminded the public that "Illinois ranks
forty-sixth in the nation in the amount of state aid to
schools while being ranked as the third wealthiest

state."~ 6

As the bargaining sessions continued into December,
very little of substance was considered.

Most items

proposed by the Board were rejected by the Union because the
Board failed to prove that the proposal responded to a real
problem.

In responding to the Union/s proposals the Board

rejected most because their implementation would cost money.
The Board also objected to some proposals on principle and
to others as "non-negotiable."

These "non-negotiable"

items

included the Union/s attempt to write job descriptions
(which the Board had to keep flexible),

tried to change

certification status (the responsibility of the Board of
Examiners), and suggested modifications of the civil service
regulations (the prerogative of the Civil Service
Commlssion).e 7
There were only seven negotiation sessions held on five
different days ending on 16 December.
other of refusing to bargain.

Each side accused the

One of the major roadblocks

for the Union was the fact that on two of the negotiation
85

"Schools in Hostage," Chicago American, 1 december 1968,
sec.1, p. 12.
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days. December 10 and 16, no Board member was present as had
been agreed upon previously.

The Union

interpreted the

absence of Board members as a sign that true collective
bargaining was not taking

place.

8

~

A second complaint

regarding the negotiating team involved the Union's feeling
that Manford Byrd Jr. did not have the statutory authority
to negotiate.

Union leader Desmond continually referred to

fact that he felt that in the end the Union would have to
negotiate with Redmond.
By mid-December the Union leaders notified their
membership:; that "the organization faced a crisis in its
collective bargaining negotiations with the Board of
Education." 8 9

Desmond appealed for unity among the various

factions in the union.

Desmond was able to abort an

attempted split by the members of TAC when he reminded them
that the Union had listed all of their concerns as part of
the demands In the December issue of the Chicago Union
Teacher.
This first phase of the 1969 contract negotiations
ended on 19 December with both sides realizing that
progress had taken place.

little

As of this date, only three Items

had been agreed upon: 1) use of teacher/s 8Chool mailboxes
for official material only, 2) the need for swimming coaches
to obtain Red Cross life-saving certification, and 3) phones
89

!bid.
°Chicago Teachers Union, "Press Release," , 23 December 1968,
Box 55, Chicago Historical Society Archives.
8
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would be made available to elementary schooi adjustment
teachers. 90

On 19 December, the Board requested a priority

list of the Union/s demands.

Union President Desmond

immediate] y responded with a statement.
will be very happy to respond to you.
on December 26, but I

Desmond stated:

11

r

I intend to do that

intend to do it with the

Superintendent of Schools, Mr. Murray, Mr. Carey, and the
Chairman of their committee.

11

'"'

1

PHASE TWO:
The second phase of the 1969 negotiations began with
the return of Redmond to the bargaining table on 27 December
1968.

Desmond stil 1 faced opposition from within the Union

with TAC's leader, John Kotsakls, saying that the bargaining
did not do enough to improve the schools, and McWhirter of
the FTB's demanding more changes in teacher certification.
With the beginning of this second phase of negotiations,
Desmond presented a 1 i st of

11

vi ta I issues" and exp 1 a i ned

each of them to the bargaining teams.

The 1 ist of issues

included ful 1 implementation of the 1968 contract, an
increase of 794 teacher aides, in-service training for
inner-city teachers, two weekly preparation periods, a
program for maladjusted children, and implementation of
class-load recommendations.

Other priority items included:

revision of certification procedures, upgrading of school

90
91

lbid., "A Chronology of Events," 21 May 1969.
Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p. 390.

clerks. provision for substitute playground teachers,
implementation of severance pay, and compensation for
extra-curricular activities.•=
The stage was now set for the Board's response to the
Union's list of "vital

issues."

On 30 December. the Board

announced that it estimated the cost of the Union's request
to be $194mi1 lion.

The Board had previously requested

improvements that totaled only $15.5mil1 ion,
less that the Union's request.

considera~ly

The Board also opposed any

salary increase for the 1969 contract.

The Board's main

complaint was that the Union dld "not really focus on the
problem at hand" and was clearly "unrealistic considering
the financial

circumstances of the Board." 98

The Union

responded that the estimated cost of the new programs would
be $127 mil I ion, but this did not include the cost of
implementing the 1968 contract. 9 4
In the afternoon, the Union submitted a written
response to the Board's counterproposal.

The response was

basically the same position the Union had given earlier.
The two parties continued to maintain their position
throughout the day.

The dlscusslons changed later when

Union attorney Jacobs raised the possibility of a

97
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supplemental budget.

At first Wild and Redmond refused to

discuss the posslbi l ity, but later Board member Murray asked
"if the Union would settle for no wage increase for now ...
but in the supplementary budget defer the possibi llty of a
wage increase."•e

Desmond chose to ignore the question and

announced that the Union would revise its counterproposal.
Negotiations continued on 31 December with the Union
presenting a second counterproposal.

The Union estimated

the cost of the new package at $32 million by the Union, but
it again did not consider the cost of fully imp:ementlng the
1968 contract.

During this session, Board member Murray and

Union attorney Jacobs began to discuss the difference

between labor negotiations in business and in public
agencies.

Murray, a union leader as well as Board member,

saw the difference in the fact that in the private sector
both sides know the ability of businesses to secure the
money needed to finalize contract negotiations; but in the
public sector, getting the addltional monies was a real
problem.
The afternoon session was marked by a heated discussion
between President Desmond, Superintendent Redmond and
Chairman Wild.

Mrs. Wild told Desmond that the Board

negotiators would have to go to the full Board to discuss
the current status of the negotiations.
that going to the Board was
·~Ibid.,

p.399.

me~ely

Redmond claimed

for guidance and was

95
necessary since the Board is "the source of our
authority." 9 6

He continued:

"! think that we are in a

position to do no more until we have touched base with our
Board." 9 7

This infuriated the Union negotiating team.

Union attorney Jacobs replied. "The Board of Education ls
not prepared to bargain collectively because it will not
give its committee the

po1~1 cr

to bargain with our Union.""''"'

This was affirmed by a remark made by Board member Thomas
Murray, "We haven't got the full power to negotiate, Joe,
you know that."""'?

Redmond concluded this session with both

sides agreeing not to comment to the press on other than
non-informative observations.

He remarked to the parties

that "we are finally within an area where we can go to our
Board and say we are within throwing distance of each
other . 11100
On 2 January 1969, negotiations continued after the
Board met to discuss the status of negotiations.
presented the Board's latest counterproposals.

Mrs. Wild
The Board

presented four points for discussion: 1> implementation of
the school

improvement programs of the 1968 contract, 2)

restoration of cuts in the educational program, 3) deferral
of salary and new educational programs until July, and 4)

"""'·Ibid., p. 400.
Ibid., p.401.
8
"'
Ibid.
"'""Ibid.
!OOibid.
97

96
continuance of negotiations on non-monetary items.

101

Desmond/s immediate reaction to thls proposal was one of
disappointment and he vie;Jed it as a complete rejection of
the Union/s requests.

Red~ond

noted that the new proposals

offered two changes in the Board/s position: the Board was
now willing to discuss salary Increases after the state
legislature had acted on increased school
was now will Ing to negotiate all

ald; and the Board

non-monetary ltems.

Desmond was irritated at the Board's offering

10

?

beca~se

the cost of the package was already considered in the
Board's November budget, and the new budget

included an

Increase of $6.5 mi 1 l Ion for increased administrative costs.
Desmond felt that the increased funds should be allocated to
Union priority items.
Desmond presented the Union's counterproposal on the
evening of 2 January 1969.

His new offer included: 1) the

complete implementation of the 1968 contract, 2) acceptance
of the Union/s certification demands, 3) an immediate $40
per month increase in salary to cover the cost of living,
and 4) all

items specified "effective September 1, 1969" to

be discussed later in the summer.

103

The Board/s new counter of fer on 3 January was rejected
because it provided additional monies for Board not Union
programs.

The negotiation session on 3 January lasted only

Chicago Board of Education, "Counter-Proposal," 2 January 1969
Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p. 404.
108
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101
1
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97
Later in the afternoon Desmond went before

twenty minutes.

the CTU/s House of Representatives and asking for a
rejection of the Board'. s proposa 1 and recommended a st r l :..~e
vote.

Earlier in the day Desmond had persuaded the members

of TAC to support his request for a strike vote.
attempted to set a date in April

for

TAC had

the start of the

stri~e

but this was defeated when it was argued that such a move
would destroy the Union/s flexibility during
negotiations.

10

""

The next negotiating session began on 4 January at 3:35

p.m. and

~8journed

at 11:45 p.m.

This session fol

lo~ed

a

three and a half hour executive session of the Board of
Education in which the negotiating team's r·ecommenda ti ons
were discussed.
spent

The majority of the negotiating session was

in off-the-record discussions and caucuses.'

05

The

thirteen points mandated by the Union/s House of
Representatives were discussed but only four had been agreed
upon before adjournment.

However, the Board did offer the

CTU discretionary power over $17.4 mill ion previously
included as a committed sum.

Although the Union felt some

progress had been made, they still were disappointed.

There

were three reasons that the Union was stil 1 Irritated by the
negotiations at this time.

The Board/s offer of

discretionary power over part of the budget was not a Union

10
1

""Ibid., p. 408.
Ibid. , p. 40 9.

r:i'""

98

demand.

Second, the Board was still refusing to consider a

cost of living increase.

Third, the Board was still

insisting on a full year contract.

106

Negotiations resumed the next day, Sunday, 5 January
1969.

Discussions lasted nearly thirteen hours, nine of

which were off-the-record.

Desmond was upset that after

eight hours of oft- the-record discussions, the Board was
stil 1 proposing a twelve-month contract without any
immediate pay raise for teachers.

Additionally, the Board

had included ten proposals that the Union had never
accepted.

Desmond reminded the Board that the Union

Representatives had recommended a strike at their last
meeting.

He reminded the Board that they had agreed to

"fashion a sufficiently satisfactory paci<.age with respect to
the vital lssues 11107 that would be acceptable to the Union
membership.

Board member Murray countered with his own

criticism of the Union/s refusal to negotiate on the ten
proposals submitted previously by the Board.

Heated

discussions continued both on and off-the-record.

Both

Desmond and attorney Jacobs, arguing for a slx-month
agreement, promised there would be no strike for the
six-month period.
As the session continued, there were several points at
which It appeared an agreement would be reached, but due to

10

""·Ibld.
Ibld., p. 410.

107

90

the Board/s insistence on their ten non-monetary proposals
the negotiations stopped.

Finally, the Board agreed to put

the!r proposals aside and discuss the two monetary, demands
that had not been agreed upon.

This discussion centered

around the Unlon/s demand for a $40 cost of Jiving increase,
effective 1 January.

Both sides spoke to the issue and gave

sound reasons for their stance.

Finally, Redmond asked the

Union leaders if they would accept a $40 increase effective
1 September.

The Union/s answer was no.

108

This session

continued with Jacob/s plea to the Board team to return to
the Board to request a salary increase because it was
necessary for the Union leadership to be able to say that
they had again asked for an increase.

Jacobs told the Board

team that it was in their best interest as wel 1 to keep the
present Union leadership in control.

The final argument of

the session revolved around Reduond/s announced intention tc
co~~unicate

with the teachers prior to the Union meeting of

6 January.

The Union so strongly opposed this suggestion

that Redmond decided not to do so.
The Union had felt that their request for a $40 cost of
living request was reasonable, espec!al ly since a quote from
Board member Murray In the Sun-Tlmes the day before stated
that he felt the Board could compromise, perhaps offering a
$40 a month cost-of-Jiving lncrease. 1 0 9

In the early

Ibid., p. 412.
•Joel Havemann, "Teacher Strike Vote Today,'' Chicago
Sun-Times, 6 January 1969, sec. 1, p. 3.
108

10

100

morning of 6 January, the Board/s negotiating team used a
telephone pol 1 to solicit support to include the salary
increase.

The pol 1 resulted in a 5-5 tie since one

could not be reached.

me~ber

One reporter, Hope Justus, speculated

that if he had been reached, the vote

wo~Jd

been 6-5 in favor of the pay increase.

110

have probably
Later on the same

day when the full Board met, the members returned to their
hard-line stand and rejected the proposal.

The Board,

however. offered to Increase educational program funds by
$1 . 7 mi l 1 ion .

Phone negotiations on 6 January were carried on between
Board headquarters and the Union.

Desmond agreed to take

the Board/s amended offer to the membership.

The amended

offer included: freezing class size as of September 1, 1968:
a planning project for federal funding of three inner-city
schools, and hiring of additional substitute teachers.

In

addition, the Board would consider certlflcation procedure
changes, further sa:ary advancement for FTBs, and
implementation of the 1968 contract clauses regarding
teacher aides, teacher workshops, and a pilot program for
socially maladjusted students.
Arguing for accepting the proposal "as the best we
could get from the Board of Education," Desmond recommended

Hope Justus, "Board Tried to Avert Strike Vote," Chicago
Dai Jy News, 7 Janurary 1969, sec. 1, p, 1.
110

101
acceptance of the contract fer the good of the children."

111

Opposition to the Board/s proposal was strong and vocal.
Kotsakis and TAC, reminding the membership that the

Ho~se

of

Representatives had recommended a strike unless substantial
progress had been made, he claimed that there had been
1 ittle progress.

Roy Stell and seventy-five members of

Operation Breadbasket walked out of the meeting to protest
the absence of automatic certification of FTBs.

As a result

of these factions within the Union, the membership rejected
the Board/s offer and authorized the House of
Representatives to set a strike vote.

The vote count was

1368 to reject the Board/s offer to 1148 to accept it.

117

Several reporters gave their opinion as to why the
proposal was rejected.
some merit.

Al 1 of the opinions seem to have

Havemann suggested that poor attendance at the

meeting Cless than 15 percent of the membership) and the
presence of a disproportionate number of Union militants
caused the defeat.

112

Dorfmann noted that those members who

voted against the contract did not all vote to reject the
proposal for the same reason.

114

Hope Justus claimed that

Desmond/s belief that the contract as presented was the best
the Union could do, was supported by several factors.

She

Ron Dorfmann, "Members Reject Plea to Accept Board/s Offer,"
Chicago American, 7 January 1969, sec. 1, p. 1.
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noted that: 1) two new Board members were "reformers'' rather
than pro-union; 2) the Board had hired a professional
negotiator in Wi ldrr,an; 3) some Board members felt that a pay
raise would not sit wel 1 with the legislature when the
Board asked for more funding; and 4) the solidarity that
Desmond had pleaded for did not

rnaterialize.

11

~

A fourth

reason could have been Desmond/s inability to conduct an
effective meeting.
Upon the Union/s rejection of the proposed contract,
Superintendent Redrriond addressed a letter to the teachers.
The letter noted that prior to its

.
L •
reJec~ron

by the

membership, the contract proposal had been accepted by the
negotiation committees and met all of the Union/s priorities
except a salary increase.

The Board members were Joined by

members of the media who suggested that a Union-wide
plebiscite on the contract would result in the contract/s
acceptance.
On 8 January, the Board, in executive session tried to
rework their offer, but failed when they were informed by
Desmond that any new offer would have to include some sort
of pay raise.

The Board voted 9-2 against such action and

voted against resuming negotiations.

Later in the day,

Desmond made it clear that he wanted another chance to
discuss the contract with the Board/s negotiating team.

115

Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p.417.
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Negotiations would take place on the next

day.

11

~

Negotiations resumed on 9 January, but no progress was
made because the Union continued to insist on a raise.

Mr2.

Wild rejected the idea immediately and called the move "an
Impasse to a settlement".

S;.;per-'.r.tendent Redmond intervened

and promised to report the situation to the ful I board.
This move by the

Super!ntende~t

enabled

Des~cnd

an

opportunity to dlsal low the strike matter to come up at the
House of Representatives meeting that afternoon and give
Union negotiators more time to reach an agreement.

117

The •Union returned to negotiations on 11 January with a
counterproposal that included a package of educational
Improvement items and nine additional
the previously accepted package.
contain a salary request.

Items not Included In

The new offer did not

The Board countered by accepting

only three of the Union/s new items and asked the CTU
leadership to arrange a referendum to approve the

...

en~;re

package and authorize a six-month continuance of the present
con tract.

1 1 8

The Union leadership was angered and noted that if their new
package was not accepted the leadership would have to call
for a strike vote.

Redmond Insisted that the Board could

not afford the additional $2 million in its budget and that
he felt the addition of the three items to the package was
.:·Ibid., p. 419.
~Ibid., p. 422.
118
Ibid.
11
11
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enough to call for a referendum. Before adjourning this
session. Desmond offered another counterproposal which fell
upon deaf ears.

Desmond then asked for and was grudgingly

granted a caucus.

Upon their return. the Union made a

formal statement to the Board negotiators requesting that
they present the Union's counterproposal to the entire
Board.
Board.

Red~ond
11

agreed to submit the proposal to the

""

The full Board met on the afternoon of 11 January.

At

this meeting, the Board approved its 1969 budget of $472
mill ion by a vote of 9-1.

After passing the budget, they

developed a new counterproposal to submit to the Union.
The new offer included:

120

1) a six month extension of the

fully implemented 1968 contract; 2) in September 1969 an
additional fifty adjustment teachers would be hired; 3)
in-service training for physical education teachers; 4)
compensatory time for publications sponsors; 5) special
counseling services for students suspended from school; and
6) a contract re-opening clause for salaries and educational

improvements when the supplemental budget was submitted in
August 1969.

1 21

On 12 January. the Union's Executive Board met and
decided to recom~end acceptance of the interim agreement.

Desmond noted that acceptance of the agreement would protect
119

Ibid., p. 423.

':c·o

Ibid.

121

Ibid., p. 424.
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the Union by a written contract.

Desmond also noted that

the CTU would have the right to strike after the agreement
ended on 13 June if the Board did not negotiate in good
faith or failed to implement fully the items agreed upon.
Kotsakis and members of TAC worked for the defeat of the
referendum on 20 January.
was 9622 to 5206.

177

The vote to accept the contract

The Un!on quickly made it known

that they would seek greater salary increases effective,1
September 1969.

The Chicago Union Teacher made the point

bluntly when an editorial

noted,

"CTU members have given a

mandate to President John Desmond and the negotiating team
to continue negotiations for educational

improvements and a

substantial salary increase for September."

122

PHASE THREE:
In the time between the signing of the interim contract
and the resumption of serious negotiations in mid-May,

there

were many new participants who would affect the Board-Union
negotiations.

After the signing, we see a spirit of

cooperation between the Union and the Board in their attempt
to influence the state legislature.

Shortly after the

interim agreement was affirmed, on 24 January 1969,
Superintendent Redmond appeared before the Illinois School
Problems Commission CSPC) and asked the legislators to
double the state aid formula and that the formula basis be

1 2 2
123

Ibid. , p. 426.
Editorial, Chicaoo Union Teacher, January 1969.
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changed

fro~

average daily attendance (ADA> to average dally

enrollment (ADE).

Redmond also noted that he felt that

teachers did deserve a sa1ary increase.

Desmond also

appeared before the SPC and echoed Redmond's requests.
These requests were genera1ly well received.

124

It was not until 24 March that the SPC made its
recommendation to the legislature when it requested an
increase in the foundation level to $550 and that average
daily enrollment should be used as the basis for computing
the aid.

Both Desmond and Redmond criticized the increases

as a ''token'' and desc::-lbed the action as "significant but
not enough."

1 2

~

On 2 ,Zl,pr i l, Governor Ogilvie recommended

raising the foundation level to $500, st11 l short of the SPC
recommendations.

126

On this same evening, WBBM-TV

editorialized that It disagreed with Governor Ogilvie's
recommendation.

The station noted that one of the reasons

Ogilvie had been elected was his statement that education
would be his administration's first priority.

Yet, his

funding proposal to the legislature was at least $50 short
of the School Problems Commission 1 s recommendation.

127

The funding crisis facing the Chicago public schools
caused the Union leadership to threaten a strike if the
legislature did not appropriate enough money to enable the
Landwerermeyer, Joe.cit., p. 428.
Justus, "Teacher Union Chief Raps School-Aid Plan,"
Chicago Daily News, 25 March 1969, sec.1, p. 5.
126
Herrlck, Joe.cit., p. 374.
127
Lanweremeyer, Joe.cit., p. 430.
124
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~Hope
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Board to give teachers a pay raise.

The CTU/s House of

Delegates voted to vacate classes on 22 Apri 1 to travel

to

Springfield as a group to try to Influence the leg!s!ature.
The Board of Education denounced the plan as depriving the
school children of Chicago of a day of education.

CTU

President Desmond asked the Board to close school on 22
April

so that teachers could march on Springfield.

added.

He

"if the Board refuses to shut the schools the

teachers wil ! close them themselves."

128

The Board of

Education ref used to c 1ose the schoo Is and Recfrnond noted.
think that anything that deprives children of even
of school

is unfortunate."

12

•

o~e

"I

day

The plan for a protest march

to Springfield was altered at the CTU House of
Representatives meeting on 11 April.
march from 22 April

to 29 April.

to set a strike date for 2 June.
strike date because he feared
angered by the action.

when it postponed the

Additional 1y, they voted
Desmond opposed setting a

the legislature might be

This feeling was also noted in a

Chicago Tribune editorial

on 16 April.

.-

The march on Springfield on 29 Apri I had no
impact.

irr~edlate

Teachers returned to Chicago and openly prepared

for a strike.

They felt that they had been ignored

by

the

legislators and used by the governor who used their march to
appeal
128

for support for the four percent

income tax program

Hope Justus, "School-Aid Protest March Set," Chicago Dally
News, 3Apri1 1969, sec. 1, p. 1.
12
"''Ibi d.
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that was to result

in higher state aid to schools. On 7 May,

Ogilvie recommended a raise in the foundation
an increase of $20, but still

to $520.

level

Jess than what the House

Education Committee, the CTU, and the Board of Education
insisted they needed.

130

Since there was l lttle progress to report, Desmond
announced that he would recofilmend at the 9 May meeting that
the House of Representatives call
teachers.

for a strike vote by the

Prior to the meeting the Board and Union

negotiating teams met on 7 May to discuss the Union's "final
offer".

The CTU presented a package that included

provisions for Union approval of any layoffs, no cutbacks In
educational programs, and a $150 monthly increase in
salary effective September 1969.
these
for

demands.'~'

The Board team rejected

The Union leadershlp was well prepared

its meeting on 9 May and the House of Representatives

voted 297-3 for a strike by the Union membership.

The House

did not accept the !eadershlp's suggested strike date but
opted for 22 May, the date proposed by the militant
factlons.

13

?

The stage was now set for a strike.

After the vote,
predictable.

the reaction of the various actors was

Desmond noted that the teachers had threatened

to use a strike before but this time it was apparent that
the threat must be fol lowed through.
Ibid., p. 435.
436.
182
Ibid., p.437.
180
181

Ibid., p.

Governor Ogilvle told

109
the press that "If they walk out, they're going to stay out
because I am not going to give them any help."

133

Mayor

Daley let it be known that he was anxious to mediate a
settlement and prevent a strike.
favored a pay raise.

He openly declared that he

An appeal was made on 13 May by

Operation Breadbasket, the Black Teacher Caucus, and the
United Educational Employees to keep Biack schools open in
spite of the vote by the House of Representatlves.
this opposition,
two-one margin

Despite

the strike vote on 16 May passed by a

(10,944-5,438).

13

~

The CTU was now committed

to strlke~n 22 May.
Reaction to the strike vote included editorials by the
daily papers asking the parties to get together.

Governor

Ogilvie asked Desmond to meet with him in Springfield.

The

Union requested a meeting with the ful J Board of Education
on 19 May to present its case.

As in the past, Mayor Daley

offered to serve as a mediator.
Support of the strike within the Union varied greatly.
TAC and John Kotsakis supported the strike and asked their
members to stay out until significant gains had been made.
Hard-line Black teachers, following the leadership of
Operation Breadbasket, promised to keep Black schools open.
Redmond noted that with the support of Black teachers many

133

David Young, "Desmond Defies Governor/ He Urges City
Teachers to Back Strike/ Union to Vote in Schools Friday,"
Chicago Tribune, 12 May 1969, sec. 1, p. 12.
13
""Herrick, Joe.cit., p. 375.
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classrooms could remain open.

The Union/s reaction to this

strike boycott was not to schedule picketing at any school
where Black teachers had not promised the Union their
supper t.

1 35

Two attempts to avoid the strike were made.
the full

On 19 May,

Board of Education met with the Union negotiators.

After the session, Board President Whiston reported that the
Board had made a substantial offer to the Union.

However,

two major omissions in the offer were pay raises and
certification of FTBs.
offer.'~~

Desmond and the Union rejected the

The second attempt was made when Mayor Daley

called both parties to his office at 10:00 a.m. on 21 May.
The Board and the Union both sald they appreciated the
Mayor/s assistance but no new offers were made.

After the

meeting, Superintendent RedTJond announced that the schools
would be closed during the strike.
The first teacher strike in Chicago's history began on
22 May 1969.

Almost 18,600 teachers honored the strike and

did not cross the picket

line.

More than seventy-five

percent of the elementary and high school
the strike.

However,

teachers honored

the boycott of the strike by Black

teachers was more successful when forty-f lve percent of the
teachers showed up for school . 1 3 7

~Sam Washington, "Inner City Teachers Defy Union's Order to
Strike," Chicago Sun-Times, 23 May 1969, sec.1, p. 52.
1
"''"' Landwerermeyer,
J oc. cit., p. 442.
137
lbid., p. 443.
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Again Mayor Daley offered hls services as mediator and
sought the governor/s support in solving the school problem.
Negotiation sessions were lengthy and after two days
negotiating, a settlement was reached.

o~

At 10:00 p.m. on

Friday, 23 May, the Board voted 6-5 to accept most of the
demands of the Union,

including a $100 monthly raise,

guarantees against cutbacks and layoffs, some educational
Improvements, and certification of FTBs after three yea1·s of
satisfactory ratings.

The Mayor had assured Board members

that he would get the money to implement the settlement.

It

ls thought that the breakthrough occurred during a
conversation between the Mayor and the Governor when the
Mayor offered Ogilvie support for his tax plan.

138

On Saturday, 24 May, the Union House of Representatives
voted 285-30 to end the strlke and accept the settlement.
Union membership was

as~ed

to vote In area schools on

Sunday, 25 May, and they overwhelming approved it by a vote
of over 9,000 to
May.

585.

18

~

Classes resumed on Monday, 26

Two days later the Board formally approved the

contract by a 6-4 vote.

Although it appeared that the

salary issue was the main item discussed, probably the most
significant advance made by the Union was the new
certification procedure for FTBs.

This new system placed a

new burden on principals when rating their FTBs.

188
189

Ibid., p. 444.
Herrick, Joe.cit., p. 376.

A third

'1....,

l J. "'-

favorable rating could mean the certification of a FTB
teacher who previously would not have been able to meet the
Board's requirements.
PHP-.SE FOUR:

The settlement of the contract in May did not end the
problems for the Board and the teachers.

In a shm,' of

unlty. Board President Whiston, Union President Desmond, and
Superintendent

Red~ond

all agreed not to get involved ir. the

fight for the income tax bi 11.

It is speculated that the

Mayor suggested to the three leaders that they al low his
supporters to carry on the battle in Springfield.

Chicago

Today reported that the agreement between Daley and Ogilvie
included the fol lowing:

1) Daley would furnish support for

the Governor's income tax plan, 2) the Republicans would
help the Democrats increase Chicago's share of the sales
tax, 3) the school aid formula would be increased to $550
and based on enrollment, and 4> Republican bl lls aimed at
dismantling the Chicago machine wouid be defeated.

140

The

spirit of cooperation between Democrats and Republ leans
began to erode when Ogilvie complained that the Democrats
had failed to support his flat-rate income tax.

The

legislature passed a dual-rate income tax C2.5 percent
personal and 4.0 percent corporate> Just two days before it
adjourned.

Further problems developed when the Senate

"Bi-Partisan Furor over Ogilvie-Daley Tax Bill Unequalled,"
Chicago Today, 15 June 1969, sec.1, p. 3.
140

113

changed the schoo1 aid base to enrollment rather than
attendance as suggested by the House.

141

With these and

other conflicts continuing in Springfield, the Chicago Board
had good reason to wonder if state monies would become
available to meet their May settlement.
By mid-sumrner it was evident that the Board would have
financial difflcu;ties ln meeting its contract requirements.
On 10 July 1969, Mayor Daley informed the Board that
revenues that the city had planned to give to the Board
not materialized and that the city's share of the sales tax
would not be aval I able untl I the fol lowing year.

Daley

advised the Board that they should still honor the terms of
their contract.

On 5 August Redmond offered the Boa::-d five

possible budget plans at a specla! meeting cal led to resolve
the school system's financial crisis.

The Board was $30

mil lion short of funds needed to support all of its
committed programs.

The Board approved a plan that included

cutting the salary increase in half, cutting vacation pa/,
and reducing transfer

rlghts.

1

~

7

The Board realized that any cuts would raise the ire of
the Union.

The next day Red-:-;ond invited the Unlon

leadership to discuss the crisis.

The Union protested the

cuts and argued that changes ln the agreement must be agreed
upon by both parties.

141

142

Vivian Gallagher, Vice-president of

Herrick, Joe.cit., p. 378.
Landwerermeyer, loc.clt., p. 450.
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the CTU, wrote to the membership to explain the situation
and solicit wide-spread Union support for a rejection of the
Board's action.

When Desmond returned

fro~

a short

vacation, the Board and Union negotiating teams met for a
two hour session on 13 August.

The two sides remained apart

with Redmond and the Board insisting that cuts must be
so that a supplemental budget could be passed

by.

:nade

15 August.

After the budget was passed, the Union House of
Representatives voted overwhelmingly to begin a strike
beginning 3 September. 1 4 8
The

ne~spapers

in Chicago supported the teacters and

asked the Board to honor its contract.
to mediate but lt

beca~e

unnecessary.

Daley again offered
On 28 August, the

negotiation teams met and as a result of new monies

~ade

available, the Board agreed to lrnplement the 1969 contract
to the Union's satisfaction.

Some

ite~s

of the original

agreement were postponed untll 1 January 1970 but these
changes were mlnor and acceptable to the Union.

Jn 20

August, the Board passed a resolution of intent to fulfl 11
the agreement reached by the negotiations committee.

The

Union membership voted on 2 September to postpone the strike
to give the Board time to Incorporate the settlement In Its
official budget.

144

With this action, the schools were able

to open without the immediate threat of a strike.
Ibid .• p. 453.
Chicago Teachers Union Collection, Chicago Historical
Society, Box 56.
143

144
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NEGOTIATIONS 1970 - SETTLEMENT BEFORE A STRIKE VOTE
After the previous year/s negotiations, those of 1970
were much less stressful.

Since 1969 negotiations actually

lasted until September, there was 1 ittle time to set
priorities for the 1970 contract.
team remained the same.

The Union negotiation

The Board team included Dr. Wesley

Wildman Ca professional negotiator), Guy Brunetti, Dr.
Eileen Stack, and Thomas Murray of the Law Department.

The

Board members of the Employee Relations Committee included
Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, Mrs. Carey Preston, and Mr. Thomas
Murray.

Negotiations were cordial throughout the month of

December.

Their was one exception to this feeling of

cooperation.

The December issue of the Chicago Union

Teacher had an editorial that cal led for no contract, no
work.

14

~

The Union leadership felt that there was

sufficient progress to return to work after the Christmas
holiday without the threat of a strike.

The Union/s House

of Representatives rejected a Board proposal on 7 January
and called for a strike vote on
beginning the fol lowing day.

1~

January with the strike

146

In an effort to avoid a strike vote, both negotiating
teams met on Saturday, 10 January, and negotiated throughout
the night and arrived at an agreement twenty-three hours

~"No Contract, No Work", Chicago Union Teacher, Editorial,
December 1969, p.2.
146
"House Rejects Board Proposal", Chicago Union Teacher,
January 1970, p. 1.
14
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later.

Superintendent Redmond informed the press that

proposed budget cuts would make the Union package possible.
Items that were eliminated for the last half of the year
included non-classroom personnel, summer school, supplies,
and materials.t

47

Redmond assured the public and the

Teachers Union that "this proposal does not envision the
reduction of teachers who face children in the
classroom."

149

In order to finance the package agreed upon,

it was necessary for the Board of Education to adopt a
fiscal pol icy that financed the first half of the school
year and depended upon seeking more funds from Springfield
to finance the second half of the year.
The Union/s House of Representatives approved the
Board/s package but only after a two and a half hour debate.
Union President Desmond urged for contract acceptance and
noted, "You told us you weren/t interested in salary
increases as much as you were in reducing class size, and we
got what you wanted."

149

The new package included

salar~.

increases ranging from nothing for new teachers to $1250 for
teachers with fifteen years or more experience.

Among the

items negotiated by the Union were:
1. Reduction of class size in 150 schools in May, 100
more in October, and 50 more in November.
2. Employ 50 more EMH teachers.
147

Casey Banas, "School Pact Gets First OK," Chicago Tribune,
12 January 1970, p. 1.
1 4
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Stan Ziemba,"Hot Debate Accompanies Teacher Vote", Chicago
Tribune, p.1.
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3. Provide summer school for EMH students.
4. Compress the salary schedule from 36 years to 15
years.
5. Increase salary lane differential by $15 a month
beginning in September.
6. A 5% increase in salary for civil service personnel.
7. Payment of 1/2 of family hospitalization insurance.
8. Restore two weeks of paid vacation.
9. Restore lost adjustment teacher and teacher aide
positions.
10. Extension of FTB certification by three year
satisfactory experience.
11. Allow the Chicago Teachers Union to participate in
hearings to integrate school personnel.
12. Consideration by the Board to allow teacher aides to
vote for a collective bargaining agent. ~
1

0

After the teachers voted to accept the new contract, the
Board of Education approved the contract by 6-5 vote.
Members voting for the contract were: Carey, Preston,
Friedman, Wild, Murray, and Whiston.

Members voting against

were: Malis, Witkowsky, Bacon, Boutte, and

Cerda.

1

~

1

In order to comply with an agreement reached with the
Chicago Teachers Union, it became necessary for the Board of
Education to offer teacher aides the right to select the

Chicago Teachers Union to act as their collective
agent.

bar~aining

On 14 October, the Board authorized such an

election.

The results of the election are shown in figure

3.2.

1

~ 0 "Provisions

in Pact OK'd By Leaders of Teacher Union,"
Chicago Tribune, 12 January 1970, p.2.
~ 1 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28
January 1970, Chicago, Il., p.2857.
1

118
RESULTS OF TEACHER AIDE ELECTION
Ballots mailed
Ballots cast
Ballots returned as undeliverable
Results:
Chicago Teachers Union
No Representative desired
Spoiled or invalid ballots
Total
Figure 3.2

1

~2

1863
1339
11

1013

92
~

1339

This election resulted in an increase of over one thousand
new members for the Chicago Teachers Union.

PICKET LINES AGAIN AS 1971 NEGOTIATIONS FAIL
Contract negotiations began again in the fa! I for the
contract year 1971.

Initially the Board produced a budget

that had eliminated teacher vacation pay, personal

leave

days, and "automatic" pay increments based on tenure.
Board later restored these items.

The

This act would become

controversial because the Board considered the restoration
of the items as part of their new contract package while the
Union considered these items as part of the master contract.
Both the Board and Union negotiators continued talking
throughout December and into January.

The Union/s House of

Representative/shad established 12 January 1971 as the
strike date and a membership referendum authorized the date
by a 16,706 to 1,493 vote.

1

es

Long hours of negotiations

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 18
November 1970, Chicago, II., p.830.
ie 3 "Annual Strike Threat", Chicago Tribune, 11 January 1971, p.16
1

e

2
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did not bring about an agreement.

Union president Desmond

presented the Board/s latest offer to the House of
Representatives at a 4:30 p.m. meeting on 11 January and it
was "unanimously rejected".

The strike began on Tuesday, 12

January, and depending upon whose statistics you select it
was between 91.6 and 98 per cent effective.

However. both

sides continued to negotiate after the strike began.

Mrs.

Lydon Wild, Board negotiator, made a positive statement
following a three and one-half hour negotiation session.
Wild noted, "It/snow safe to say that we are trying our
level best to solve some of these problems. 111 !!5 4
followed a harder line after the session.

Desmond

He listed

differences in educational improvements, fringe benefits,
and class size.

He pessimistically said that "The teachers

wil 1 remain out until these issues are settled. 111 !!5!!5
The Union estimated the cost of their demands at $42
mil lion, while Redmond estimated the package at over $64
mil lion.

Redmond told reporters that "the Board sincerely

regrets that the Union negotiating team continues to demand
a financial package that the Board cannot meet."

1

!!5

6

He

noted that the Board/s latest package restored all previous
reductions and included a 4 per cent cost of I ivlng pay
increase.

Edith Herman, "Union House Rejects Bid from Board," Chicago
Tribune, 12 January 1971, sec.1, p.1.
1

!!5

4

1 ~ !!51...Ql.Q •
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Ibid.; p.2.
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The first hint that the feuding parties might seek help
from the mayor came on 12 January when Mrs. Wild said,
"Mayor Daley may be the answer to this."

Desmond responded

by saying that negotiations were not yet at an impasse and
he could not discuss whether the mayor would be asked to
help.

1

~7

Mayor Daley declared that his office "would be

open" to both sides if they wished his aid in solving the
dispute.

This offer was not appreciated by al 1.

The

Citizens Schools Committee urged the mayor "to refrain from
participating in salary negotiations, and to allow the Board
to exercise their legal right to make crucial salary
decisions without outside

interference."

1

~9

Although the Board presented a new offer to the Union
on 13 January,

it was rejected because it was "very

inadequate" and "does not even meet the cost of Jiving
increase."

1e 9

Mayor Daley again became involved with negotiations
when he summoned both sides to his off ice at 2:00 p.m. on
Thursday, 14 January.

After twel.ve hours of shuttling

between the two parties the mayor announced an agreement had
been reached at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

Mayor

Daley was joined by Superintendent Redmond, Board President
Carey, and Union President Desmond to announce that a
1

~

7

Edith Herman, "Teachers' Strike Goes into Second Day,"
Chicago Tribune, 13 January 1971, sec.1, p.1.
1ee.l..l;;ti_Q.
1

9

Edith Herman, "Teachers Reject New Bid." Chicago Tribune, 14
January 1971, sec.1, p.1.
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settlement had been reached.

Terms of the agreement were

not announced until after the House of Representatives

meeting

late~

that day.

On Saturday, 16 January, the House of Representatives
approved the package by a 2 to 1 margin and the general
membership approved the contract the next day by a vote of
7,429 to 1,290. 1 6 0

The package worked out in the mayor/s

office was truly unique in that it covered a period of two
years.

The Board of Education gave its/ preliminary

approval with an 8-2 vote.

The two year contract was

officially approved on 17 February 1971 by a 7-2 vote.
Member Sbarboro voted against the contract noting that he
did so only because he questioned the legality of the length

of the contract. 161

Union Attorney Joe Jacobs told

reporters that the legislature wi11 be asked to make a
simple amendment to the school code, and that the contract
wi I I be legally sustained.

11162

'The package included the

fol lowing provisions for 1971:
1.Salary increase of 8 per cent for teachers.
2.Salary increase of 7 per cent for civil service
employees.
3.Salary increase of 10 per cent for teacher aides.
4.Full premium cost for individual and family health
insurance.
5.Lower class size in 150 schools.
6.Expanded special education summer schools.
16011
Contract Approved", Union Teacher, Special Edition, 17
January 1971, p.1.
161
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 17
February 1971, Chicago, II., p.2742.
162
Edith Herman, "Teachers/ House Accepts Pact", Chicago
Tribune, 16 January 1971, sec.1, p.1.
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7.Additional supplies for practical arts classes.
8.Col Jective bargaining representative vote for
ESEA teacher aides. 1 0 8
The second year of the package will be discussed
separately because of the difficulties the Board of
Education faced in late 1971.

The Board-Union agreement had

provided for the reopening of contract talks after 1 July if
either side had items that they felt must be discussed.

A CONTRACT COLLAPSES - STRIKE IS THREATENED
A salary freeze, benefit cut-backs, early closings,
class size increases, and teacher layoffs were among the
suggestions offered by the Board of Education during
contract discussions in the winter of 1971.

Although the

contract reached in January provided for additional salary
increases of 8 per cent for teachers, and 7 per cent for
other civil service employees, the Board found itself
without the necessary resources to provide the increases and
asked the Union to re-negotiate.

After over a month of

negotiations with the Board, Union president Desmond
announced that he would ask the Union representatives to set
a strike date against the Board.

"The Union dispute with

the Board ls not over salary increases alone.

The Board at

this tlme ls also proposing to lay off more than 1,800
classroom teachers and a large number of civil service

a~d

"Teacher Pact Data", Chciago Tribune, 16 January 1971,
sec.1, p.2.
103

123
other personne 1 • "u. 4

Desmond a 1 so noted threatened cu ts in

teacher/s fringe benefits.
The Chicago Teachers Union House of Representatives
voted overwhelmingly <314-14> to begin a strike on Tuesday,
18 January

1972.

10

~

A strike vote was held in the schools

on 11 January and the strike date accepted by the general
membership.

On the same day, Board member and negotiator

Wild announced that a new offer was going to be made to the
Union.

Although this attempt to appease the Union failed,

negotiations continued.

The Board postponed the passing of

the 1972 budget while bargaining sessions were taking place.
On 14 January a compromise was reached and the Union
House of Representatives recommended acceptance by a 158-133
vote.

106

The compromise restored al 1 benefits to the

teachers but lessened the salary increase to 5.5 percent.
The offer was financed by cutting the school year by eleven
days, depending upon at least $29.5 mil lion in additional
aid from the legislature, and cutting 1,036 positions. 1 6 7
Union president Desmond said that the Union would seek
arbitration for restoration of the salary increase and
would seek additional help in the legislature for funds to
keep the schools open in June.
104

Union membership voted to

Edith Herman, "Union President to Recommend City Teachers
Vote for Strike," Chicago Tribune, 9 January 1972, sec.1, p.1.
~Edith Herman, "Teacher Delegates Ask for Jan.18 Strike,"
Chicago Tribune, 10 January 1972, sec.1, p.1.
160
Edith Herman, "Union Urges Teachers OK Compromise," Chicago
Tribune, 15 January 1972, sec. 1, p.1.
10

1 6 ?'

.l.bl..d .
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accept the contract settlement by a vote of

11,416-7,394.

16

~

Desmond defended the relatively close vote by saying there
was a high teacher absentee rate and that members did not
understand the Board/s budgetary practices.

The vote

al lowed schools to remain open, at least for the time being.
Another surprise was given to the teachers by the Board
of Education when on 1 February it announced its intention
to demote 668 special service teachers and return them to
the classroom in a cost cutting move.

These demotions

resulted in the firing of 600 classroom teachers.

The Union

and a group of those demoted filed for an injunction in
Circuit Court but were denied.

The Union declined to call

for a strike over the matter but noted that they would file
an appeal of the court/s decision.
At the 14 April meeting of the Union/s House of
Representatives, an overwhelming vote was taken to issue a
warning resolution to the Board of Education regarding the
proposed eleven day school closing.

The Union announced

that they would take "any action necessary,

including a

strike, to prevent these and any other contract
violations."

1

'•

These words were carried into action in

mid-May when the Union Executive Board and the House of
Representative recommended that the membership hold a strike

1

9

Edith Herman. "No School Strike, OK Pact," Chicago Tribune,
18 January 1972, sec. 1, p.1.
~Edith Herman, "Teachers Union Threatens Strike," Chicago
Tribune,·· 15 April 1972, sec.1, p.1.
•

16
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vote on 22 May and set a date for the strike of 25 May.
As the referendum day approached, Superintendent
Redmond wrote a letter to teachers asking for their support
and understanding of the Board/s current financial position.
The strike vote was approved by the closest margin in the
history of Teachers Union voting - 10,391 to 10,193. 170
Negotiations were resumed the morning after the
referendum.

The Board offered to cut the eleven day school

closure to six days in June and five in December.

This

would give the Board some more time to seek new funds.
Additionally, they offered to restore some of the cut
positions it money became available.

Contract negotiations

continued and resulted in an agreement reached late in the

evening on 24 May.

The agreement contained the following

items:
1.Cutting the 11-day closing to 5 days and paying the
teachers for six extra days.
2.Restoration of proposed September cuts in music, art,
and physical education.
3.Restoration of al I fringe benefits.
4.Restoration of special teachers who were displaced in
January. 171
The agreement was narrowly approved by the Board with a
6-5 vote.

Board member Warren Bacon warned that "the

language was not clear in its intent," and indicated that he
"feared the Union would demand all restorations whether or

170

Edith Herman, "Slim OK for School Strike," Chicago Tribune,
22 May 1972, sec.1, p.1.
171
"Facts of Settlement at a Glance," Chicago Tribune, 25 May
1972, sec.1, p.1.
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not state aid comes through."

172

Redmond said that he was

pleased with the offer because it was a victory for the
school board which basically gave up nothing but made
everything contingent on the possibility of additional state
aid.

17

~

The school year ended five days early and both

sides awaited help from the legislature.

NEGOTIATIONS 1973- A NOVELTY AND ANOTHER STRIKE
In one sense, the Board-Union negotiations for 1973
began on 26 January 1972.

It was on this day that Warren H.

Bacon first introduced the idea of conducting contract
negotiations in public.

174

A committee was established to

meet with Superintendent Redmond and his staff, as well as
with President Healey and his Union staff, to discuss
guidelines for conducting public negotiating sessions.
Members of the committee included Warren H. Bacon as
chairman, Thomas Nayder and Catnerine Rohter as members.
At a meeting on 11 September 1972, President Healey·
indicated that he opposed public negotiations because of
what he considered the potential of a circus atmosphere and
the difficulty of changing bargaining positions once taken
in public.

He felt that both parties should be better

informed about the progress of negotiations and this could
172

Edith Herman and Clarence Page, "Teachers to Vote on New
Offer," Chicago Tribune, 25 May 1972, sec.1, p.2.
173.I..bl.d·
174

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 26
January 1972, Chicago, II., p.2853.

127
be achieved by timely news releases and press
conferences.

17

~

At this same meeting, a committee member

moved that public negotiations not be considered by the
Board.

The motion carried 2-1.

The chairman noted that

the committee would bring the question of public
negotiations to the full Board for its official action.

176

Hope Justus, a Tribune columnist, reported that Wesley A.
Wildman, the Board/s labor relations consultant, also
advised against public negotiations.
meeting of 11 October 1972,

177

At the Board

the ful 1 Board voted to hold

open negotiations by a vote of 7-3.

179

At later meetings guidelines were established for the
public negotiations.

Among the items included in the

guidelines were specific deadlines for Board proposals,
prohibition of electronic equipment, provision for private
meeting rooms for caucuses, and reserved seats for eight
city-wide organizations.

Negotiations were to begin on 4

December 1972. 1 7 9
As noted earlier, the Union, the Board/s labor
relations consultant and at least three Board members were
opposed to public negotiations.
17

Superintendent Redmond also

~Minutes of the Chciago Board of Education Meeting, 27
September 1972, Chicago, II., p.828.
176
Ibid.
177
Hope Justus, "Contract Talks Going Public", Chicago Tribune,
20 October 1972, sec.1, p.20.
179
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 11
October 1972, Chicago, II., p.835.
179
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 29
November 1972, Chicago, II., p.1357-58.
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opposed "negotiations in a fishbowl".

In an interview with

Superintendent Redmond on 28 July 1989, he recalled that "I
objected to the public negotiations and to the Board/s
participation In them rather than staff members.
did decide to conduct public negotiations,
Brunetti to advise them.

When they

I gave them Guy

When the Board began these

negotiations al 1 that they did was to take a stance and make
speeches.

They never got down to negotlate."

190

Redmond

continued to recal 1 the negotiations when he noted, "you
can/t yell and get down to real negotiations when the public
was present.

Bob Healey agreed and he told me he was going

to use the meetings to make speeches to support his
proposals."

101

Redmond stayed away from the public

negotiations and left the Board and Brunetti handle them.
As negotiations continued with little progress, Redmond was
eventually able to convince the Board that it would be more
constructive to negotiate in an executive session which they
did.

Redmond noted that he remained with the Board members

while Brunetti and the Union negotiated.
As mentioned earlier, negotiations began on 4 December
1972 but there was no critical moment until 2 January 1973
when the Union leadership offered to scale down its salary
demands from ten to two and one-half per cent.

The Union

leadership also called on the Union House of Representatives

180
161

Redmond Interview,
Ibid.

lac.cit.
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to recommend a strike date of 10 January and for a strike
vote in the schools on 5

January.

1

~~

Progress prior to the

strike vote was limited to an offer to extend the present
contract to the end of the school year.

Healey flatly

rejected the offer and called for teachers to support a
strike vote.

Teachers listened to their leadership and

approved the strike date by the largest margin ever in a CTU
vote, 16,565 -

2,997.

19

~

Both Union and Board leaders asked to meet with
Governor-Elect Dan Walker to discuss the possibility of
state assistance in overcoming the negotiations deadlock.
The governor-elect was not available for discussion until
the day before the strike date.

President Healey asked

chief Board negotiator, Mrs. Wild, to assemble the full
Board for discussions on the weekend prior to the strike to
consider a new offer from the Union.

Mrs. Wild refused to

cal 1 the ful 1 Board together before the meeting with
Governor-elect Walker.
After meeting with the governor-elect, the two sides
had somewhat differing opinions as to what took place.

Mrs.

Wild noted that "nothing the governor said today wil 1 allow
us to give one more dollar to the teachers tomorrow."

182

184

Edith Herman, "Union Leaders Urge Strike, but Lower Demands
on Wages," Chicago Tribune, 3 January 1973, sec.1, p.1.
103
"Strike vote, Walker to Join Teacher Talks," Chicago
Tribune, 6 January 1973, sec.1,p.1.
184
Edith Herman, "No Time Set for Renewed Negotiations,"
Chicago Tribune, 10 January 1973, sec.1, p.1.
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Healey disagreed with the Board about the outcome of the
meeting.

"The governor obviously is committed to leading

the way for more aid to the schools," he said, "that should
be enough to get the Board back to the bargaining table and
make an agreement with

us."

19

~

As a result of their

continuing disagreements, the strike began as planned on 10
January 1973.
Negotiations over the next twelve days continued with
no real progress being made.

Some minor issues were

resolved but as of 22 January the major issues of reduced
class size, teacher preparation time, and a shortened school
year remained.

The inevitable happened, Mayor Daley cal led

the sides together to see if he could help find a
settlement.

Although no solution was found immediately,

some new inroads were made.

The final

issues, shortening

the school year and the hiring of additional teachers,
were solved in the early hours of 25 January 1973.
The Union membership was asked to vote on the contract
that increased their salary by

t~o

and one-half percent,

shortened the school year to 39 weeks, extended class size
limits to all 600 schools, gave an additional preparation
period in elementary schools, and provided seven make up
days to offset salary lost during the strike.

The

membership vote of 8,145 to 1,012 ended the longest school
strike in the history of the Chicago schools after sixteen
1 9'!1.lli.d.

13~
days.'

8

~

The brief experiment with Board members serving as
negotl3tors left much to be desired.
that fact

~nd

~uthorlzlng

The Board realized

on 28 March 1073 Introduced a motion

the staff to lnvestlgate alternatives for future

~egotiations.

The motion was adopted by a 10-0

vote.

18

~

The Board had obviously learned from this experience because
at it/s 25 April
recom~endation

l073 meeting it accepted the fol lowing

from Superintendent Redmond:

It is recommended that the day-to-day collective
negotiations be the direct responsibility of the
General Superintendent of Schools, util !zing an
administrative staff team, a Board of Education
attorney, and a negotiations consultant. <Mr. Wesley
A. Wildman, who is also an attorney is currently
serving in this capacity.)
The General Superintendent of Schools and appropriate
members of staff involved in the negotiations will meet
with the Board of Education to establish prior
positions. During the course of negotiations, the
General Superintendent and appropriate staff will meet
with the Board to keep the Board advised of the
progress of negotiations and to secure additional
input from the Board. The Board shall be involved in
the final agreement. 1 0 8
As a result of the collective bargaining agreement of
1973, the Board held an election to determine it ESEA
teacher aides would be represented by a col lectlve
bargaining agent.

The election held on 18 April resulted in

Edith Herman, "Teachers OK New Pact 8-1," Chicago Tribune,
26 January 1973. sec.!, p.1-2.
187
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 March
1973, Chicago, Il .• p.2377.
~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 April
1973, Chicago, Il .• p.2506.
186
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the Chicago Teachers Union being named the agent for over
800 teacher aides.

189

The Teachers Union gained further

strength to be used in future negotiations.

EIGHT MONTH CONTRACT REACHED WITHOUT STRIKE THREAT
Negotiations for 1974 began in October and continued
through the end of the year without any strike threat.
Union President Robert Healey noted that "The Board has been
negotiating in good faith, and there/s no need to threaten a
strike to get action at the table."

190

By January, both

sides had agreed on a reduction in maximum class sizes and
the hiring of 400 new teachers.
The term of the contract was set at eight months
because the Board of Education was changing its fiscal year
to coincide with the school year.

Contracts would begin to

coincide with the school year rather than the calendar year.
The negotiating teams for the Union and the Board reached an
agreement for the period
on 17 January 1974.

1 January 1974 to 31 August 1974

The new contract cal led for a salary

increase of 6.3 per cent for most teachers and Union civil
service workers.

Also included in the settlement was an

additional preparation period per week in January and a
second period beginning in June.

199

Union members also

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 23 May
1973, Chicago, II., p.2980.
19
°Connie Lauerman, "Teacher, Board Talks Stalled," Chicago
Tribune, 4 January 1974, sec.1A, p.6.
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received increased medical and life insurance benefits.

191

A period of relative calmness had arrived in the Chicago
Public Schools.

NEGOTIATIONS 1974-75 - UNION WILL WORK RATHER THAN STRIKE
In late August Union President Healey announced that
the Chicago Teachers Union would continue to work on a day
to day basis as long as current contract talks continue.

He

announced that Union demands would include salary increases,
improved fringe benefits, and reduced class size.
Negotiations continued into mid-September without any strike
threat.

However, the Union House of Representatives voted

<302-2) on 14 September to set a 19 September referendum
to begin a strike on 23 September.

After the House vote,

192

both Healey and Superintendent Redmond issued press releases
that indicated that both sides were still optimistic towards
avoiding a strike.

Redmond said, "I think a strike vote is

absolutely unnecessary.

I recognize it as part of a

technique of the bargaining process.
there will be no need for a strike."

I am confident that
19

s

Negotiations continued through the 19 September
referendum.

Superintendent Redmond spoke to the press on

Thursday morning and said that tentative agreements had been
191

Connle Lauerman, "Teachers, Board OK Tenative Pact," Chicago
Tribune, 18 January 1974, sec.1, p.5.
192
Casey Banas, "Teacher Strike Vote Ok'd," Chicago Tribune, 15
September 1974, sec.1, p.1.
19Sl..Qj_g.
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reached on al 1 issues except salaries.

He noted that the

Union/s "salary demands are indeed excessive" but he
remained hopeful

that negotiations would continue and a

settlement reached.
The final

194

negotiation session began at 4:00 pm Saturday

and ended with an agreement at 7:30 am Sunday.

President

Healey spoke to reporters after the agreement and said, "It
was a tribute to the collective bargaining process that we
reasoned out our differences without a

strike.

1119

~

Among

the items in the settlement were:
1. The hiring of 200 elementary school and 100 high
school teachers to cover additional preparation
time.
2. An increase in major medical benefits to $40,000.
3. Individual teacher supply accounts of $28.
4. Salary increases ranging from 4 to 11 per cent. 1 9 6
The Union membership overwhelming voted to accept the
contract by a 18,037 to 1,676 margin.

197

THE REDMOND APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Redmond/s interest in collective bargaining was
witnessed in the topic of his dissertation, Administrative
Factors Affecting Teacher Strikes, written in 1947.

In

studying Redmond/s approach to collective bargaining during
Dave Schneidman, "School Strike Vote Today; Redmond Asks
More Talks,"
Chicago Tribune, 19 September 1974, sec.1, p.1.
~Casey Banas, "Avert Strike; School Today," Chicago Tribune,
23 September 1974, Sec.1, p.1.
611
1
""
Special Report: 1974 Contract," Union Teacher, Seeptember
1974, Vol .XL, No. 19.
197
"Chicago Teachers Union Members Vote to Accept New
Contracf, 11 Chicago Tribune, 26 September 1975, sec.2, p.8.
194

19
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his tenure as Superintendent in Chicago, we can compare his
findings in 1947 to the situations he encountered during his
negotiations with the Teachers Union.

Redmond listed seven

factors that contributed to teacher strikes in his study.
They are:
1. The lack of channels of communication between
teachers and administrators, and between the boards
of education and the citizens of the community.
2. The lack of an opportunity for teachers to
participate in the determination of policies which
affected them.
3. The imprudent discharge of obligations on the part
of status leaders, both the leaders within the
school system and the leaders of the teacher
organizations.
4. The lack of fiscal
education.

independence of the boards of

5. The injudicious methods of bargalning practiced by
both the boards of education and the teacher
organizations.
6. The lack of understanding of how to use the power of
organizations.
7. The lack of provision for effective Jay
participation in educational planning. 1 9 9
Communication between the Union and the Board of
Education was wel 1 established after the initial collective
bargaining agreement.

Grievance procedures were spelled out

in the contract and refined by both sides during future
negotiations.

The Board had established an Office of

James F. Redmond, "Administrative Factors Affecting Teacher
Strikes," <Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Teachers
College, Columbia University, 1947), p.56.
198
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Employee Relations which was used for general as well as
contractual discussions.

The public/s access to Board of

Education meetings provided a means for citizens to voice
their concerns to the Board of Education.

The press and

electronic media kept the public informed about actions
being considered by the Board.
The advent of collective bargaining provided teachers,
through their union, an avenue to participate in determining
some of the policies that affected them.

Teachers were able

to negotiate sick leave, personal leave, transfer policy,
and many other policies that affected them.
Although at times Redmond and his counterparts in the
Union were not discreet in their actions or criticism,
negotiations generally were carried out in a professional
manner.

Each side tried to appear as the prudent leader who

wanted only what was best for the children.

Redmond

admitted during his interview tnat negotiations sometimes
became personal and bitter but that these blow-ups were
quickly forgotten.
The lack of fiscal

independence of the Chicago Board of

Education was evident during each negotiation under
Redmond/s leadership.

Since Chicago never seemed to have

enough money to appease the Teacher/s Union and avoid a
strike, the Board was continually asking for more support
from the state.

Redmond noted that he did not mind

negotiating with the Union, but he greatly disliked the
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interference created by Mayor Daley who felt that the Board
could give the Union whatever it asked for financially as
Jong

as a strike was avoided.

Daley always promised that he

would help the Board get additional funding but was not
always able to fulfi I 1 his promises.

Redmond noted that he

would rather settle with the Union on a compromise rather
than go to the Mayor/s off ice for a settlement because he
knew that he would lose there.

Redmond noted that the only

times Mayor Daley interfered with his administration were
during contract negotiations and the implementation of the
Redmond Plan to intergrate the schools.
The maturing of both the Union and the Board during
Redmond/s administration was quite evident.

Both sides

learned to use the press and pub! ic sentiment to their
advantage whenever possible.

Both sides learned the give

and take of negotiations, that is, they developed an idea of
what to offer and what to withhold.

Redmond noted that he

felt that as negotiations continued in the early to
mid-seventies that he had the better negotiator in Guy
Brunetti.

Redmond felt that Brunetti could control his

anger better than Desmond or Healey.

Redmond, however, did

praise the Union/s attorney, Joseph Jacobs as being the best
negotiator for the Union.
Again both organizations, the Union and the Board,
developed a better understanding on how to use their
particular strengths to enhance their positions in
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collective bargaining.

Through each of the negotiations,

both organizations learned more about themselves and their
adversary and were able to develop better negotiating skills
for the next contract.
We have seen how James Redmond reacted to the immediate
problem of negotiating a teacher contract for the first
time.

After his administrative team had been through the

process once they were able to learn and develop their
skills so that later negotiations were a more familiar
experience.
Just as he finished the first collective bargaining
agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union, Redmond was
notified by the Office of Health, Education and Welfare that
Chicago must begin to desegregate their schools.

With no

time to sit back and enjoy his successful negotiations,
Redmond now had to attack the problem of a segregated school
system and try to develop programs that would enhance
integration.
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CHAPTER IV
REDMOND AND THE CHALLENGE OF DESEGREGATION
After spending his first two months negotiating a
collective bargaining agreement with the union and prepar!ng
a budget for 1967 Redmond was finally able to return to his
pursuit of solutions to the challenge of desegregation of
the schools.

Redmond received a letter from the Office of

Health, Education and Welfare in January 1967.

He reported

that the Jetter was "polite yet firm, reminding me that the
civil rights controversy was far from over.

111

Redmond was

now under the questioning eye of the federal government and
he and his staff had to create a plan that would help solve
the problem of desegregation in the Chicago Public Schools.
Redmond requested an appointment with Secretary Howe of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare to discuss the
problem.
This chapter will discuss the development of
segregation in the school system and how it reached the
crisis situation that existed when Redmond arrived in
Chicago.

The reader will also learn about the plan

developed by Redmond and his staff to alleviate some of the
segregation in the schools and intensify educational efforts
James F. Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize
the Administration of a Large City School System," Speech at
Columbia University, New York, June 10,1968.
1
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in those schools that could not be desegregated.

BACKGROUND OF SEGREGATION - 1860-1950
The first documented occurrence of a segregated school
system in Chicago took place during the Civil War.
was conflict

There

in the city between the Lincoln Unionist

Pepubl leans and the Democrats. particularly the Irish, who
were at the bottom of the economic strata and felt
threatened by the possible economic competition of
African-Americans. 2

The Irish rioted against a few

African-American dock workers who had "taken the jobs of
their brothers.''

The most serious result of this tension

between these groups resulted in the city council passing
the Black School Law of 1863.

This law required that all

African-American children attend a segregated school . 8

The

parents of the African-American children in already
established schools refused to send their children to
another school and kept them where they were.

Pressure from

African-American citizens on the mayor and the Board of
Education brought about the repeal of the measure in 1865. 4
A study by the Chicago Urban League suggests that the
elimination of legal segregation in Chicago public schools
after the Civil War resulted in schools that were
integrated.
2
3

4

African-Americans were at the time residing in

Herrick, Joe.cit., p.52.
Ibid., p.53.
Ibid.
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many areas of the

city.~

The formation of the homogeneous

South Side community after World War I introduced de facto
segregation. but even in 1920 there is evidence that from
one-third to one-half of the African-American pupils
attended integrated elementary schools.

After 1920,

racially mixed neighborhoods seemed to contract, partly as a
consequence of restrictions upon the sale of housing to
African-Americans and partly due to the influx of southern
African-Americans who settled in the mixed areas. 6

The

migration of African-Americans from the South mirrored in
many ways the migration of European ethnic groups in the
nineteenth century.

Both groups of immigrants moved to

areas of the city where relatives and friends lived.

These

newcomers could adjust to 1 ife in the city easier when they
were with "their own kind."

An observer at either Union

Station or the Illinois Central Station could give an
educated guess as to where newly arriving African-Americans
were coming from and into which neighborhood they would·
first settle.

With this kind of migration it is easy to see

why segregated neighborhoods developed and why the
neighborhood school was also a segregated school.
During the 1930/s and early 1940/s, It Is probable that

E. Coons, Civil Rights U.S.A .. Public Schools in Cities
in the North and West. 1962 - Chicago, United States
Commission on Civil Rights, 1962, p.186, citing Baron,
Chicago Urban League, "An Equal Chance for Education,"
<preliminary report), March 1962, p.7.
~John

~~.
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administrative pol icy played a significant role in
preserving the segregated character of Chicago schools.
School zone lines were made to conform to the configuration
of the African-American communities and. as these
communities grew in population. the administration placed
new schools within their boundaries rather than transfer
African-American children to available space in white
schools.

It was also fairly certain that white students
0

assigned to African-American schools could easily obtain
transfers to other schools. 7

In 1947, Superintendent Herold

Hunt planned and executed the redistricting of 102 schools
in an effort to end overcrowding.

The Urban League

characterized his efforts as "essentially an impartial
application of the neighborhood school pol icy."
eliminated most of the neutral areas.

Hunt also

Neutral areas were

selected areas in which a student was given an option to
attend one of two schools in his area.

This was generally

used as a way to keep the schools segregated. 8

PARENTS QUESTION SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
The first signs of discontent with the school situation
in Chicago occurred in June 1955.

The United States Supreme

Court had already ruled that segregated schools were
inherently unequal and must be desegregated "with all

;c'.IQl.Q.' p. 186.
'

03

Ibid.
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deliberate speed."•

In an article in the Chicago American.

citizens from the North Lawndale area complained of badly
overcrowded schools.

Superintendent Wi 11 is responded to the

group by pointing out that there were worse areas in the
city.

The parent group referred to a survey that noted that

22 percent of their schools were on double shift and that 43
percent of their teachers were substitutes.

The group asked

why it appeared that Hyde Park was being given preference
with new schools, building additions, and new teachers.
Wi l 1 is/ response to their request was that he must look at
the needs of the entire city not just one neighborhood.
In September 1961, the first

10

legal action was taken by

parents of African-American children attending various
public schools in Chicago.

In Webb v. The Board of

Education 11 parents alleged deliberate racial segregation by
the school authorities through gerrymandering of school
boundaries,

in choosing school

location, by refusing to

utilize space in white schools, and in applying a
neighborhood school pol icy.

The parents stated that their

children attended double shift or overcrowded schools; that
in some cases classes were as large as 60 students,

instruction was inferior, and that space that was unfit and

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686
<1954) and Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75
S.Ct. 753 <1955>.
10
Wnek, Joe. cit., p.99.
11
Civ. No. 61C1569 D.C., N.D. Ill., cited in Coons, lac.cit.,
p.209.
9
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unsafe was used for classroom purposes.

12

After many

pre-trial motions the case was disposed of in August 1962,
upon a motion by the defendant to dismiss.

The court held

that the plaintiffs did not exhaust the administrative
remedy available under the II l inois School Code.

The remedy

in the School Code provided that the complainant must file
with the State Superintendent of Schools al legations of
exclusion or segregation of any pupil because of race or
religion.

But the federal

judge dismissed the suit saying.

"Chicago can not deny the existence of /de facto/
segregation or excuse it on the pretext of benign
. Separation can not be defended on the

indifference.

ground that it is the result of a high concentration of
Negroes in a school distr·ict."

13

After rendering his

decision, Judge Julius Hoffman noted that he had great
confidence in Wil !is and that he was sure that Wil !is would
see to it that the Chicago schools would be fully integrated
and equa 1 • 1

4

On 19 January 1962, a group of parents of
African-American students at the Burnside School filed suit
against the Board of Education.
of

Education

1

~

In Burroughs v. The Board

the parents charged the Board with deliberate

racial segregation, and assignment of their children to
12

Coons, Joe.cit., p.209.
"'Herrick, loc.ci t., p.313.
14
Ibid .• p.211.
15
Civ. No. 62C206, D.C. N.D.
1 oc. c i t ·; •. p. 212.
1

II 1. <1962), cited in Coons,
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inferior schools.

A request for an injunction was made that

would end the all-white status of nearby Perry School.

The

plaintiffs presented evidence which measured the distances
to the all- white Perry and the al I-African-American
Gillespie from the plaintiffs' homes.

They also focused on

the degree of utilization of facilities, and the boundary
changes ln the attendance areas made by the Board of
Education.

On 31 January, Judge Richard Austin denied the

plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order.

BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY ON INTEGRATION
After the Brown decisions. civic organizations began to
ask the Board of Education what itrs policy on integrated
schools was?

The Board appointed a committee to prepare

It's statement and this committee heard from many
organizations who offered input for the Board's
consideration.

The statement did not even mention

integration or any other positive goal.

Adopted by the

Board on 14 January 1959 it bega.n:
Better human understanding among all peoples, based
upon deeper mutual understanding, is a primary
objective of the entire educational program in
Chicagors publ le schools. Al I activities under the
jurisdiction of the Chicago Board of Education shall be
so organized and all persons so directed as to bring
this desirable objective to closer fulfillment,
promptly and prudently.••
The organizations were greatly disappointed when the
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, January
14. 1959, Chi ca go, I 1 • , p. 830 .
16
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official policy statement was presented and approved.
Several civic organizations began to Issue statements
regarding their support for Integration.

In 1961 the

Chicago Teachers Union, by action of its House of
Representatives, had pledged Itself to work for integration
within the system so as to equalize educational opportunity.
The following year they presented specific proposals with
the statement that the neighborhood school policy should not
be used as an excuse for segregating children.

17

The

Citizens Schools Committee continued to press for advisory
committees, as well as an independent survey of the system.
They advocated a pol icy of continuous redistricting and
special

aid for al 1 economically underprivileged children

through reduction in class size. securing extra materials
and auxiliary services, and for the assumption of
integration as a positive and explicit goal.

The Chicago

Region of the P.T.A.

The Urban

took simil'ar positions.

League issued a series of studies, and held a Schools
Seminar in March 1962.
Organization,

The South East Community

largely white, asked for a regional exchange

for South East Side high schools to promote integration and
to stabilize the already integrated schools.

19

Board members themselves held varying views on
integration.

17

18

Herrick,
Ibid.

As early as 1956, Dr. Joseph Pois had spoken

Joe.cit., p.315.

147

to the Citizens Schools Committee on the importance of the
schools in the necessary effort to make the city an
integrated community.

In the early 1960/s Board members

Bacon and Friedman had clearly, courteously. and
consistently urged action to integrate the schools.

During

his tenure as Board President <1962-64), Clair Roddewig met
with

sev~ral

African-American groups to try to gain support

for furthering the cause of integrated education. 19
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in April 1963,
the Board of Education enlisted the assistance of Professor
Robert J. Havighurst to conduct a survey of the school
system.

The appointment of Havighurst did not sit well with

Superintendent Wi Ills because he was aware of Havighurst/s
rejection of the neighborhood school plan in favor of
integrated education and regional high schools.

The report

called on the Board to take an active part in social urban
renewal.

The results of the survey reflected Havighurst/s

philosophy of education and called for further integration
of the schools and compensatory education for disadvantaged
chi l dren. 20

The Board of Education also responded to pressure put
upon lt by the courts when on 28 August 1963 it agreed to
establish a Five Man Panel of Educators to study the school
system.

The Board resolution read as fol lows:

'~lbl.d.

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, November
27, 1963, Chicago, Il .• p.746.
20
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Be It Resolved: that this Board hereby reaffirms its
policy to provide the best possible educational
opportunity for all the pupils in the school system so
that every child may achieve his maximum development,
and to recognize and work toward the maximum resolution
of every problem or inequity that may exist in the
system, including . . . schools in the system being
attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes . . . . 21
This panel later became known as the Hauser Panel.

Their

suggestions included an integration of all faculties, a more
equitable distribution of experienced teachers, in-service
training for teachers and educational opportunities for
teachers to learn more about the students with whom they
were working.

The panel developed a clustering plan that

enlarged attendance areas in contiguous neighborhoods so
that the Black and White children would attend integrated
schools.

It further suggested open enrollment in general

high schools within high school districts, and open
enrollment in all vocational and special schools.

22

As the conflict between the Board and Superintendent
Wi 11 is continued, several Board members under the leadership
of President Roddewig drafted and adopted on 13 February
1964 a new policy statement on integration.

The new pol icy

read in part:
The members of the Chicago Board of Education believe
that this city and this country would be healthier
economically, educationally, and morally if Chicago,
Illinois, and al 1 sections of the country, reflected
the kind of racial and ethnic diversity characteristic
of the nation as a whole.
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, August
28, 1963, Chicago, Il ., p.332.
22
Herrick, loc.cit., p.325-26.
21
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We have already made clear our opposition to
segregation or discrimination in planning attendance
areas and educational programs.
We believe the
children of Chicago would be better prepared for
today/s world if their classrooms and school staffs
reflect a racial and ethnic diversity.
We shall continue to seek, and promptly take, any
practical steps by which, in conformity with sound
educational procedures, racial and ethnic diversity in
schools and classrooms can be promoted . . .
Therefore. we affirm and publicly declare a policy of
racial integration.
We shall endeavor to effect the
development of a continuous program to achieve this
goal .z:c:
This new policy could not be mistaken for the previous
pol icy that failed to mention integration.

In reading this

new policy, one should certainly understand that

it was now

the Board/s policy to take a positive approach to
integrating the schools.

But as we shal 1 see, a stated

policy is not always immediately acted upon.
To further complicate the Board's policy on racial
integration, an additional pol icy statement regarding the
Board's commitment to neighborhood stabi I ization was issued
on 12 November 1964.

The pol icy read:

While the Board continues to search for ways to
increase the interracial association of students, it
also has a responsibility to help preserve, as far as
possible, such associations in areas where they now
exist.
Therefore, as one of our important objectives in the
field of integration, the Board of Education hereby
asserts that it is the policy to seek and take any
possible steps which may help to preserve and stabilize
23

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, February
13, 196"4, Chi ca go, I 1 . , p. 1945.
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the integration of schools in neighborhoods which
already have an interracial composition. 2 4
In the 1960's, as well as today, these policies on
integrat~on

confl let.

and neighborhood stabilization have come into
History of the Chicago school system has shown

us that as schools integrate (following Board policy> they
have tended to unstabi Jize the neighborhood (contrary to
Board policy).

There have been few exceptions to this

trend.

A NEW TRANSFER POLICY
John E. Coons writes in his study for the United States
Commission on Civil Rights:
An official policy prohibiting transfers from assigned
schools has been in effect for a number of years. The
no-transfer rule has had two consequences.
In a
racially homogeneous area, coupled with the
neighborhood school policy, it has tended to preserve
the segregated character of the school. In integrated
areas it has tended to preserve integration by
preventing the transfer of white children. ~
2

Finally, on 27 December 1961, the superintendent
introduced the administration's .Plan to alter the transfer
rules beginning in the fall of 1962.

The new plan would be

"permissive" or voluntary on the part of students and aimed
at the better use of classroom space.

The plan was limited

to the issuance of temporary permits to students on double
shifts to enrol 1 in elementary schools with available space
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, November
12, 1964, Chicago, Il ., p.542.
25
Coons, Joe.cit., p.191.
24
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within their general area.

Pupils who were granted

transfers were responsible for their own transportation at
no expense to the Board.

If their home school reached

average class size of less than forty then the chlld/s
transfer was revoked and he must return to his home school.
The plan also limited the number of transfers to any
receiving school so that the average class size
reach above thirty pupils. 2 6

did

not

The Chicago Urban League, a

long-time advocate of a transfer policy, sharply criticized
the superintendent"s plan.

The League pointed out that the

plan discriminated in that it set a higher enrollment number
(forty) for the overcrowded schools Cgenerally
African-American) and a lower enrollment Cthirty) for the
less crowded schools (generally White). 27

Although the old

rule of no transfers did not permit further integration, at
least it did not discriminate against students, mostly
African-American, in the overcrowded schools.
The permissive transfer plan took effect in the 1962
school year.

The purpose of the plan was to relieve

overcrowding and utilize available space.

In the first year

28 elementary school students were transferred at their own
request from overcrowded schools.

There was no program for

the high schools during this school year.

In the 1963

school year elementary permissive transfers increased to 35

2.$1.Ql.d.
27

Ibid.
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students.

The permissive transfer program was extended to

the high school during the same school year but included the
proviso that students seeking to leave an overcrowded high
school must be academically in the top 25 percent of their
city-wide class.

This proviso I imited the number of

transfers to 58 students in 1963. 29

Hirsch became the first

high school to take part in the permissive transfer after a
parent group, f rem the school began to seek he 1p to a 1 1 ev i ate
overcrowding by appealing to the courts. 29
In August 1963 Superintendent Wi 1 lis presented to the
Board and received approval on a new "permissive transfer"
plan that would allow honor students in crowded high schools
to transfer to twenty-four less crowded high schools.
Subsequently, Willis reduced the number of receiving schools
to nine.

At the 25 September Board meeting, President

Roddewig suggested reinstating two schools that had been
dropped.

Wil 1 is made no objection and the two schools were

reinstated.

Willis balked at transferring 24 students who

had requested placement in the two reinstated schools but
finally conceded after a court order was issued for him to
do so. 30

This overturning of Willis/ actions by the Board

resulted in his resignation "over his principles and sense
of professional integrity."

After a short time an agreement

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, Octriber
13. 1965, Chicago, II., p.808.
29
Chicago Public Schools, Open Enrollment: A Progress Report.
November 1972, p.19.
80
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.316.
29
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was reached between the

Board and the Superintendent "to

delineate areas for action" and Will ls rescinded his
c-eslgnation.

31

Wil I is del lvered a report on the
the Board on 8 June 1966.

permiss~ve

transfer to

Will ls noted that the program had

relieved overcrowding in some schools to a significant
degree.

It had encouraged integration in some schools where

African-American students were attending the school for the
first time.

Finally he noted that most students who had

transferred had adjusted to their new schools. 3 2

At this

same meeting Board member Cyrus Adams introduced a
resolution that stated:

A student who transfers from one school to another
under cluster or permissive transfer plans must have
earned and must continue to deserve the privilege of
transfer. in terms of effort. achievement, and
conduct. '3 3
This resolution was modified and expanded in May 1963
with the fol lowing revision so as to be less restrictive in
determining student participation in the permissive transfer
program:
Students seeking to transfer to one of the receiving
schools should be accepted with the following being the
only exception. No child presently placed or
recommended by a child study report for placement in a
mentally handicapped division or social adjustment
division should participate.
Once a student is accepted by a receiving school he is
.lill..d .• p.318.
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, June 8,
1966, Chicago, II., p.3302.
31

32

331.QlQ.
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to be considered as a member of that school/s regular
body and therefore not unilaterally transferable.
However. under extenuating circumstances, a parent may
apply for a transfer for a child back to the school in
the attendance district which the parent resides.
Parents of children at the primary level or in grade
four who can provide transportation and are available
in case of an emergency should be notified that their
children may participate in the permissive transfer
program. "'3 4
Further privileges were extended to elementary school
students who participated in the permissive transfer
programs including permitting the transferees the option to
attend a high school

in their home district or one in the

district to which they were

transferred.

3

~

Below are listed the totals for student participation
in the permissive transfer program for the period 1962-1974.

YEAR
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
~ 4 Minutes

PERMISSIVE TRANSFERS 3 6
NO. IN ELEMENTARY
28
35
102
103
N.A.
164
151
89
121
78
79
N.A.
N.A.

NO.

IN HIGH SCHOOL
0
58
602
673
1500
957
965
735
499
385
329
500
27

of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting. May
23,1973. Chicago. II .• p.2921.
~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, April 26,
1967. Chicago, II., p.2840.
~ Data collected from various Minutes of the Chicago Board of
Educati~ri Meetings during the years 1962-1974.
3

6
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The reader can see that participation in the permissive
transfer program reached its high points in the mid to
late sixties.

The number of participants may appear to be

sufficient unti 1 one realizes that during this time there
were over 550,000 students enrol led in the Chicago schools.
Upon further investigation it should also be noted that
although over 8,000 students had utilized the program
during these years. there were several
students eligible to participate.

times as many

As an example in 1967,

there were 7,380 high school students and 2,374 elementary
students eligible under the permissive transfer program but,
as noted above, only 957 high school students <12.9%) and

164 elementary students C6.9%> took part in the program. 3
This year was typical of other years listed.

?

The great

majority of the student population remained in his/her home
school even though some were extremely overcrowded.
The permissive transfer program started by Willis was
continued throughout the Redmond administration but reached
its peak in 1966 and began to decline for the rest of
Redmond/s administration.

THE REDMOND PLAN: A RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.
James F. Redmond assumed the Superintendency of the
37

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27
December 1967, Chicago, II., p.1037.
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Chicago Public Schools ln October 1966.

He immediately

faced problems in preparing a budget for the 1967 schooi
year.

Moreover, he had to find ways in which to cover an

existing five mi Ilion do11ar deficit in the 1966 budget.

In

addition he had to prepare a legislative package for the
General Assembly which would help the Chicago schools.

In

an address at Teachers College of Columbia University he
recalled his first months in office and in particular a
letter he received in January,

1967.

He noted, "As if

waiting for me to take a deep breath, the Office of Health,
Education, and Welfare sent a nice, polite but firm letter
to me early in the month reminding me that the civil rights
controversy was far from over.

I was asked to immediately

reply to their queries about desegregation."

39

The letter

referred to a United States Office of Education report
entitled Report on Office of Education Analysis of Certain
Aspects of Chicago Public Schools under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The report included a statement

of findings and recommendations concerning the Chicago
Public Schools. 3 9
Redmond requested a meeting with officials from the

James F. Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize
the Administration of a Large City School System," Address
presented at a Special Training Institute on Problems of
School Desegregation, Teachers College of Columbia
University, New York, July 10-12, 1968, p.1.
39
Board of Education, City of Chicago, Increasing
Desegregation of Faculties. Students. and Vocational
Education Programs, Board of Education, August 23, 1967, p.1.
38
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Off ice of Education and members of his staff to discuss
writing a grant that would study the areas of desegregation.
In April the grant was approved and Redmond recruited some
very able consultants to assist in the study.

The

consultants included university professors. school district
officials. and public relations experts.

One of the

consultants was John E. Coons of Northwestern University who
led the 1962 study of the Chicago Public Schools for the
United States Civil Rights Commission.

These consultants

joined staff members of the Redmond administration and
resource personnel from various local organizations to seek
solutions to the problems facing the Chicago Public schools.
Committees were formed to study four areas of concern
mentioned in the Office of Education Report.

The areas

were: Faculty Assignment Patterns. Boundaries and Student
Assignment Policies. the Apprenticeship Training Program.
and Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools. 4 0

In

addition to these areas identified by the Office of
Education. Redmond/s staff added two additional areas to be
studied:

one was Research and the other was Public

Understanding. 41
On 23 August 1967 the Board accepted "in principle" the
document entitled Increasing Desegregation of Faculties.

40

.l.Qj_g.

Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize the
Administration of a Large City School System". p.2.
41
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Students. and Vocational Education Programs. 42

This

document is generally referred to as "The Redmond Plan."
The Board accepted the report in principle so that it could
maintain control over it by insisting that any
recommendations would be brought back to the Board in
separate

reports.

4

~

The introduction stated the basic

assumption on which the report/s recommendations were based:
We see as a primary and urgent need the establishment
and maintenance of the conditions in the Chicago
schools that open up for al 1 young people meaningful
life chances and that speed them on their way to
acceptance and accomplishment.
Particularly are we concerned about the racial and
economic deprivation in our midst . . . . When a
condition so pervasive in our city bears in upon the
schools, the schools can not hope to solve the problem
except in commitment and action shared by the community
- a genuine shared commitment with al 1 groups who can
make common cause with the Board of Education for
quality education for al I . . . . We see an obligation
to undertake a comprehensive educational program
aimed at reversing a pervasive social condition that
has become deeply rooted in our society . . . and seek
educational pathways to a better society. 44
The report discusses each of the six topics addressed in the
report and offers recommendations that should be implemented
in order to make the plan a success.

The writer will list

some of the major recommendations for each area addressed.

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, August
23, 1967, Chicago, Il ., insert after p.534.
4
:=:Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize the
Administration of a Large City School System", p.3.
44
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, August
23, 1967, Chicago, Il .• insert folfowing p.534, cited in
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.344.
42
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FACULTY ASSIGNMENT PATTERNS
The committee on Faculty Assignment Patterns found a
serious staffing imbalance in Chicago.

Teachers in

African-American schools and schools in low socioeconomic
neighborhoods were younger and had less experience and
It was

formal training and were subject to more turnover.

recommended that a new system of staffing be implemented.
The instructional group would include highly qualified
master teacher group leaders, less experienced teachers and
aides, interns. and practice teachers.
offered a strong in-service program.

These teams would be
The team members would

work ln attractive conditions and be offered incentives that
would make for more effective and stable staffing.• 5

An

in-service training program would be offered to principals
about to assume positions in the inner city.

The principal

would be given the responsibility to reduce staff turnover,
and develop an esprit de corp among the staff . 4 6

It was

further recommended that it become a requisite that a
candidate for the principalship examination have at least
two years service in a low socioeconomic area. 4 7

Expansion

of services for children who presented serious discipline or
learning problems would be expanded. 4 6

A city-wide advisory

~Increasing Desegregation
of Faculties. Students. and
Vocational Education Programs, p.A-25.
46
"Here/s Text of Redmond/s School Plan," Chicago Tribune,
August 24, 1967, p.8.
4

47

lbl.d.

46

Ibid.·-
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committee representing community organizations and the
school system would be established for the purpose of
proposing ways in which inner city school communities and
the staff of the schools would help each other in achieving
and maintaining equitable

staffing.

4

~

The Board of

Education should adopt policies and procedures on assignment
and transfer which would result in having in each school
the same percentage of regularly certified teachers as the
percentage in the system as a whole. 50

The collective

bargaining agreement signed by the Chicago Teachers Union
has pledged that the union and the Board wil 1

"~erk

cooperatively to develop and implement policies with respect
to the assignment of teachers in such a manner as to lead to
the achievement of representative social composition of
school faculties and of a more equitable distribution of
11

regularly assigned

teachers."~

1

A research study should be

undertaken to determine financial and quasi-financial
incentives which might be effective in securing and
retaining experienced teachers in inner city

schools.~ 2

BOUNDARIES AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES
The student population of the Chicago Public Schools
increased an average of almost 14,000 pupils per year from

49

Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.A-26.

'50 Thi ..-1

~-

Joe.cit,, p.345.
Here/s Text of Redmond/s School Plan,

~1Herrick,
!"5

211

11

p.8.
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1951 unti 1 the time of the report.

The increase in pupils

was not spread throughout the city but in only 50 percent of
the schools.

In order to more equitably distribute the

burden of the increase the Board of Education used norma1
procedures such as:

adjusting attendance areas. changing

grade patterns in schools, renting community faclllties.
using mobile units, and, lastly, bui !ding new schools and
additions to existing buildings.
Efforts had been made to further integration through
attendance area adjustments, voluntary permissive transfer
programs, open enrollment in vocational and technical high
schools, and in the planning and building of new school
facilities.

City-wide programs had brought together

students of al 1 races and cultural and socioeconomic
backgrounds around a common area of interest and competence.
The al 1-city chorus, al 1-city band, and the al 1-city
orchestra met regularly throughout the

year.~ 3

Prior to discussing the recommendations, the committee
that studied student assignment policies compiled a 1 ist of
assumptions upon which they based their recommendations.
They assumed that integration was desirable for both white
and African-American

children.~ 4

Every effort should be

made to retain the white population and promote
stabilization in integrated school situations.

Desegregation of Faculties, p.B-4.
p.B-6.

~ 8 Increasing
~ 4 1..Ql.Q.,

The
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responsibility for integration should be shared by al 1 of
the white community by maintaining fixed racial proportions
in the schools.

The transportation of students by the

school system would be necessary to achieve racial
Integration.~~

Since the existing housing segregation

pattern in this city would continue for some time, it would
be necessary for the Board of Education to continue to
improve the·qual ity of education in all schools and
particularly in the ghetto

schools.~ 6

Finally, the

committee noted that funds to implement the recommendations
should be avai !able from state and federal sources as wel 1
as local

sources.~ 7

Recommendations for student assignment policies were
made in three categories.

Short term recommendations

included the recommendation that fringe area schools <those
integrated schools located between African-American
segregated and white segregated schools) should have a
limited percentage of minority students.

In outer area

schools additional educational staff and services would be
provided to meet the needs of the pupils who had been
transferred in and this staff would be in-serviced in human
relations.~e

A voluntary permissive transfer would continue

to relieve overcrowding, achieve stabi 1 ization, and promote

~!5"Here"s

!5 61...b.1..d •
~ 7'

Text of Reclmond"s School Plan," p.8.

.l.tU...Q •

~srncreasing

Desegregation of Faculties, p.B-7.

~63

integration.

Selection of sites and the bui !ding of new

schools would be carried out In a way that would promote
integration whenever

possible.~·

Intermediate plans suggested the establishment of
magnet schools at the high school and elementary level, each
to offer exemplary programs in special lzed fields.

These

magnet schools would have attendance areas large enough
to insure that they would be integrated. 60

The magnet

schools would have course offerings and instruction so
outstanding that they could not be matched anywhere in
the city.

Transportation would be provided to students who

live excessive distances from the school.

Some

consideration should be given to establishing magnet schools
in a shared-time arrangement with parochial and private
schools. 01
The only long range recommendation regarding student
assignment policies was to conduct a feasibility study on
the possibilities of establishing educational parks or
cultural-education centers. 6 2

THE APPRENTICE PROGRAM
The committee studying the apprenticeship program
included both local and national leaders in education, labor

l.bl.Q. , p. B-8.
""o.l.Qj_g., p.B-9.
·=- 111 Here/s Text of
62l.Qj_g.

~.,,.

Redmond"s School Plan," p.8.
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organizations, and civil rights.
three objectives for their study.

The committee established
These objectives were:

1. To cooperate with the U. S. Office of Education and
the U. S. Department of Labor in a review of the
Mayor/s program to increase enrollment of students from
Negro and other minority groups in apprenticeship
programs.
2. To develop plans for working on a continuing basis
with the Joint Apprenticeship Committees to assist in
increasing minority representation in apprenticeship
programs and to develop public confidence in the
procedures of the committees.
3. To develop an effective program of disseminating
pertinent information to students from minority groups
about apprenticeship opportunities and to plan
additional programs to prepare minority group students
to achieve eligibility. 6 3
The committee of experts studied the apprenticeship
program at Washburne Trade School and made recommendations
to improve the program.

They suggested that at least two

levels of advisory committees or councils should be
organized in order to get advice and counsel as to how
Washburne could best serve the needs of industry and the
needs of the community.

The first level of the advisory

committee would deal with policy matters as they relate to
the school and to the community.

The second level would be

an advisory committee for each of the trades being taught at
the school . 64

They also noted that the Board of Education

should encourage the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training,
the Illinois State Employment Service, and other interested

03

64

Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.C4-5.
!bid., p.C-20.
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community groups to make a study of job openings in each
trade with a view of determining how many apprentices may be
employed per year for the foreseeable future.

Because of

the charge that arose that certain ethnic groups dominate
certain trades while others were excluded, the committee
suggested that sponsoring agencies should be encouraged to
accept a disinterested third party, such as the Illinois
State Employment Service, into their screening and standards
committee.

0

~

They also noted that the Board of Education,

with the cooperation of the advisory committees, should
institute a study as to the effectiveness of the vocational
programs in the vocational schools in regard to the placing
of its graduates as apprentices in the trades.' 0

The need

for an increase in personnel at Washburne was also noted,
especially for counseling purposes, for a liaison with the
high schools, and for curriculum development.

Finally, a

recommendation for increased public relations and
communication so that more people would become aware of·the
opportunities available at Washburne. 6 7

OPEN ENROLLMENT IN VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS
The fourth area of concern reported upon in "The
Redmond Plan" was that of open enrollment in Chicago/s
vocational high schools.

The official Board of Education

Text of Redmond/s School Plan," p.8.
Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.C-21.
67
.I.Q.l_g., p.C-22.
0

~

00

11

Here/s

166

pol icy regarding vocational schools was that these schools
had open enrollment, that is, any student who lived in the
clty could attend any vocational high school

in the city.

Although this policy existed, students generally attended
the vocational school closest to their home.

This pattern

of dttendance led to segregation in these schools. Of the
ten vocational high schools listed in this section of the
~eport,

body.

only· Chicago Vocational had an Integrated student
Each of the other nine schools had racial majorities

that made up between 80 and 98 percent of the student
enrol

lment.~ 8

The committee on open enrollment in vocational
education made twenty-four recommendations.
some of them.

I wil 1 mention

The committee found that there was a great

need to publicize the open enrollment pol Icy and to become
aggressive In recruitment for program.

They recommended

that general admittance requirements for vocational schools
be abolished and replaced by a

list of prerequisites for

admittance to the various programs. 6 9

The committee felt

that students should be encouraged to attend their general
high school

for the first two years and then transfer to a

vocational school at the eleventh grade. 7 0

They also felt

that a survey should be conducted whereby job opportunities
for vocational school graduates could be identified, thereby
69

69

!bld., p.C-24.
Ibid., p.C-27.

701.Q.i.Q.
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making it possible to institute appropriate preparation
programs. 71
It was further recommended that advisory committees be
established to help staff develop a philosophy for
vocational education in Chicago.

Additional advisory

committees should also be established in each of the career
fields being taught in vocational education. 7 2

Immediate

attention should be given to the construction and renovation
of vocational facilities which will make them more
attractive and up to date, and in turn will draw more
students. 73

The committee also suggested a dropout

prevention program for fifteen year olds and the need for
city-wide recruitment to increase integration in vocational
ski l ls. 7 4

PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING
In submitting their report to the Committee on Public
Understanding, the consultants made the fol lowing statement:
Our study revealed that, among the urban school
districts in the nation, perhaps no other one at the
present time is confronted with greater communication
challenges than those which face the Chicago Board of
Education in pursuing its objectives of integration of
students and faculties, adequate financing,
well-informed community attitudes, decentralized
administrative services, high employee morale, and
instructional improvement.

?' 1

.I..Qjjj .

.I..b..l..Q., p.C-28.
::3 .l.Q.i.d •
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. . . . We believe the Board and its new leadership can
devise a system of communications and relationships
with the community which wil 1 establish the essential
understanding and support to bring success to Chicago/s
important enterprise of public education. ~
7

The committee studied the community relations and
information services of other large cities and found Chicago
greatly lacking.

Other large cities had central office

staffs of more than thirty people while Chicago operated
with only four full time staff members.

They also noted

that the Booz. Al Jen. and Hamilton Report indicated clearly
that a strong communication capability, internal and
external, must be planned, developed, and made a reality in
order to carry out the major recommendations of the
report . .,.,.,..,
The committee made suggestions that various positions
be created under the leadership of an assistant
superintendent for communications and community relations.
The new positions included an associate director, an
editor-writer, a community relations consultant, a writer, a
radio-television liaison, a special events staff person, a
photographer, a public inquiries service desk, and staff
secretaries."'"'
The committee further suggested that the General
Superintendent immediately conduct a public opinion survey
~Letter from the Consultants to the Committee Chairman,
August 16,1967, cited in Increasing Desegregation of
Faculties, p.D-3.
76
Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, p.D-8.
77
Ibid.; p.D-10 - D-16.
7
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to secure a profile of public attitudes toward the schools
and toward integration. the level of information known about
the schools, and areas of misinformation in the community. 7 9
A brief alert bullet in should be sent weekly to al 1 news

media outlets advising of coming events.

Central office

staff and the local schools should be informed weekly about
the things happening in the schools as wel 1 as new policies.
programs, and personnel changes. 7 9

RESEARCH
The last item to be studied in Increasing Desegregation
of Faculties. Students. and Vocational Education Programs
was the determination of areas that needed research.

This

section of the report discusses the methods of research used
to develop researchable questions in each of the major areas
of the study.

Methodology oonsisted first of the scrutiny

of working papers and committee minutes with some
participation in committee discussions and then of the
extraction of these documents of. researchable questions the answers to which contributed to a) the assumptions, b)
the program requirements, or c> the purposes of explicit
recommendations. 60

76

!bid., p.D-18.
lbid., p.D-21.
90
Ibid., p.E-3.
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REACTION TO THE REDMOND PLAN
As mentioned earlier the Redmond Plan was accepted by
10 to 0 vote with one abstention.

Even strong neighborhood

school pol icy supporters 1 ike Boardmember Thomas J. Murray
voted in favor of the issue.

On his vote he stated, "I have

always supported the neighborhood school pol icy but I am not
one who cannot change my mind.

.

I

join with the rest.

The recommendations are proper and right and should be
implemented as soon as possible.

1181

The four major daily newspapers (Sun-Times, Tribune,
Daily News, and American) all carried banner headl Ines
announcing the Redmond Plan.

Each paper provided a synopsis

of the plan on the first page.

Each paper noted items such

as educational parks, magnet schools, bussing of students to
increase integration, teacher integration, and the expansion
and improvement of vocational education.

The topic of

racial integration on a metropolitan basis was discussed in
the American.

The article told of the plan to have a

metropolitan area educational council composed of educators,
civic leaders, and student leaders that would help develop
plans for teacher and pupil exchange programs between the
city and suburban areas. 82

The editorial section of the two

morning papers ran opposing editorials.

The Tribune

How School Board Members View Plans." Chicago Tribune,
August 24, 1967, p.1.
82
"Main points of Program," Chicaqo"s American, August
23 • 1 967 , p . 1 .
9111

1 71
rejected the ideas of the plan on 24 August and 27 August
1967.

The Sun Times praised the plan and called it "an

educational Burnham Plan for Chicago, a proposal for
experimentation and innovation in keeping with the needs of
modern urban living. 8 3

The Daily News, in it/s "Blue Dart"

editions, ran a daily page on happenings in local schools in
the Chicago area.

In mid-September this edition ran a

series of articles on the "Redmond Report" and explained the
meanings of its various proposals. 94
Public reaction was mixed.

Edwin C. Berry, executive

director of the Chicago Urban League, was quoted in the
Sun Times as saying, "Its a good first step.

It's the kind

of thing I have been expecting from Redmond.

I do think

that he is taking some significant steps toward quality and
equality in Chicago." 9

'!5

Berry was quoted earlier though as

having some reservations when he said, "But I/m not
endorsing the quota system.

As a beginning, to gain

integration In the schools, this is al 1 right to start with.
In order to implement the educational system and get better
education for our kids I have to go along with the plan at
this polnt." 96

Meyer Weinberg, head of the Teachers for

Integrated Schools, was considerably more critical.
"Redmond"s Courageous Plan, 11 Syn Times, August 25, 1967, p.33.
"Redmond Report", Chicago Daily News <Blue Dart Issue),
September 13 - 27, 1967, Education page.
~ A Big Step Forward, Clty"s Leaders Agree," Sun Times,
August 24, 1967, p.2.
9
11
•
First Reactions: Hostility, OK," Chicago Dally News, August
23 • 1 967 , p . 1 .
"'-'

3

84

8

11

172

Weinberg concluded that "its tone is much more constructive
than anything that came out from the office under Wil lls.
The recommendations accept the goal of integration in a much
more detailed way than under Willis, but the main question
is whether the intentions wil 1 be carried out." 9 7

Weinberg

continued, "No steps were outlined, nor was a timetable
presented by Redmond for carrying out four chief
recommendations of the U. S. Off ice of Education." 9 6
Weinberg, who also served as head of the educational
committee of the Coordinating Council of Community
Organizations, said "the recommendations offer no basis for

ceca,

or anyone, to be assured that anything will change

S. Thomas Sutton, an Elmhurst attorney who headed
"Operation Crescent," an organization opposed to school and
neighborhood integration, said that "the Redmond Plan may
force the group to press Operation Withdrawal."

Operation

Withdrawal cal ls for whites to move en masse from their
communities if public officials ignore pleas against
lntegration. 90

State Senator Joseph Krasowski said, "This

plan will force white families out of Chicago and will mean
a loss of teachers.

971.QlQ.,

ee.l.Ql..d.
99..l.QJ..d.
90.IJ;;tl,g.

p.8.

The school board has shown a total
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disregard for community sentiment.

1191

Mattie Hopkins,

president of Teachers for Integrated Schools, cal led the
plan "ful 1 of pie-in-the-sky generalities.
probably won't come for a generation." 9 2

Real

Improvement

John Desmond,

president of the teachers union protested any change In the
teacher transfer pol icy.

"Now ls not the time to deny

teachers the right to transfer.

The critical shortage of

teachers would be more acute If teachers were frozen in the
schools where they did not wish to remaln.• 9

:'3

The two University of Chicago professors who had
earl ler studied the Chicago school system both had favorable
reactions.

Phil Ip Hauser said of the program: "It's a

wonderful step In the right direction." 9 4

Robert Havighurst

added, "the basic ideal of the Redmond Plan was very
impressive and very desirable.
workable."

9

I think the proposals are

~

The reaction to the plan from suburban educators
reflects the reception received in general.

Park Forest

Superintendent Seymour Bixhorn said that a city-suburban
exchange would be "a positive way of changing the
educational opportunities of Negro youngsters.

I think it

would be a real advantage having teachers from the

0pponents Hint Action At Blocking School Plan," Sun Times,
August 24, 1967, p.3.
•

111

9::2~.
93

~

4

9~

l..b..i_g.
"A

Big Step Forward", Joe.cit.

..I..Qj_Q •..
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advantaged schools teaching in the inner city for awhile.

119 6
·

Everett Kerr. Blue Island Superintendent, thought the
plan was worthwhile.

11

I think anything that gets on with

lntegratlon is good.

There/s no question we have the

problem of achieving integration.
degree and how fast.

1197

This question is of

An opposing view was received by

Berwyn Superintendent Robert Gentry who "doubted that an
exchange is of sufficient advantage to children involved to
warrant the administrative work.

There are many areas of

the city that students from the ghetto could be transferred
to and not involve the suburbs in administrative
headaches.""" 8

PROTEST AND PROGRESS
Redmond met with the press on Tuesday, 29 August 1967
to review his first steps in his integration plan.

He

reiterated that the first steps would be to improve the
staffing of inner-city schools, and develop a model
educational program for a

"magn~t"

school.

When asked what

he would do if there were serious opposition to some phase
of the plan, he responded:

"I'm not so strong-headed that I

can't compromise, as long as it isn't a compromise with
principle.

'"'

0

No one facet of the plan is important that the

"What Suburban Educators Think Of Plan," Sun Times, August

25. 1 967. p . 4.
97.l..Ql.g.

99

.I.Q.ld.
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whole program will

fail because of opposition to some aspect

of it.""""'
Within three wee.ks of its announcement. the Redmond
Plan was placed in jeopardy when the Coordinating Counci I
of Community Organizations <CCCQ),

led by Al Raby, wrote a

letter condemning the plan to U.S. Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare John Gardner.

Raby/s Jetter to

Gardner said, "We demand that you invoke the fullest
resources of the law and immediately begin formal
proceedings to cut off federal
schools.

11100

funds to the public
.
The seventeen page CCCO report cal led the

Redmond Plan "racist" and a "non-plan that is in no sense a
plan for actlon.

11101

The response to CCCO objections was delivered by U.S.
Education Commissioner Harold Howe.

On 24 October 1967 Howe

endorsed the Redmond Plan for integration as a "major step
toward correcting possible Civi'l Rights Act violations in
Chicago schools.

11102

The correspondence from the U. S. ·

Office of Education and the Office of Civil Rights told
Superintendent Redmond that federal assistance would be made
available to implement the plan.

The federal officials

noted however, that "solutions or recommendations were not
99

"Steps in Schools Plan Outlined by Redmond," Sun Times,
August 30, 1967, p.3.
10011
CCCO Asks U.S. to Bar Funds for Redmond Plan", Sun Times,
September 10, 1967, p.1.
t 0 1

.I..Ql.d •

U.S. Lauds Redmond School Plan," Sun Times, October 24,
1967, p.3.
10211
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proposed for several areas and these problems must
ultimately be grappled

with."

10

~

Howe continued by saying

that "you and the Board of Education have recognized a
serious problem facing the Chicago schools and have come to
grips with it.

We commend you and your board for the

positive leadership positions you have taken."

104

EDUCATIONAL PARKS - A MEANS TO INTEGRATION
Developing out of the Redmond Plan, a group of
educational consultants under the direction of Professor
Donald Leu of Michigan State University presented a report
to the Board of Education urging the construction of a
series of "cultural-educational parks" for

Chicago.

10

~

The

plan called for immediate action on a "prototype" complex
that would serve up to 20,000 public, private, and parochial
school students ranging in age from pre-school to college.
Leu said that the parks "would cluster in one area large
groups of students of wide age differences, and varying
socio-economic, ethnic, and religious backgrounds."

10

""

The

parks would include campuses for several kinds of schools,
including pre-school centers called schemes, magnet and
middle schools, and two or three high schools along with a
college facility.

Each park would be unique in reflecting

Ibid.
Ibid.
10
!5"Education Parks for City Urged," Chicago Daily News,
December 13, 1967, p.1.
100
Ibid.
103

104
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the needs of its surrounding area and there would be no
"model" to follow.

107

Sites would be located at points

easily accessible by highways or boulevards.

108

Although the concept of the "cultural-educational
park" was not fully implemented, several of its ideas were
put into effect.

The clustering of schemes and elementary

schools was made in several areas of the city.

The

development of the magnet school and the middle school also
owe their beginnings to ideas brought out in the Candol i-Leu
study.

BUSING PLANS FOR AUSTIN & SOUTH SHORE
The Board of Education voted on 27 December 1967 to
provide $150,000.00 during the next year to bus 5,000
elementary school students in South Shore and Austin in
order to try to foster racial stabillty in those
neighborhoods.

109

At the meeting Superintendent Redmond

promised to hold public hearings on the plan.

He said that

the rapidly changing areas were selected because they asked
for help to anchor the remaining white people.

110

The vote

carried by a eight to two margin with Frank Whiston and

Ralph J. Cusick, "Implementation of the Leu-Candol i Report
for Educational Change in Lincoln Park and Near North,
Chicago, 1968 To 1973" <Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation,
Loyola University of Chicago, 1985>, p.3.
1os.l.b.l.d., p.5.
109
"Busing Plan Wins School Board's O.K.," Chicago Tribune,
December 28, 1967, p.1.
107

1101..b..i.Q.
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Thomas Murray casting the negative votes.

In supporting the

appropriation for the busing plan, Boardmember Warren H.
Bacon noted that "busing

i~

one of many, many tools in

Redmond/s plans for quality education and integration."

He

warned that the Redmond Plan would be a sham if the board
tied the superintendent/s hands by not al locating the busing
funds.

111

The initial plan called for African-American students
in the Austin area who already attended integrated but
overcrowded schools to be transported to schools with empty
seats in outlying - stable- white areas.

In the South

Shore area both African-American and white students were
bussed to equalize racial percentage.

112

At the Board

meeting on 10 January 1968, fifteen hundred people protested
the Board/s action on busing.

As a result of pressure from

these protestors the Board voted to defer action on the
busing plan until after public hearings.

113

At the Board

meeting on 28 February 1968, the Board failed to pass the
Austin transfer plan when vote ended with a five-five split.
The Board also voted nine-one for a revision in the South
Shore pJan. 1 1 4

On 4 March 1968 the Board again voted on a

revised Austin plan that al lowed African-American parents
the choice as to whether their children should be

Ibid., p.2.
Herrick, loc.cit., p.350.
1 1 3 .l.b.l.Q •
114
Ibid:, p.351.
111

113
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transferred instead of marking off areas from which children
would be transferred automatically.
approved eight to

one.

11

~

The revised plan was

On 10 July 1968, the Board

approved a revised plan for South Shore in which some 300
children would attend two new small "magnet schools," with
smaller classes than other schools and special services and
opportunlties.

116

SUCCESSFUL MODELS FOR INTEGRATED EDUCATION
Project "Wingspread" was first discussed by the Board
of Education at the meeting on 8 June 1966 during the Willis
superintendency.

Will is warned his board that he felt that

the program involved too many risks and involved the
delegating of Chicago Board powers to suburban boards.

He

could not recommend participation. 1 1 7
The "Wingspread" was revived by the Redmond
administration and began during the summer of 1968 with five
schools from the central city and f Ive "North Shore"
suburban districts.

The

progra~

E.S.E.A. Title III grant. 1 1 9

was funded under an

The program involved city and

suburban students, teachers, administrators, and parents
combining their resources and talents in an exploration of
bi d . , p . 353 .
Ibid. , p. 353.
. ~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, June 8,
1966, Chicago, II., p.3303.
118
Davld U. Levine, ed., Models for Integrated Education,
<Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Company,
1971), p.98.
1 1

~I

1 1 6
1

1
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metropolitan living.

The program was designed to promote

mutual understandings among students of different
socio-economic and racial backgrounds, it helped students
develop new perspectives about the total metropolitan
community.

The program had three basic divisions:

Direct School Exchange Programs,

The Magnet or Central

Site, and the Once-a-Week Interest Group.

Through June

1971, more than 4500 students and teachers from 46 Chicago

and suburban schools had taken part in the "Wingspread"
program.

1 1

""

In the fal 1 of 1970 Metro, the Chicago Public High
School for Metropolitan Studies, opened its doors.

Metro

was an attempt to establish a "School Without Walls"
patterned after Philadelphia/s parkway program. 1 2 0

The

program multiplied the educational options available to the
student and provided a much greater opportunity for the
development of individual aptitudes and interests.

It

provided educational activities that were related to the
student/s personal and vocational goals.

Enrollment in the

program was open to all high school aged students in the
city.

The program selected students in a manner which

insured diversity.

The program generated considerable

support and enthusiasm among its students and in the city as
a whole. 1 21
1 1 9

.1Ql.g. , p • 99 .

32
~·· p • .
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The concept of magnet schools as developed at the
Disney Elementary, Hyde Park Career Academy, and Whitney
Young High School has assisted in the integration of some
of Chicago/s schools.

These schools attempted to implement

some of the objectives of the Redmond plan and gave students
of different cultures and ethnic groups the opportunity to
share with each other the educational experience.

The

racially controlled enrollments of these schools made it
possible for the citizens of Chicago to see integrated
education work.
The fatal flaw in the Redmond Plan was that the Board
of Education accepted it "in principle" but never really
supported it financially or theoretically.

Redmond was able

to show that the ideas in the plan could help provide the
school system with integrated schools with the success of
the magnet schools established during his tenure as
superintendent.

His plan for faculty assignment was similar

to a plan that was later ordered by the federal courts and
is stil 1 being followed today.

The suggestions of open

enrollment for vocational education and the apprentice
program

expan~ion

were eventually carried out but vocational

high schools today can still be categorized in racial terms.
Although the plan was generally accepted it was never fully
implemented and Redmond feels that the plan was not as
successful as he would have 1 iked because the mayor and the
machine politicians felt that it would lessen their

182

influence over various voting blocks.
Redmond/s challenge of desegregating the schools
continued throughout his tenure.

Redmond also realized that

the Chicago system was too large to be managed by only one
pecson so he developed a plan to decentralize the schools
and make them more accessible to local communities.
next challenge discussed by this study with be the
decentralization of the public schools.

The

!83

CHAPTER V

REDMOND IMPLEMENTS A DECENTRALIZATION PLAN
As discussed ln the previous chapters, some members of
Redmond/s staff were preparing their response to the federai
government/s request for a desegregation plan and others
were negotiating with the Teachers Union.

A third group of

staff members were providing input into a study of the
organization of the Board of Education conducted by the
management firm of Booz, Al Jen, & Hamilton, Inc ..

Although

this study began at the end of the tenure of Superintendent
Benjamin Willis in May 1966, James Redmond/s administration
would be responsible for finalizing the study and
implementing the recommendations of the firm.
But first, we must note that the term
"decentralization" is sometimes ambiguous.

We are

introduced to two of its/ meanings in Fantini and Gittel l/s
Decentralization: Achieving Reform.

These authors tel 1 us

that decentralization can be an administrative device that
shifts administrative power from central administrative
offices <I ike the Board of Education) to the field <local
districts or schools).

In this type of decentralization,

the bureaucracy is reorganized to permit field
administrators greater authority and power to act.

Another

definition asserts that decentralization plans embody a
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design for meaningful shifts in power from central agencies
to local communities.

1

In the former definition, the

central administration distributes its power to local
adrnlr.istrators who carry out the directives from above.
In the later. the power base resides in the local community
rather than from above.

The local community is able to make

decisions that effect them without getting prior approval
from the central authority.
This chapter discusses the decentralization of the
Chicago schools that took place under the leadership of
Superintendent Redmond.

We wil 1 see that Redmond used a

management consultant/s report to administratively
decentralize.

He later expanded the idea of district and

local school advisory boards to provide an example of what
could be considered political decentralization.

But first.

we wil 1 briefly discuss the history of school district
decentralization in general and note some instances of
Chicago/s prior experience with decentralization.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF DECENTRALIZATION
According to Professor Jeffrey Mirel of Northern
Illinois University, decentralization is one of the
recurring elements of educational reform.

Mirel notes that

in the 1890/s there were over 100,000 school

districts in

Mario Fantini and Marilyn Gittel 1, Decentralization:
Achieving Reform.
CNew York: Praeger Publishers, 1973>, p.12.
1
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the United States each governed by a separate board of
education. 2

Parents and citizens had enormous control

over these schools.

They not only had the right to hlre

teachers and principals but they also selected textbooks,
set salaries, and made curriculum decisions.
were truly decentra1 ized.

The schools

The problem with education in

these schools was that teachers were 1 imited in thelr
teaching.

Schools had to reflect community attitudes and

values, and this made education insular rather than
cosmopolitan.

A teacher had to be sure that what he or she

taught and how he or she taught it were not contrary to the
cornrnun 1 t y,. s idea of curriculum.

If he or she was not

careful to respect the cornmunity/s ideals, the teacher would
be dismissed.

These schools reflected the narrow range of

ideas particular to a given community and the ideas of
outsiders were not welcomed.
outrage was the infamous

An example of the community's

Scope/~

Monkey Trial in Tennessee,

when a biology teacher was jailed for teaching Darwln/s·.
Theory of Evolution.
Rural areas were not the only locations for
decentralized school systems.

Many of the urban areas of

the 1890/s had a ward based school board.

Each ward of the

city would elect one or two board members for the board of
education.

These board members had almost complete control

Jeffrey Mi rel. Wbat History Can Teach Us About School
Decentralization, Presented to the Chicago Principals
Association Conference, 23 March 1990. <Duplicated>
2
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over educational matters within the ward.

They could

control the hiring and firing of educational personnel.
select textbooks and decide curriculum, and even decide
where schools should be

built.~

Contemporary advocates of decentralization refer back
to the 90,.s as a time when local communities were
responsible for the education of their own children.
fai 1 to note

0

They

however, that the reason the system became

,

more centralized later on was because of the great amount of
patronage and corruption that were found in the ward based
school boards.

In 1894, Detroit/s reform mayor Hazen

Pingree went to a school board meeting with a squad of
pol icemen and announced, "Quite a number of members of this
board are going to jail tonight."

Four members of the board

were later arrested on charges of taking bribes for building
contracts. 4

Twenty years later, after continued corruption,

the people of Detroit voted to abolish the ward based school
board in favor of an elected at large school board.

The

movement to centralization was designed to give more power
to educational professionals.
In the late 1960/s and early 1970/s, the cries for
decentralized school districts were again heard.

New York

and Detroit both moved for sireater community involvement in

3.llU_Q.

M.G. Holli, Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. Pingree and Urban
Politics. CNew York: Oxford University Press, 1969>, cited
in Mirel presentation of 23 March 1990.
4
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the schools.

The new decentralized system in these two

cities gave local citizens more control over their schools
but also resulted in labor disputes and long teacher
strikes.

Conflicts over curriculum and teacher appointment

in the local schools became a point of controversy.

In

1976, the citizens of Detroit declared decentralization a

failure and voted to recentralize the system.

New York

maintains its/ decentralized system but it continues to be
the center of controversy with twelve of the thirty-two
regional boards under investigation for al Jeged corruption
in 1989. ~

EARLY DECENTRALIZATION IN CHICAGO
The first instance of decentralization in the Chicago
Public Schools was based upon a recommendation of the Harper
Report of 1898.

Among the recommendations of the

Report

was a cal 1 for decentralization and involvement of lay
citizens in the community.

The Board of Education was asked

to divide the city into special inspection districts to
include not more than ten schools.

The mayor would appoint

six "resident commissioners" for terms of three years to
visit the schools and report on discipline. sanitation, and
the work of

t~e

schools to the Board.•

The Report noted

the "present tendency is to make the school system more and

re 1 , 1oc. cit .
Herrick, Joe.cit., p.86.

~Mi
0
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more a matter of expert control."

It continued, "If the

system of public instruction is not readily affected by
public opinion, a feeling of dissatisfaction naturally
arises."

The Report outlined the legitimate role of a

7

Board of Education.

And it was curiously modern in its

emphasis on community "inspectors" and the need for
"community schools." Slowly many of its recommendations went
i n t o e ff e ct . '3
The next attempt to decentralize the schools came in
the late 1920/s during the tenure of William J. Bogan.
Superintendent Bogan divided the city into forty-one areas,
and set about developing local community-school advisory
committees in each area.
they

wer~

These committees were active until

disbanded in the financial turmoil that occurred

in 1932. ·:;>
In 1961, Superintendent Willis increased the number of
sub-districts to twenty-four and established districts that
included both elementary and high schools with geography and
population being the determining factors in district
boundaries.

Wil 1 is also asked each sub-district

superintendent to appoint an advisory committee from the
community. 10

" lb i d . ' p . 87 .
c.Ibid.
·¥ .I.Q.lQ. ,
p . 227.
10
.I.Q.lg.-; p.309.
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BOARD AUTHORIZES BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON STUDY
At a meeting on 4 March 1966, the Board of Education
voted to employ the management firm of Boaz, Allen &
Hamilton, Inc. to study its own operation and that of
non-teaching services.

11

Boaz, Allen & Hamilton responded

with a proposal that included the study of five areas: 1) an
administrative organization study, 2) a survey of the
financial operations, the budget, and the budgeting process,
3) a study of Board information requirements, 4) appraisal
of the data processing activity, and 5) a review of
purchasing practices and procedures.

12

Discussions

regarding the study took place in committee meetings,
resulting in formal Board approval of the Boaz. Al !en &
Hamilton Report on 24 August 1966 at a cost of $193,000.00.
The motion was passed with an 8-1 vote. 1 3
It was fortunate in a way that the study was
commissioned during the superintendency of Benjamin Willis.
The use of an outside consultant made it clear that the
resu 1 tant report was not some th i.ng designed by Redmond to
carry out his own administrative re-structuring.
his staff, and Board members

Redmond,

were interviewed by the

consultants and their ideas considered.

Additionally, the

Booz, Al !en & Hamilton team visited school officials in New
.l.Ql.d. , p . 330 .
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 July
1966, Chicago, II., p.83.
13
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 24 August
1966, Chicago, II., p.363.
1 1
.

12
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York and Los Angeles to discuss their recent attempts at
organizational reform.

The team sought to iearn of the

organizational practices employed and the problems
encountered in these large systems.

The first study. and

the one that helped to decentralize the administration of
the school system. was the organizational study.

This study

was chosen first because it effected all other parts of the
proposed areas of study.
The organizational survey itself was presented to the
Board of Education on 24 May 1967 in a bound volume.

The

survey presented the Board with an evaluation of the present
organization structure, noting areas of concern related to
I

both function and structure.

Next, it discussed the

environment in which the school system existed, the demands
placed on it, the resources it had available, and the
constraints under which it operated.

These factors

established further requirements that had to be met in the
new organizational structure.

The third section of the'

survey presented the actual recommended plan of organization
for the school system and a time line for its' execution.
The time line began with the approval of the Basic
Organizational Plan on May 24, 1967 and continued through
the 1969 Legislative Session (January> during which the
Board would ask the legislature to change the statute to
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allow the Board to delegate certain personnel actions.

14

The appendix contained job descriptions for each
administrative position in the new structure and schematic
drawings of the current <May 1967), an interim, and the
proposed organizational structures <See schematic drawings
identified as item 1,2, and items 3 a,b,c, in the appendix).
The size of the Chicago school system dictated that a
plan of organization be built around the work to be donethe functions to be performed.

The system was far too large

to be organized around the talents of specific individuals.
By organizing around function rather than personality,
there could be continuity when the people in power positions
change.

People could be fitted to the position rather than

the position fitted to the person.

The consultant team

noted that since the Chicago system had many dedicated and
skilled administrators, it would be easier to help these
people adapt to new functions rather than to try to fit the
function to the person.
The consultants reported that the essence of the plan
ls:

decentralization to an extent considered practical; the

creation of tolerable work loads at al 1 levels, from the
Board down; and the grouping of staff activities which have
a natural kinship to each other into organizational

units.

1

The major elements of the recommended plan can be summed. up
"Qrganizational Survey", Booz. Allen. & Hamilton Report,
<Chicago: Chicago Board of Education, 1967), p.53.
~.lb...ld., p.iii.

14

1

~
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in five statements:
1. The role of the Board of Education as a
policy-making and program approving body is
underscored.
Increased use of Board committees is
proposed and the Board is provided with adequate
staff support.
2. The function of the General Superintendent is
defined as that of chief administrative officer of
the school system, with basic emphasis on planning,
developing programs, and evaluating results. He
also is provided with adequate staff in support of
this role.
3. Responsibility of the day-to-day management of the
school system is delegated to a deputy
superintendent who is, in effect, the chief
operating officer.
4. The city is divided into areas of manageable size,
each headed by an associate superintendent with a
ful 1 staff of his own. Each area associate
superintendent has under his direction the
organization equivalent of a major school system.
5. Only those staff activities which are system-wide in
nature or which can be most effectively performed at
the headquarters level are carried at this level.
These, and certain specialized operating functions,
are retained in the central office. 1 6
The recommended plan of organization required that one
change be made in state law governing the Chicago Board of
Education.

The School Code of Illinois stated that

appointment, promotions, and transfers of teachers and other
personnel must receive board of education approval.

This

Jaw would have to be amended to allow the board to delegate
most of these personnel appointments.

The consultants

suggested that the Board of Education retain the authority
to review and approve appointments of personnel who report
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to the Board, and heads of organizational units that report
to the general superintendent or his deputy.

The general

superintendent should approve the appointment of district
superintendents and key subordinates of staff directors.
The deputy superintendent, as chief operating officer.
should approve the appointment of principals, directors of
field staff functions and their key subordinates.

The area

associate superintendent should approve appointment of
personnel reporting to his staff directors and the
assignment of teachers in his area.

17

The consultants

suggested that the reorganization take place over a period
of eighteen months.

They suggested that key personnel be

selected to fill new or modified positions and that an
interim organization structure be designed until the new
organization becomes completely operational.

The Interim

Organization Plan was submitted to and approved by the Board
of Education on 28 June 1967.

At the same meeting, the

Board approved the appointment of two assistants to the
General Superintendent, Manford Byrd, Jr. and James
Moffat. 19

These positions were recommended by the Booz.

Allen. & Hamilton Report to assist the general
superintendent in the discharge of selected administrative
activities as directed.

They were to perform research

assignments, help prepare materials and reports for the

lb..ld., p.iv.
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 June
1967, Ch·i cage, I 1. , p. 307-309.

17

19

194

general superintendent, and obtain data and information for
special

projects.

1

~

Both of these men continued to be high

ranking Board administrators for twenty years.

Redmond

said that he was generally happy with the selection of these
two men over time. He noted great disappointment with the
events that lead to the ending of Moffat/s career. 2 0
The next phase of implementing the Interim Organization
Plan was to divide the city into three administrative areas
and select personnel to ti l I the position of Associate
Superintendent in each of the areas.

Redmond made the

fol lowing recommendation for these positions: Dr. Curtis
Melnick for Area A on the southside, Julien Drayton for
Area B in the central city, and Dr. George Connelly for Area
C on the northside.

This new appointees were to help the

General Superintendent develop the details for the
decentralization of the school system while maintaining
their current positions until the decentralization plan was
ready to be put into effect. 21
At the Board of Education

~eeting

of 13 March 1968,

Redmond recommended that the Board approve the revised
administrative structure and approve changes in titles that
reflected the reorganization as suggested by the management
consultants.

He added that he and his advisors recommended

p. Appendix A (17>.
Redmond interview, Joe.cit.
21
"Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting", 13
September 1967, Chicago, Il ., p.544.
1

~1..Q..l..Q.,

20
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the retention of the positions of Assistant Superintendent
for Vocational and Practical Arts Education and the
Assistant Superintendent for Federal-State Relations
which were not included with the management survey.

The

Board approved both recommendations. 22
The last major change in the structure of the
administrative organization of the school system was the
appointment of a Deputy Superintendent.

As mentioned

earlier, the role of the General Superintendent would become
the "chief administrative executive" and that a new off ice,
the Deputy Superintendent, would be charged with the daily
operations of the school as "chief operating officer."

The

Deputy Superintendent would have the responsibility for
managing the system on a day-to-day basis with the heads of
central staff departments and Area Associate Superintendents
reporting to him. 23

At the Board meeting of 13 November

1968, Superintendent Redmond recommended the appointment of
Manford Byrd, Jr. to the position of Deputy Superintendent.
Byrd was approved by the Board and began his new position on
1 December 1968. 2 4

He served in that position throughout

the remainder of Redmond/s superintendency.
In an interview. Redmond said that he felt the
organization was right but that he should have considered
"Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 March
1968, Chicago, Il ., p.1569-60.
23
"Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13
November 1968, Chicago, II., p.768.
24
1.Ql.Q., p. 760.
22
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making more than the three

districts."

2

~

In retrospect, he

thought that generally the areas operated as they had been
planned.

He warned that decentralization had its/ good

points but that districts like New York, have gone too far.
He felt that educators should get input from all groups
involved in the schools. but the input should be advisory
only.

The decisions must ultimately made by the school

administration.

POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHICAGO
The idea of political decentralization of the Chicago
Public Schools was first presented at a Board of Education
meeting on 26 January 1966 when guidelines for the District
Superintendents/ Educational Councils were first discussed.
Although guidelines were established the development of
councils was Jagging.
On 29 March 1969, a Board report described the impetus
and organizational pattern for the Districts/ Counciis.
After the report was Issued, the Board made it clear that
al 1 District Superintendents should form a councl 1 and if
necessary continue to sol lcit membership on the council from
persons and groups Interested In school affalrs. 20

A survey

reported that only f lfteen of the twenty-seven districts had

Interview, lac.cit.
Mlnutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 10
September 1969, Chicago, II., p.362.
2

~Redmond

20

197

an advisory council of some kind.

27

Many of the councils

deviated from the original guidelines which mandated that
one-third of the council should be appointed by the District
Superintendent and that these appointed members select the
other two-thirds from business and industrial personnel who
1 Ive or work in the community, from parents of children in
the schools, from professionals such as principals and
teachers, and from representatives of local youth service or
community agencies. 2 8
A report on the District Superintendents/ Educational
Councils presented at the Board of Education meeting on
10

September 1969 pointed out that the legal responsibility

for al 1 decisions pertaining to school matters rests with
the General Superintendent of Schools with the approval of
the Board of Educatlon. 29

However, it is noted that it ls

possible that District Educational Councils can make
recommendations to the District Superintendent who can
transmit their recommendations to the Area Superintendent,
the Deputy Superintendent, the General Superintendent, and
ultimately the Board of Education. 3 0
This report noted areas of concern in which Educational
Councils might make recommendations to the District
Superintendent:

27.l.bl.,g.
28.l.b.LQ.
29
.I.!2.1.Q., p.363.
30.I.Ql.Q.

1)

order of priorities with the district for
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allotment of funds for purchase of educational equipment, 2)
order of priorities for improvement or repair of facilities
within the district, 3) qua! ities desirable in persons who
might be candidates for administrative positions. 4) sites
and educational specifications for school faci I ities, and
5) attendance boundary adjustment.

These powers of

recommendation were granted to the councils by a 9-0 vote of
the Board of

Education.~

1

Prior to March 1970. the Board al lowed Educational
Councils to advise District Superintendents on the qualities
they felt were desirable in candidates for administrative
positions in the district.

In March 1970, the Board adopted

a report by the Calumet-Hess Committee that recommended
District Superintendents make available to advisory groups
the names of eligible candidates to fil 1 the principal
vacancy in their school.

The committee also recommended

that the advisory group be al lowed to interview candidates
for the vacancy and recommend their selection to the General
Superintendent. 3 2
Beginning at the Board meeting of 14 March 1973, the
Board was presented with a set of Guidelines for Operation
of District Education Councils.

Further discussions of

these guidelines were carried on at subsequent Board
meetings of 28 March, 11Apri1, and 25 April 1973.

The

31.l..b.1..Q.

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 March
1970, C~itago, Il ., p.3192.

32
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guidelines were adopted under a omnibus rol I call vote on 25
April 1973. 3 3

These guidelines for operation included the

fol lowing items:
1. Bylaws shal I be established with the rules and
policies of the Board of Education by each council
which will set criteria for membership, organizing
patterns for the counci 1, including officers, terms
of off ice, and methods for conducting business.
2. Methods of placing items on the agenda will also be
regularized.
3. Minutes wll 1 be kept and distributed to members,
Area Associate Superintendents, and District
Superintendent.
4. Counci I meetings wil 1 be held monthly and
additionally as needed. Meetings will be held in a
convenient location.
5. District councils must have at least one member from
each local school council. Sixty percent of the
members must be parents of students in the district.
6. District Superintendents and District Human
Relations Coordinators shall serve as resource
consultants for the councils.
7. Meetings of the councils shal 1 be open to the public
and announced one week in advance. Councils may set
limits of participation by members of the public who
are not members of the council.
8. Agenda topics to be consldered at meetings of the
councils shall focus more on district concerns
including priority of items for budget consideration
at the District level.
9. The Chicago Region P.T.A. will see that a
representative from one of its 18 P.T.A. Councils is
named to each District Educational Council. 3 4
These District Educational Councils were precursors of the

Mlnutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 April
1973, Chicago, II., p.2682.
33

34.lQ.i.Q.
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next step in the political decentralization of the school
system,

the local school councl l.

The idea of local school councils was the second form
of political decentralization that arose during the Redmond
administration.

The first discussions concerning the

establishing of the local school councils began in October
1970.

The Board of Education in general committee made

several recommendations regarding the councils.
Their first recommendation was that each principal,
whether administrator of one building or buildings with
branches, should establish a Local School Council.

Schools

that had active and effective PTAS, Concerned Parents, or
other school groups could be selected as Local School
Council members.

The decision of using a current

organization should be made at community

meetings.

3

~

The principal was asked to take the initiative in
cal ling public, evening meetings with advance notice given
by flyers sent home with students, and by publicity
local newspapers or radio stations.

thr6~gh

Those eligible to vote

in the election were parents of the children in the school
and the faculty of the school.

The principal was to act as

the chairman pro-tern of the meeting until a chair could be
elected.

After this election,

the principal was to act in

an advisory or resource capacity only.

8

The principal or his

~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 9
December 1970, Chicago, II., p.1037.
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representative should attend al 1 Council meetings. 3 6
The Board also listed what they felt the purposes of
the Local School Counci 1 should be 1 isted as fol lows:
1. To permit parents and school patrons to share in the

process of arriving at decisions which affect local
schools.
2. To inform District Education Councils of the needs
of individual schools and to suggest how these needs
can be met. 3 7
The

Boa~d

also suggested that membership on the Local

School Council should be broadly representative of the
community within the school attendance district and members
should be residents of the community and representative of
its institutions.

A minimum of sixty percent of the members

should be parents of children in the school.

School

personnel, representatives of the community, religious.
civic, social-service, business, and youth serving agencies
should be included.

Each Council should decide the number

of members on its Council. 3 9
The Councils were also directed to elect officers,
including a chairman or president, a vice-chairman or
vice-president, and a secretary.
up as soon as possible.

By-laws were to be drawn

These by-laws should include the

provision that meetings be held at least monthly during the
school year.

The meetings were to be public meetings and
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minutes were to be kept. 89
In order to encourage night meetings of the Local
School Councils, the Board of Education provided $150,000.00
in operational funds so that each Council could have at
least three evening meetings per year. 40

This funding was

necessary because the Stationary Engineers Union was
extremely powerful and demanded that their union members get
paid for the additional hours work.
Seven months after the initial adoption of the Local
School Council guide! ines, several revisions were made.
These revisions included the provision that the principal or
his designee must be present at al 1 Council meetings.

The

principal was also given the right to serve as an officer if
the Local Counci 1 wished.

Additionally, representation of

Local School Council to the District Education Council was
to be equal, with each School Council having the same number
of delegates. 41
Further revisions included the provision that each
Council should have representatives from PTA, Concerned
Parents, or other established school-wide parent
organizations.

Terms of officers were also limited to one

year. It was also noted that the Council may not interfere
in the day to day operations of the school, but may include
39Th;

,...j

~-

40Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 10 March
1971, Chicago, Il., p. 2805.
41 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 July
1971 , Chicago, I 1 • , p. 12.
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any problems on its agenda.

It also recognized that the

principal should make every effort to comply with the
Council/swishes but the Council members must recognize that
the principal may not have all the administrative power to
comply w1th all their resolutions. 4 2
Other revisions of the guidelines for Councils were
made on 25 October 1972.

These revisions included the

requirement that officers in the Councils must be parents of
students in the school . 4 3

At this same meeting but deferred

was a recommendation that the Board adopt guidel Ines for a
Principal Nominating Committee of the Counci 1.

These

guidelines were debated and deferred for over a year.

The

Board finally approved and amended these guidelines on 14
November 1973. 4 4

The Principal Nominating Committee was

charged by the Local School Counci 1 to help select
candidates for school principal.

The guidelines noted that

the Nominating Committee must include representatives of the
PTA and/or local Concerned Parents Organizations.

The

committee must reflect the ethnic diversity of the school.
The Nominating Committee must have at least five members and
must reflect at least a sixty percent participation by
parents.

The Nominating Committee shal I be guided by the

District Superintendent.

The Nominating Committee may

42.lblQ,

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25
October 1972, Chicago, II., p.1044-45.
44
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 14
November· i973, Chicago, Il., p.1100-03.
43
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nominate up to a maximum of three candidates from the
eligibility list if they

desire.

4

~

The Nominating Committee

must nominate at least two candidates for each vacancy.

The

committee must also realize that state law requires that the
General Superintendent recommends and the Board gives final
approval of all principal appointments. 4

•

These moves towards decentralization made it appear
outwardly that it was Redmond/s intention to spread out his
authority and provide the public with a voice into the
administration of the school system.
both half-truths.

In a way, these were

Redmond/s plans for administrative

decentralization were sincere.

It was his intention to

leave the daily operations of the school system to the
Deputy Superintendent and the Area Associates.

This sharing

of powers would allow him more time to be a planner and a
lobbyist for program improvements in both Springfield and
Washington, D.C ..

In fact, the political decentralization

that took place with both the District Education Council and
the Local School Councils could be considered merely "window
dressing."

Both of these Councils were basically advisory.

In James Cibulka's "Obstacles to School Decentralization:
The Chicago Case," it is noted that these Councils reached
only the fifth level on Arnstein's "Ladder of Citizen
Participation."

This means, according to Cibulka, that the
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Councils were created only to placate the citizens, and give
them only advisory power. 4 7

The Board of Education did not

delegate any real powers to these groups.

The Councils did

benefit in that they felt that they had input into some of
the decisions of the schools.

Since they felt that they had

been empowered, they felt some responsibility toward their
schools.

In fact, they had little power and eventually

would realize it.
Redmond/s ability to make more people feel that they
were involved in the running of the schools was a positive
outcome.

The increase in the power of local school groups

to give input into the selection of their school leadership
helped give these groups the feeling that they were able to
have some control over there own schools.

This distribution

of power seems to coincide with Fantini and Gittel l/s
definition of political decentralization of the schools.

We

must remember however, that the' councils could only advise;
the final decision rested in the hands of the General
Superintendent or his designee.

He also tried to get

support from the parents of parochial school students by
establishing a shared-time program that would allow students
from parochial schools to attend classes in regular public
high school for part of the day.

This idea of shared time

?James G. Cibulka, Obstacles to School Decentralization: The
Chicago Case, Paper presented at the American Educational
Research Association Annual Meeting, April 1974.
4
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will be discussed as the fourth challenge met by
Superintendent Redmond.
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CHAPTER VI
REDMOND AND THE SHARED-TIME EXPERIMENT
After meeting the challenges of Union negotiations,
desegregation. and decentraiization. Redmond encountered a
fourth challenge. the shared-time program.

Redmond finally

met a challenge that was not ordered by the courts. demanded
by his employees, nor recommended by his consultants.

Like

desegregation, this program was inherited from
Superintendent Ben Willis.

The program began in September

1965 at two Chicago public high schools.

This was a program

that was not extremely controversial and that in fact had
some community support.

Redmond/s task was to insure

that the experiment continue and then, with his staff,
analyze its results and plan for the future. Before we
discuss the Chicago shared-time schools, we wi 11 present the
background of the idea of shared-time.
Shared-time is defined as an arrangement whereby
nonpublic schools send their students to public schools for
instruction in one or more subjects during the school day.
The term was first heard in 1960 and the concept of
shared-time has been called other names such as split time,
reserved time, dual school enrollment, educational
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co-operation, part-time enrollment, and dual registration.

1

The United States Senate Education Sub-committee discussed
the concept and in 1973 defined it in the fol lowing manner:
... the term shared-time means an arrangement for pupils
enrol led in nonpublic elementary or secondary schools
to attend public schools for instruction in certain
subjects ... regarded as being mainly or entirely
secular, such as laboratory science and home
economics. 2
Although shared-time programs may take place in leased or
rented parts of parochial schools, the instruction is
provided

by

public school personnel.

Usually the program

provides secular courses such as industrial arts, science,
anri

~~thematics

with public school teachers, while subjects

such as social studies, humanities, and literature are
taught by private school teachers.
The sharing of students between public and private
schools has been defended in several ways.

One defense is

that the parochial schools relieve the public school from
a substantial portion of its burden to educate society.
Assistance to the parochial school in providing secular
classes by public school teachers repays the parochial
school for the relief it provides a burdened public school
system.
A second rationale for the use of the shared-time is

Shared-Time Programs: An Exploratory Study <Washington:
National Education Association Research Division, 1964), p.5.
2
Martha M, McCarthy, A Delicate Balance: Church. State. and
the Schools, <Bloomington, In.: Phi Delta Kappa Educational
Foundation, 1983), p.103.
1
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that it complies with regulations of federal categorical
funding laws.

Federal categorical programs usually provide

for assistance to meet the needs of certain groups of
children whether they attend public or parochial schools.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
state-supported remedial and therapeutic programs do not
implicate the establishment clause as long as they are
provided at religiously neutral sites, even if parochial
school students are served in particular programs. 3

The use

of federally funded auxiliary services has been endorsed
even when the public school teacher ls assigned to the
parochial school to provide the needed services. 4
In a November 1963 survey conducted by the Research
Division of the National Education Association, post cards
were sent to 12,366 United States school districts that had
minimum enrollments of 300 students.

Responses were

received from 7,410 superintendents, 280 of whom said that
they had parochial school students come to the publ le school
for instruction in one or more subjects.

This response

indicated that only 3.8 percent of those replying were
implementing shared-time

programs.~

Illinois

superintendents responding showed that thirty-seven
Mc earthy, Joe.cit., p.104, citing Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 247 <1977).
4
.lQl.Q., citing National Coalition for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Harris. 489 F.Supp.1248<S.D.N.Y. 1980).
~National Education Association Research Division,
Shared-Time Programs: An Exploratory Study <Washington:
Nationa1··Eduaction Association, 1964), p.7.
3
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shared-time programs existed in Il I inois at the time of the
survey. 0

The Chicago school district was not one of these

thirty-seven respondents from Illinois.

BOARD OF EDUCATION AUTHORIZES SHARED-TIME EXPERIMENT
After being deferred three times by the Chicago Board
of Education, the proposal for shared-time was discussed at
the Board meeting of 23 April 1964.

At this meeting, the

first motion regarding shared-time was to further examine
the issue and invite representatives from al 1 religious and
civic groups to present their views on the issue.
motion was defeated by a 3-7 vote. 7

This

Fol lowing this vote,

Superintendent Willis addressed the Board and reported
on a study of the shared-time issue ordered by the Board on
13 November 1963.

He noted that parents of the John F.

Kennedy High School (previously Kinzie High School) wanted a
shared-time program and were willing to accept any workable
plan that might be presented. 8

Willis reminded the Board

that based on other similar programs throughout the country,
parental support was essential for a successful program.
Willis suggested a five-year experimental shared-time
program beginning in September 1964 with 300 freshmen from
the Kennedy area and classes of 400 students in each of the

C•Ibid.
7
Meeting of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 23 April
1964, Chicago, II., p.2163.
8
.I..Qj_g •• p.2164.
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fol lowing years unti 1 1969.

It was proposed that the

students spend one-half to two-thirds of their time at
Kennedy and the remainder of their time at St. Paul High
School.~

Willis referred to a legal opinion given by Mr. Hutson.
legal counsel for the State Superintendent of Publ le
Instruction, that indicated his belief in the legality of
the shared-time concept.

Willis also stated that the United

States Commissioner of Education favored such experiments
and that similar programs were being tried nationwide.
Wil 1 is reminded the Board that the program would be
experimental only and that they would remain responsible for
and keep control of the Kennedy High School.

He reminded

the Board that the students taking part in the shared-time
program must live in the Kennedy school attendance area.

He

also assured the Board that if other communities wanted to
investigate the establishment of experimental shared-time
programs with other parochial schools they would assist ·them
in doing so.
After

10

Willis~

comments, a resolution was presented that

authorized an experimental shared-time program to begin in
September, 1965 and not extend beyond the school year
commencing in September, 1968.

The resolution directed the

General Superintendent to request private schools in the

·rbid.
10
Ibid., p.2164-65.
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Kinzie area, other than St. Paul/s, to cooperate in the
experiment and also stated that:
... while the Board of Education and the Attorney for
the Board are of the opinion that the experimental
program does not in any manner violate the statutes and
the Constitution of the State of II linois or the
Constitution of the United States, nevertheless because
there are people interested in the Chicago public
schools who are fearful that the experimental program
may be in violation of such statutes or constitutions.
the Board wil I welcome the filing of a test case by
such persons and in the event such a test case is
fl led, it wi l 1 be the policy of the Board of Education
to promptly respond thereto and to cooperate to
the maximum extent for an early hearing, disposition
and determination of any issues raised in such a test
case. 11
A rel 1 cal 1 vote was cal led and the resolution was adopted
by a vote of 7-3.
As was expected, a cha! lenge to the resolution took
place within a month.

A complaint was filed in the Circuit

Court of Cook County which sought:
to enjoin the Board of Education from maintaining
the dual enrollment program on the grounds that the
program violated statutory and constitutional
provisions. 1 2
The complaint was dismissed in January,1965, "with
prejudice", and the court held that the dual enrollment
program would not violate either statutory or constitutional
provisions.

The case was appealed to the Illinois Appellate

Court on 18 February 1966, and the decree of the trial court
was affirmed.

1 1

It was stated in the opinion of the trial

liU...d. • p . 2165 .

Morton v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 69 Il 1.
App. 2d 38, p.42.
12
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court that:
We, cannot find any intention on the part of the
legislature to limit the power of a school board to
adopt and develop better methods of educating the
children of this State. so long as the methods adopted
are otherwise consistent with the provisions of the
School Code. ~
1

The Appellate Court also held that:
The experimental dual enrollment plan adopted by the
Chicago Board of Education is merely an attempt to find
a better method for the education of the Chicago public
school children at the option of the parents or legal
guardians of those children. 1 4
In July 1964, the Board established the attendance area
for the new Kennedy High School.

Construction of the new

building continued throughout the 1964-65 school year and
Ms. Dorothy Sauer of the Kinzie Elementary School was named
principal.

As classrooms became available, the nearly 1400

students were gradually moved into the new

building.

1

~

In the spring of 1964, plans were being developed for
the new St. Paul High School
Kennedy High School.

located three blocks away from

Under the direction of the Christian

Brothers and staffed by Christian Brothers and Sisters of
the Order of St. Joseph, the school began recruiting
students for the shared-time program from the area/s
parochial schools.

16

In the spring of 1965, the principals of Kennedy and
13
14
1

Ibid.
Ibid.

~Joan M. Raymond, An Evaluation of the Experiment in
Shared-Time, <Chicago: Department of Operations Analysis,
1969), p.15.
10
Ibid., p.16.
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St. Paul/s met frequently to discuss the programming of the
shared-time students and other details of the program.
concert with the school principals,

In

the General

Superintendent presented to the Board of Education the
fol lowing guide] ines for the students in the shared-time
program.

Students in the shared-time program shall:

- be accepted only upon written request of a parent or
legal guardian
- be in full compliance with the compulsory attendance
laws
- shal 1 be assigned to class schedules in accordance
with the plan worked out by the principal of the
school
- shal 1 be assigned to a school division and school
counselor on the same basis as pupils in ful 1-time
attendance
- shall meet the requirements for graduation and
receive a diploma issued by the Board of Education
- shall be offered al 1 subjects available to full time
students except those mentioned below
shal 1 receive credit towards graduation in English,
Social Studies, Music and Art in a non-publ le school
accredited by the North Central Association and the
Illinois Department of Public Instruction
- shal I fol low Chicago public school courses of study
and utilize Chicago public school textbooks
- shall be considered members of the public school
student body with respect to athletic eligibility. 1 7
In September 1965, the shared-time program for the
students in the Kennedy-St. Paul area began.

This was the

first time in the history of the Chicago Public Schools that
students were al lowed to split their school day between
public and parochial schools.

In the first year of the

program 255 students from St. Paul/s participated in the

17
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 April
1965, Chicago, Il. , p.2489.
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program.

18

Only one minor change was requested in the

original program.

The faculty of St. Paul/s realized that

it could not offer art and music to their students and they
requested that these classes be taught at Kennedy.

The only

classes that would be taught at St. Paul/s would be English,
social studies. and

religion.

1

~

When James F. Redmond began his superintendency in
October 1966. the shared-time program had been operating for
over one year.

The enrollment had increased to 398 students

in freshman and sophomore year.

20

Enrollment increased to

487 students in 1967-68 and to 535 students in 1968-69. 21
In a Board author!zed stud;, An Evaluation of the
Experiment in Shared-Time, Dr. Joan M. Raymond discussed
several aspects of the shared-time programs, particularly
the Kennedy-St. Paul program. 2 2

Raymond noted that students

in the shared-time program met the same graduation

requirements as the regular public high school student, were
able to receive the support services available in the
public school, and were placed in a homeroom at both
schools. 23

The grading system in both schools was the

same, but grade reports were originally sent out at
different times.

Problems arose the first year with the

Raymond, Loe.cit.,
?Ibid., p.23.
20
Ibid., p.22.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid .• p.24-25.
18

1

p.22.
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timing of grade reports. so it became necessary for St.
Paul/s to adjust their marking periods to conform with those
of Kennedy.

Grades received by the shared-time students

at St. Paul were transferred to Kennedy. except for
religion. and entered as transferred credits on the
students/ permanent record cards.

Students who failed

English or social studies were required to make up the
fai iures during summer school . 2 ·"
Another aspect of the Kennedy-St.Paul program was the
discussion of serious discipline problems.

Serious

discipline problems were discussed informally between the
staffs of the two schools.

There were no official exchanges

of information except when a student was suspended from
Kennedy he was also suspended from St. Paul/s.

The reverse

procedure was not true because St. Paul/s did not use
suspension as a disciplinary technique. 2

e

As noted earlier.

shared-time students were subject to the same rules as
ful 1-time Kennedy students and were al lowed to participa:t.e
in extra-curricular programs at both schools.

However.

there was one additional rule for shared-time students.
They were prohibited from wearing any identification from
St. Paul"s. 2 6

24
Ibid .• p.26-27.
:2!5Ibid:. p.28.
2
""' Ibid. • p. 30 .
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SHARED-TIME PROGRAM ADDS TWO SCHOOLS
On 29 April 1965, when Superintendent Willis was asking
for acceptance of the final guidelines on the Kennedy-St.
Paul ·s program, he also requested that the Board approve a
second shared-time program involving William Howard Taft
High School and Luther High School North.

In the original

proposal it was mentioned that other school groups would be
invited to participate in the experimental program and one
group, the Lutheran Council of Greater Chicago, decided to
ask to be considered as a participant. 27
The proposal submitted by Luther North suggested that
approximately thirty freshmen take social studies and
religion at their campus and the remainder of their classes
at Taft High School.

The proposal for participation ln the

shared-time program was developed by the Chicago Lutheran
Shared-Time Education Committee.

This organization was

formed by representatives of the American Lutheran Church,
the Lutheran Church in America, and the Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod in 1964 to "make it possible for
public school students to be enrolled for certain courses in
a non-public school . 2

e

The Taft-Luther North program was to start in

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 29 April
1965, Chicago, Il ., p.2488-89.
29
Raymond, Loe.cit., p.31, citing U.S. Department of Helath,
Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, Bureau of
Research, Some Effects of Dual Enrollment Upon Students
Enrol led in the Shared-Time Program, July, 1967. p.1.
27
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September,1965, but scheduling difficulties delayed the
program until September, 1966.

The students who were to

begin the program as freshmen in 1965 were selected to
participate as sophomores in 1966.

In comparison to the

Kennedy-St. Paul program, the Taft-Luther North program was
considerably smaller.

The fourteen students who

participated did so for only two years.
The major difference between the Kennedy-St.Paul and
Taft-Luther North was that the students at Kennedy were
recruited for the program before they entered high school
and they entered the two high schools simultaneously.

In

the Taft-Luther North program, the students were already
ful I-time public school students who agreed to partic.ipate
in an experimental program in which they would take one of

their major subjects at a nonpublic school along with
religious instruction. 29
Another difference in the Taft-Luther North program was
the proximity of the schools.

Because Luther North is some

distance from Taft, it became necessary for the fourteen
shared-time students to have their classes at Our Savior
Elementary School, a Lutheran school much closer to Taft
High School.

Two teachers from Luther North taught the

fourteen sophomores religion and social studies in one
classroom at the elementary school.

29

Raymond, Joe.cit., p.32.

These fourteen students
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continued In the program during their Junior year. 3 0
The shared-time students took Modern World History
during the first year and Contemporary American History
during the second year.

The course of study in these

programs was reviewed by the Taft social studies department
chairman.

At Taft, these shared-time students were placed

in classes in the same manner as all public school students.
These students would take a full day/s program minus one
major subject (social studies).

The transfer of credit for

classes taken from Luther North were carried out in the same
manner as at Kennedy-St.Paul.

An unique aspect of the

Taft-Luther North program was that the shared-time students
were transported from Our Savior Elementary School to Taft
High School on a bus provided by the Chicago Lutheran
Shared-Time Committee. 31
The third parochial school that contacted the
Superintendent and asked to participate in the shared-time
program was the Chicago Jewish Academy (now cal led the Ida
Crown Jewish Academy).

The Girl/s High School Branch of the

Academy had moved into temporary quarters near Von Steuben
High School . 32

In August 1965, the Academy requested that

eighteen girls be allowed to take some courses at Von
Steuben which were not available at their school.

The

proposal was given tentative approval and guidelines for
301Q.LQ,. p.33.

36
p .•
Ibid., p.36.

:31 Th;,...,
32

~··
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participation were

establlshed.~ 8

The Chicago Jewish Academy program differed from the
other shared-time programs in some ways.

Unlike the two

other shared-time programs where the students were actually
enro1 led in the public school for most of the day, the girls
from the Jewish Academy attended Von Steuben for only one or
two classes.

These shared-time students/ records were kept

at the parochial school rather than the public school.

The

credits earned at Von Steuben were transmitted to the
Chicago Jewish Academy and were used toward meeting
graduation requirements.

Student attendance records were

also maintained at the parochial school with daily reports
forwarded from the public school . 3 4
The Von Steuben-Chicago Jewish Academy program actually
began two days before it was formally approved by the Board
of Education.

The Board stipulated, as it had done before

in the other shared-time agreements, that students
participating in the program must live in the attendance
area of the public school they would attend.

The students,

with signed parental approval, were to be programmed into
classes in chemistry, shorthand, and typing.

The parents

of the girls objected to the coeducational nature of
instruction in the chemistry class and the Jewish Academy
requested that the girls be withdrawn from that class.

33.I..bl.Q.' p.38.

34.l.b..Ld.

The

girls did remain in the typing and shorthand classes for two
years. ·3 5
The Von Steuben-Jewish Academy shared-time program did
not have official exchange of information concerning either
the students or the curriculum.

Student grades were sent to

the parochial school which notified the student's parents of
the student's work. 3 6

The contact between the shared-time

student and the pub! ic school was minimal in this case
because the majority of time spent in school was in the
parochial school r3ther the public school.

SHARED-TIME PROGRAM ENDS AT TWO SITES
Two of the shared-time programs, Von Steuben and the
Taft, were participants for only two years.

Although the

program at Von Steuben-Jewish Academy started at the same
time that Kennedy-St. Paul began. its program ended in June
1967. 3 7

One of the reasons for· the program's 1ack of

success at Von Steuben could have been the smal 1 number·qf
participants from the Jewish Academy.

There were only

eighteen girls who participated in the program.

The girls

also participated in an atmosphere that was quite foreign to
them.

They had been attending school in the segregated

setting of an all Jewish girls school.

Their parents even

requested that they not take class with males and this
35.lltl..Q., p.39.
.lQ.l_g. • p. 40.
:"37' .l.b..l.Q. ,
p. 149.

36
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request was honored even though it restricted the girls to
only two classes.
The Taft-Luther North program had a simi Jar problem in
that only fourteen students decided to participate in the
shared-time program.

These students took part in the

program and were even provided transportation to the public
school after their shared-time classes ended.

We must

recal 1 that these students were already enrol led ful 1 time
at Taft when the program began in September 1966.

This

program lasted two years also and was terminated in June
1968.::: 8

Administrators at Taft, Von Steuben, and the Chicago
Jewish Academy noted that the biggest disadvantage of the
shared-time program was the difficulty it presented in
programming students for classes.

They also noted that in

order to have a successful program the student body must
show an interest in the program and cooperate with it.
These administrators did note that since the program was
able to function wel I for two years, it ii lustrated both
the feasibility and the possibility of more shared-time
programs.

All of the administrators interviewed about the

program noted that they did not experience any serious
difficulties in the operation of their programs and
did not observe any harmful effects to their schools
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or their

students.~~

KENNEDY-ST. PAUL PROGRAM CONSIDERED SUCCESSFUL
In Joan Raymond/s study, An Evaluation of the
Exoeriment in Shared-Time, we can read a complete analysis
of the academic achievements and extra-curricular
participation

of the graduates that attended the

Kennedy-St.Paul program for four years.

Raymond considered

only students that attended Kennedy for four years.

This

included students that attended Kennedy only, students that
participated in the shared-time program for some time but
withdrew and became ful 1-time at Kennedy, and students that
were enrolled ln the shared-time program for all

four years.

Raymond/s study considered achievement tests scores, subject
taken in school, grades in all major subjects, grades in
each major subject, grade point averages, class rank, post
high school plans, ACT scores, attendance patterns,
participation in extra-curricular activities, and service
jobs at Kennedy High School . 4 0

On the basis of statistical

analysis of the data related to the school performance of
graduates who attended Kennedy High School for four years
and those who attended Kennedy on a shared-time basis for
four years, the fol lowing summary profile emerged.

39

.l.b..l..d •• p.147.

40

Ibid., p.48-77.

The
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shared-time graduates:
-

possessed, on the average, greater general ability
took more college preparatory courses
ceceived high grades
were in fewer honors classes
earned about the same grade point averages
had similar class ranks
were more college oriented
received about the same scores on the ACT
were absent less
participated in fewer extra-curricular activities
had fewer service Jobs at Kennedy
received fewer honors at Kennedy
were elected to fewer off ices at Kennedy. 41

Raymond reminds us that it matters little if the
program is administratively feasible and has no harmful
effect on the students if there was an adverse reaction to
it by those who were directly involved in its operation.
In fact.
crucial

the opinion of the participants might be the most
factor in the evaluation of the shared-time program.

We must therefore, consider the reactions of the parents,
students, teachers. and administrators who participated in
the program. 4 2
The opinions of the administrators involved in the
shared-time program were favorable.

The three programs

involved six administrative teams, all having varied
experiences with the program but al 1 noting a favorable
reaction to the program with no indication of any serious
difficulties in the shared-time operations. 4 3

41

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 June

1969, Chicago,
4

I I., p.3151.

Raymond, Loe.cit., p.156.
:::i Ibid. ; - p . 157.

42
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The author of this dissertation had the opportunity to
interview a former administrator of the St. Paul High
School.

Brother Konrad Diebold, F.S.C.,

is now the

president of St. Patrick High School on the northwest side
of the city.

Brother Konrad served as both a teacher

C1966-69) and principal

(1970-74) at St. Paul/s.

that the program was indeed a success.

He felt

He noted that

administrators and staff at both schools worked hard to
make the program succeed.

The enthusiasm of the students

and the concern of their parents fostered the growth of the
program. 44
Brother Konrad related that although there was apparent
support from the Board of Education/s central off ice. most
of the management decisions regarding the two schools were
made locally by the principals involved.

He noted the

problems of scheduling classes and adopting a common school
calendar were settled locally.

He felt that the reason that

St. Paul was able to remain open for twelve years was the
fact that the shared-time

progra~

was functioning wel 1 and

allowed the non-public school to operate on a minimum
budget.

4

~

The shared-time program ended in 1977 when St.

Paul's made what their administration refers to as an
educational rather financial decision.
that the opening of Curie High School
44

Brother Konrad noted
in 1975 significantly

Personal interview with Brother Konrad Diebold, F.S.C.,
Chicago, II .• 27 February 1991.
4

~Ibid.
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students.

We must recall that the Board of Education

limited participation in the shared-time program to those
students who iived

the Kennedy High School attendance area.

With the opening of Curie, the Kennedy attendance area was
cut in half.

Since the area from which St. Paul could

recruit potential students was cut in half also, their
incoming student population was greatly decreased. Since
less students meant wider varience in student abilities
within each class. the administration of St. Paul decided it
would be better to close than to operate a program that did
not meet the needs of each individual student.

46

The parents and students who participated for four
years in the Kennedy- St.Paul program also reacted favorably
to it.

Some parents had minor complaints while other

parents viewed the same issues as pluses <e.g. homework).
The biggest problems indicated -were that the school day was
too long and that there were conflicts in some students·

extra-curricular activities.

Most parents did note that

they would recommend the shared-time program to friends and
relatives. 47
The teachers assigned to Kennedy were in general
agreement that the shared-time program did not create

46
47

Ibid.
Raymond, Loe.cit., p.157.
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additional work or problems for them.

Moreover, they did

not observe any harmful effects either to the school or to
the students because of the shared-time program. 4 8
In summary, Raymond noted that from the point of view
of the Chicago publ le schools, the shared-time programs were
administratively feasible and not detrimental to the program
of education in the publ le schools.

Raymond recommended to

Superintendent Redmond d.nd the Board uf Education that the
shared-time program at Kennedy-St. Paul continue as long as
St. Paul authorities concur.

She recommended that the Board

consider additional programs with other non-public schools.
These recommendations were accepted by the Board of
Education with a 10-0

vote.

4

~

Redmond noted in an interview that he continued the
program which was in place when his superintendency began
but that his participation In the program was minimal.

He

felt that although he was a Catholic, he had a hard time
developing a philosophical argument for shared-time but that
he also found it hard to argue with parents who wanted to
try shared-time for their children.
parents in

thei~

He supported the

desire for continuing the program and noted

that part of his support was due to the legal opinions that
supported the

program.~ 0

Ibid. , p. 158.
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 June
1969, Chicago, Il .• p.3152.
~ Redmond interview. Joe.cit.

"'

19

49
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Redmond ref erred to the Raymond study of the
shared-time program as a very accurate report of the
shared-time program and as the basis for his recommendation
that the shared-time program continue as a result of the
success of the experimental program. 51

Further inquiries

into the possibility of expanding the shared-time program
were received by the Board during Redmond/s superintendency
but none of the inquiries resulted in the establishment of
new programs.

Inquiries from Brother Rice and Quigley South

High Schools were received as wel 1 as from some parochial
elementary schools.
Although this issue was not critical,

it showed

the wi 11 ingness of Superintendent Redmond to carry on
experimental programs that seemed to be working.

He also

made it clear that he was supportive of new programs if
parents wanted them.
We have discussed four challenges that Redmond dealt
with while in office.

Now we wil 1 take a brief look at

James F. Redmond/s administrative style as he perceived it
and as he was perceived by others.
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CHAPTER VII
AN ASSESSMENT OF REDMOND'S LEADERSHIP
James F. Redmond served as General Superintendent of
the Chicago Public Schools for almost nine ful 1 years. from
October 1966 unti I September 1975.

His tenure as

Superintendent brought the school system through some of the
most complex problems that it had seen before or since.

He

has been complimented and criticized for the programs and
the plans that he implemented during his superintendency.
This chapter wi 11 discuss what others thought of Redmond as
a leader and wil 1 try to give an idea of what Redmond
thought of his own leadership.

Some of the comments were

made after Redmond notified the Board of his intention to
retire in 1975.

We will also discuss how Redmond measures

up to the functions of a school leader as defined by
Redmond's friend and mentor Herold Hunt.
We must recal I that Redmond succeeded Benjamin Willis
who at first had support from the Board and the community.
In his later years, Wi 1 lis alienated several communities and
had some staff members worried about whether they would be
the next to feel the superintendent's wrath.

Redmohd

arrived with a reputation of being a "conciliator."

He

welcomed input from community groups on both sides of any
issue.

·HI·s "fatherly" Image gave people the Idea that he
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wanted to hear their side of an issue and that he would help
them solve their problem.

This public image of Redmond was

generally reinforced by those who worked for and with him.
In a article ln the Chicago Tribune Sunday Magazine,
Ridgely Hunt noted that after only a year, Redmond "wi 1 I get
his way a lot of the time, and get it so gently, so
persuasively, that those through whom he works may not even
know who brought the miracles to pass.

He is not greatly

concerned with grabbing al I the praise so long as the job
gets done.

He must rely on other people and It does no harm

to let them take the credlt.

111

Redmond was able to fulfil 1 his first contract without
much criticism.

The time frame of the contract (1966-70)

was filled with each of the challenges mentioned In this
dissertation.

His second four-year contract was approved by

the Board of Education on 25 March 1970 by a vote of 10-0. 2
Later in the year, the Board again voted to renew Redmond/s
contract and again he received a 10-0 vote,

including the

vote of new board member Gerald Sbarboro. 3
The first public criticism of Redmond from the Board of
Education came at a Board meeting on 28 July 1971.

Mrs.

William Rohter, a newly appointed Board member, addressed

1
Ridgely Hunt, "The Concilator," Chicago Tribune Sunday
Magazine, 3 September 1967, sec.7, p.19.
2
Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 March
1970, Chicago, Il ., p.3224.
3
Mlnutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 26 August
1970, Chi cage, I 1 • , p. 348.
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herself to Redmond at the meeting and stated that she felt
there had been an erosion of discipline within the schools.
She criticized Redmond saying:
: feel that you do not know what is going on in
the schools. Not that you're not concerned. but that
you have over a perlod of time insulated and isolated
yourself from our problems. Perhaps you have relied
too much on your staff. when you ~:ght better have
served our schools by replacing some of them.
I do ~o~
overlook the fact that you inherited many of these
problems. but that was some years ago.
In my judgement
not enough effort has been directed to correcting these
i 1 ls and preventing others, from developing.
Rather.
the action has been to Justify and defend.
Dr. Redmond. it is my considered opinion that this
system needs a thorough shake-up from the top down,
that will clear it up and clean It out and make it
work. Only you can do that.
I ask, even plead with
you, to stop talking about accountabi llty and start
demanding it from those next to you, those under them.
and the way down the line. 4
After this verbal attack, the usually quiet Redmond was
noticeably upset but did not react unti I the next Board
meeting on 11 August 1971.

At the meeting Dr. Redmond

presented the fol lowing statement <in part):
I have re-read your statement carefully since the Soard
meeting of July 28, 1971 and repeat my comment on the
floor of the Board that it is my bel lef that your
comments were wel I motivated. However, they are
subjective and very general in nature, and therefore
difficult to answer specifically. It is difficult to
speak of specifics when we are not aware of the
specifics referred to.
I trust that you wi 11
understand that generalizations offer little guidance
to the General Superintendent. Specifics wil I be
Investigated, and answered whenever submitted to me .
... Decentralization, however has been a traumatic
change in Chicago. It demands a complete rethinking of
Minutes of the Board of Education Meeting, 28 July 1971,
Chicago, Il., p.211.
4
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roles for everyone on the staff and for the members of
the Board of Education. We must remember that it is a
great deal to expect an immediate change of attitude on
the part of people steeped in the concept of central
off ice control .
. . . So long as al 1 decisions emanate from the General
Superintendent of Schools, centralization is in effect,
and paper structure to the contrary changes nothing.
This I do not intend to let happen. The Deputy
Superintendent and the three Area Associate
Superintendents and the field staffs have been given
authority and responsibi Jity to look at the
communities, the schools, the teachers, the children,
and to evaluate and assess needs of these groups ...
I expect the Deputy, the area associates, the district
superintendents, and the principals to grow in
confidence as each makes decisions and witnesses
education coming alive for al I the children in the
schools. Leadership cannot be fostered or developed if
decisions are being questioned constantly ...
... I do believe that as you travel across this city,
you wil 1 find leadership in schools where it never
existed before ...
To resolve problems, Mrs. Rohter, you suggest that I
make sweeping changes of staff. Yet, when they were
appointed these administrators met criteria essential
for appointment; they have responded to what they were
told at the time of appointment; and if the rules are
changing, they must also be told and they must be
helped in the changing ... ~
Redmond/s response indicated that he was concerned that Mrs.
Rohter did not truly understand his administrative style and
how it coalesced with the idea of decentralization.

He

noted that he felt it was essential for his subordinates to
realize that they could be decision makers.

He defended his

subordinates and reminded Mrs. Rohter that he realized there
were some problems but he also noted growth and a new
of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 11 August
1971, Chicago, Il ., p.276-77.
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willingness to make decisions and develop programs.
Redmond s wi 1 lingness to defend his subordinates was an
1

indication of his leadership ability and of loyalty to them.
The relationship between Redmond and Mrs. Rohter never
changed during his tenure as Superintendent.

In an

interview with Redmond, he noted that he had great
difficulty with her and felt that she had her own personal
agenda for the Board of

Education.~

Most of the commentary on the leadership ability of
Redmond came either at the time of his tenure as Acting
Superintendent or after he removed his name from the list of
candidates for the Superintendency in August 1975.

Redmond

received- a one-year appointment as Acting Superintendent on
22 May 1974 by a vote of 7-2.

It was apparent that Redmond

had lost some of his support on the Board.

There was

speculation in the papers that Black Board members would not
vote to retain Redmond for another four years. 7

After the

22 May meeting, Board member Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, a Redmond
supporter, said, "The superintendent has done as well, if
not better, than any man could.

I believed in him then and

I believe in him now and I would include him in the search
for the new superintendent." 9
On 12 October 1974, Redmond received a vote of

Redmond interview, Loe.cit.
Connie Lauerman, "Redmond Elected for One More Year,"
Chicago Tribune, 23 May 1974, p.1.
0
7

8.lQl.9,
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confidence from one of his yearly adversaries, Robert
Healey.

Healey, who said he was speaking as an individual

not as a Union representative, praised Redmond for his
success in developing a balanced budget in the last two
years and for various educational programs.
~entioned

Healey

the child parent centers, the Disney Magnet School

and the READ program at Goudy as positive examples of
Redmond/s administration.

Healey said, "if he takes the

blame for the bad, he should take credit for the good." 9
Red~ond

removed himself from consideration for the four

year term as Superintendent on 25 April

1975.

He announced

his intentions at a press conference during which he took an
unprecedented stance against the Board.

Redmond said:

Despite the efforts of several sincere and dedicated
members, I feel the present board membership is not
compatible and not able to work together for the
improvement of the schools.
The constant bickering by
the board membership among themselves, the personal
attacks by some of the board members on members of my
staff, the intrusion of some members of the board into
administrative prerogatives of the staff at the school,
district, area, and central office levels; the
continuing refusal of some the board members to
confine their activities to policy matters, despite the
pleas and protestations of some few of the board
members, all of these have led me to my decision. 10
After hearing of Redmond/s decision, Mayor Richard J. Daley
commented, "All the city of Chicago should be grateful for
what Redmond did in seven dissentious and contentious years .

.... Casey Banas, "Redmond Should Be Retained: Healey," Chicago
Tribune,
12 October 1974, p.3.
u:icasey Banas, "Redmond Angered; Bows Out," Chicago Tribune,
26 Apr i r · 1975 , p . 2 .
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After the history of the Board of Education is reviewed, I
think he will go down as a great supecintendent.

1111

Board

P['esident John D. Carey said, "I am saddened by his
decision, although I can understand his feeling.

111

2

In his iast speech as superintendent, Redmond addressed
the delegates of the Chicago Region Parent Teachers
Association, his stauch ally over his nine year tenure.
Redmond acknowledged his strong working relationship with
the PTA du['ing his tenure.

PTA President Doris Leftakes

presented Redmond with an honorary lifetime PTA membership,
and praised him foe "the long, hard hours of work that you
have contributed on behalf of our youngstecs. 1113

Leftakes

then noted Redmond/s accomplishments including his
legislative program, pub! ishing of the reading scores, the
intensive reading program, and building rehabilitation
programs.

She continued saying that he made the schools

more accessible foe parents and made great strides in
relation to teacher salaries. 1 4
The strained feelings between Redmond and the Board
were apparent during his last Board meeting as
Superintendent on 28 May 1975.

Redmond did not say a word

at the meeting which included a communication from the
Chicago Federation of Labor that thanked Redmond for his
1 1
·

Ibid.

t :2

Thl.Q.

Casey Banas, "Schools /Alive and Vital,/ Says Redmond,"
Chicago Tribune, 28 May 1975, sec.3, p.3.
14
Ibid.
1 3
'
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support and participation in co! lective bargaining with the
various labor groups
Education.

~epresenting

empioyees of the Board of

This Board meeting concluded with President

Carey thanking Redmond publicly for al 1 that he had done
for the children of Chicago.

A resolution was immediately

passed that reflected these same feelings from the entire
Board.

There was a brief standing ovation for the outgoing

Superintendent and then a quick

adJournment.

1

~

In an interview with Dr. Manford Byrd. former
Superintendent of Schools in Chicago and Deputy
Superintendent under Redmond, the topic of Redmond/s
leadership was discussed.

Byrd noted that one of the

characteristics that he most admired in Redmond was his
integrity.

Byrd said, "He was probably one of the most

ethical persons I have ever known.

He would not sacrifice

others when pressures were great on him.
scapegoat staff to save his neck."

1

He would never

'

Byrd said that Redmond would delegate certain tasks .to
his staff, and once delegated he would try to keep himself
clear of the task so that the staff member would feel that
he had control of his own situation.

Redmond had great

confidence in his staff and would be very supportive of them
even in the face of criticism from Board members.

Byrd felt

~Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 May
1975, Chicago, Il ., p.2355.
1
•Personal interview with Dr. Manford Byrd, Jr., Chicago, Il .,
13 December 1989.
1
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that Redmond helped many staff members deveiop into leaders
by giving them tasks and the free reign to fol low the task
through fruition.
Byrd noted that his successes as Deputy Superintendent
and later General Superintendent were due in large part to
the empowerment that Redmond gave him.

He felt that Redmond

wanted to develop leaders and was the person who helped hlm
understand

what it meant to be a leader.

When asked lf he

saw any weakness in Redmond, Byrd replied that "if he had
one it was that he tolerated staff longer that he had to.
He did not like to give up on people, he felt that they
could be reached.

1117

When asked to define his own style of leadership,
Redmond said that he felt that "if I think enough of a guy
to recommend his appointment to a position of importance
then I/m convinced that he is able to do the job and I want
him to get it done.

I don/t believe in second guessing my

subordinates but I would step in if I saw disaster
coming. 1118

He wanted to give people the chance to prove

themselves and was not concerned with minor errors.
Redmond felt that it was the responsiblity of the
leader, whether he is a superintendent or a principal, to
create an atmosphere for the enterprise to work.

The

leader must make available the tools that his subordinates

17
18

Ibid.
Redmond interview, Loe.cit.
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need to do their job.
dreamer as wel 1.

He said that a leader must be a

He must be able to seek alternate

solutions to problems that he encounters.
to make long term plans.

1

He has to be able

•

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, Redmond
considered his friend and former boss, Herold Hunt, as his
mentor.

Referring to

Herold Hunt s eight functions of
1

adminstrative responsibility listed in chapter one, we will
now analyze Redmond's leadership abilities in relation to
Hunt/s criteria. The first criterion, the cooperative
development of a program that is custom made for a
community, was exemplified by both the "Redmond Plan" for
the desegregation of the schools, and by the development of
district and local school advisory councils.

The second

criterion, organization of an administrative framework to
implement and facilitate the program, was achieved through
the implementation of the Boaz. Allen. and Hamilton Report
which decentralized the school system and gave more decision
making capabilities to district superintendents.

The third

criterion, serving as an adviser and executive officer to
the board of education, was also achieved through the Boaz.
Allen. and Hamilton Report which created the role of the
Deputy Superintendent <as chief operating off iccer) and gave
the Superintendent (chief administrative officer) time to
develop educational, financial, and facility plans for board

review and approval.

The fourth criterion. providing a

democratic leadership of school personnel. was also achieved
through the administrative decentralization of the system.
The fifth criterion, observation of legal educational and
administrative requirements, was exemplified in the efforts
that the Redmond administration showed in trying to comply
with the federal
schools.

government's order to desegrate the

During teacher negotiations, Redmond also tried to

defend the right of the Board of Examiners to establish
criterion for teacher certification.

He warned both the

Union and Board members that they could not

legally

negotiate changes in certification procedures.

He insisted

that changes had to be approved by the Board of Examiners.
The sixth criterion called for the development of working
relationships with home and community agencies.

The

guide! ines for the composition of district and local school
councils required the inclusion of parents, community
members, and local community workers on the councils.

The

seventh criterion, adequate instruction and guidance in
American citizenship, has always been a stated goal of the
Chicago public school system and the Redmond administration
embraced this goal.

The final

criterion, providing a

healthful, humanized, and satisfying Jiving for pupils and
teachers, was strived for through negotiations with the
Teachers Union.
improve~ents

Redmond supported many of the educational

suggested by the Union but he found it
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difficult at times to reach a prioritization of needs with
the Union.

His remarks after the first negotiated contract

showed that he was in favor of providing a equitable salary
for his teachers.

After reflecting on Hunt's functions of

administrative responsibility, we can see that according to
hls criteria, James F. Redmond showed the qualities of a
good administrator and leader.
Finally, we wil I try to assess Redmond as a leader
using three leadership theories.

First, we wi 11 use Robert

Tannebaum and Warren Schmidt·· s "Conti nu um of Leader
Behavior."

Tannebaum and Schmidt describe "forces" a

leader should consider when deciding how to manage. 20
Al thought other theorist would place these forces into the
category "situational," Tannebaum and Schmidt cal led them
"forces in the manager," "forces in the subordinates," and
"forces in the situation. 1121

We would evaluate Redmond as a

"Relationships-Oriented Leader" who wanted to permit his
subordinates as much freedom as possible.
great confidence in their abilities.

He expressed

He assured those who

had held positions of authority under Willis that he would
not remove them if they were performing their duties
appropriately.

He would be considered a democratic leader

as opposed to an authoritarian leader.

Although he was a

Stuart C. Smith, Jo Ann Mazzarella, and Phi I ip K. Plele,
School Leadership- Handbook for Survival, <Eugene, Oregon:
Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 1981), p.66.
2 1 lb.l.Q. • p • 67 •
20
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democratic leader, he also noted that ultimately he was the
one who would be accountable to the Board in case of errors.
Secondly, we will consider Redmond/s leadership style
using the Hersey and Blanchard/s situational leadership
model.

2

Using this model, we find that Redmond fell

=-'

into

the second quadrant which indicated a high task and high
relationship style of leadership.

Redmond shared many of

his duties. a mark of a good administrator.

He not only

shared tasks but gave his subordinates the authority to
carry out the tasks.

We see that Redmond did exactly what

Hersey and Blanchard said a leader of this type would do.
As his subordinates matured in their positions, Redmond
would decrease task behavior and increase relationship
behavior unti 1 the subordinate reached a moderate level of
maturity.

As the subordinate reached above average maturity

in his position, Redmond decreased both task behavior and

relationship behavior.

The

su~ordlnate

was given power to

make his own decisions.
Finally, if we were to place Redmond on Blake and
Mouton's "Managerial Grid", we would find him in the 9.9
Management area. :z~
staff.

Redmond had a high concern for his

He wanted them to feel ownership in his organization

and encouraged them to offer their own opinion.

He fostered

Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, Management of
Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hal 1, Inc.,1976).
23
Robert Blake and Jane Mouton, The Managerial Grid, (Houston,
Texas: Gulf Pub! lshing Company, 1964).
22
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a belief in the idea of providing the best possible
education for the children of Chicago.

He would appoint

people whom he felt were committed to the schools.
wanted to build a leadership atmosphere of mutual

He
trust and

respect with the common goal a better educational system for
Chicago.

He tried to assure those who held power before he

assumed the superintendency that he was not interested in
replacing them, but wanted them to continue to contribute
and support his efforts.

He did not "clean out the cabinet"

when he arrived but asked those in influential postions to
continue to support his efforts for the schools.
In considering the assessment of Redmond/s leadership,
whether we choose the assessment of his subordinates, his
adversary,

leadership theorists, or Redmond himself, we must

conclude that he was in fact, a leader.

His quiet demeanor

was only part of the make up the man who ably led the
Chicago public schools for nine years.

He received the

support of his subordinates by giving them the opportunity
to make decisions and providing them with support in their
decisions.

The effects of his leadership remain with the

school system.

Programs and ideas first discussed during

his administration were carried out by future superintendents.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
James F. Redmond assumed the superintendency of the
Chicago public school system in October 1966.

He was

selected for the position because he offered the Board of
Education both a new type of leadership and a familiarity
with the Chicago public school system.

The Board of

Education and community leaders had tired of the abrasive
and dictatorial style of Benjamin Wil !is.

James F. Redmond

brought to the Board a quite different personality.
known as a calm and democratic leader.

He was

Upon his arrival

Redmond was immediately involved in critical decision
making.

In his first six months as General Superintendent,

he was required to negotiate the first collective bargaining
agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union and prepare a
response to the federal government/s demand to develop a
plan to desegregate the schools.

Within the first eighteen

months he would be responsible for the decentralization of
the school system.

He had to manage all of these new

responsiblities while at the same time assuring the citizens
of the city that the current educational offerings,
including programs like the shared-time experiments,
would continue to meet the needs of their children.
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The purpose of this final chapter is to discuss how
Redmond/s ideas and decisions have fared with the test of
time.

We wi 11 discuss his plan of action for each of the

issues presented in this dissertation and how, over the
fifteen years since Redmond left office, these plans
have affected the Chicago school system.
The first issue discussed was the collective bargaining
negotiations between the Board of Education and the Chicago
Teachers Union.

Redmond made it clear in the first

negotiations that he was generally supportive of demands for
a salary increase.
the Union.

Redmond negotiated nine contracts with

During this period there were only three strikes

and they accounted for twenty-two days of lost school time.
In my interview with Redmond, he noted the growth in the
abilities of the Board negotiators during his years as
superintendent.

He felt that a key to his success in

negotiations was the development of a good bargaining
team led by Guy Brunetti.

He noted that his only regrets

about the negotiation process was when the two sides were at
an impasse and were forced to seek mediation from Mayor
Daley/s off ice.

Redmond said that he would rather

compromise with the Union on an issue than go to the Mayor/s
office, because once negotiations reached City Hall, he knew
that his bargaining position had eroded.

Redmond recognized

that Mayor Daley depended upon being considered a friend of
the unions and if negotiations reached the Mayor/s office,
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the Mayor would tel 1 the Board members to give the Union
what they wanted.

Redmond/s attempts to keep the Board in a

fiscally responsible position were continually thwarted when
he was forced to create a large deficit because Board
members were told to appease the Union.
Redrnond/s experience in the Board/s negotiations
reflect the conclusions he reached in his own dissertation.
He advised school leaders to seek the support and input of
teachers and develop within them a sense of power and
responsibility.

If teachers feel that they have power

within the system, then they feel an ownership and are
willing to share responsibility with the Board.

Redmond

warned school boards not to become fiscally dependent on
other governmental bodies.

Redmond knew the limited

resources of the Board of Education and tried to maintain
fiscal responsibi 1 ity.

Nonetheless he was often left

powerless because of the Mayor/s influence over Board of
Education members.

Eventually, the influence of city hall

over the Board of Education lead to the financial col lapse
of the Board and the resulting watchdog group called the
School Finance Authority.
The Recimond Plan <Increasing Desegregation of
Faculties. Students. and Vocational Education Programs) was
Redmond/s solution to end the segregated school system in
Chicago.

This plan recommended a new faculty assignment

plan that would assign experienced teachers to schools
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throughout the city.

The plan also cal led for changes in

school boundaries to lessen the burden of overcrowding.

The

ldea of open enrollment in vocational and technical high
schools were further efforts to provide an integrated school
system.

Students of al 1 races were encouraged to take part

in extracurricular activities such as the all-city band and
chorus.
Redmond/s recommendations were accepted in principle.
He referred to the term "ln principle" as the Board saying,
"It/s a good idea but it/snot politically reasonable to
carry it out."

1

He said that Board members realized that

the programs had to be educationally beneficial to all
children and provide a way for the Board to show the federal
government that we were trying to desegregate the school
system.

However, he also felt that they had been told that

the plan could not be put into effect because it could
threaten the political machine.·

Many ethnic groups voiced

their disapproval of integrated schools, and since these
groups made up part of the political machine, their voices
were heard.
It seems that many aspects of the Redmond Plan were
necessary in order to attempt to desegregate the schools.
In the later 1970/s and 1980/s, many of the suggestions of
the fl.fill were carried out by later administrations.
Consent Decree entered into by the Board of Education
1

Redmond interview, Loe.cit.

The
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restricted the teacher transfer policy of the Board of
Education and assured that all school faculties would be
integrated.

This plan helped to keep some experienced

teachers in schools where they could be used as a resource
for new teachers.
The Redmond Plan's concept of magnet schools was later
expanded. The "Access to Excellence" and "Options for
Knowledge" ptograms of later superintendents are basically
the same programs as suggested in the Plan.
One might reflect and wonder what changes would have
taken place in the Chicago public schools if the Redmond
Plan was accepted in fact rather- than "in principle."

It is

possible that the "white flight" that took place in the late
1960's and 1970's

could have been lessened.

The cr-eation

of specialized schools might have kept some parents from
leaving the city in order to get a quality education fortheir- children.
The Boaz. Allen. & Hamilton Repor-t which became the
basis for the administr-ative decentr-alization of the Chicago
Public Schools was fully supported by Supec-intendent
Redmond.

Redmond was pleased with the report because he

shared many of the management consultants' ideas.

He felt

that the General Superintendent should be the chief
administrative officer- and should be r-esponsible for
developing the educational, financial, and facilities plans
for Board r-eview.

He should be the planner and the policy
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implementer for the Board.

The day-to-day operations of the

schools would become the responsibi 1ity of the Deputy
Superintendent.
The Boaz. Al Jen. & Hamilton Report also suggested the
creation of the office of Area Associate Superintendent.
This new position would further decentralization because
the new Associate Superintendents could make decisions
previously made only in the central office.

The Area

Associate Superintendent administered the total spectrum of
activities of the school system in his assigned area.
The political decentralization of the Chicago public
schools began when the Redmond administration created the
district advisory council and later the local school
counci I.

Both of these groups were composed of parents and

community members who were interested in creating a better
district or school.

The council members could advise the

district superintendent or principal on matters regarding
the school.
Redmond/s ideas of administrative and political
decentralization have continued through the years with a few
changes.

The position of Area Associate Superintendent has

been eliminated, but the position of Deputy Superintendent
remains and stil 1 functions in the same areas that were
delegated to the position by Redmond/s reorganization plan.
Until the recent school reform movement, local school
councils continued to act as advisors to the principal.

The
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powers of the local school counci 1 were greatly increased in
the recent school reform movement.

Now the local school

counci 1 has the power to make decisions. not just act as
advisors.
As stated earlier, the shared-time experiment was Just
one example of programs that were already in existence when
Redmond became General Superintendent.
staff

f~llowed

Redmond and his

the progress of the experiment and suggested

that it continue on a limited basis after the four year
trial period.

The Kennedy-St. Paul program was quite

successful and lasted for an additional eight years.

The

reason the program ended was not because of lack of
interest. but because the area from which St. Paul could
draw Its students was limited to the Kennedy attendance
area.
The idea of shared-time programs could again become a
reality.

Many states are discussing the possible use of an

educational voucher system to give parents an opportunity to
select the school which their child wil 1 attend.

It

would be reasonable to assume that shared-time schools
similar to the Kennedy-St. Paul program could develop again
and provide parents with an additional option for their
child's education.
James F. Redmond served as General Superintendent of
the Chicago Public Schools for almost nine years.

During

his tenure In off ice there was a great deal of social
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change.

Redmond was able to assume the leadership of a

troubled school system and provide a stable atmosphere
unti 1 the last year of his tenure.

Redmond met the four

challenges discussed in this dissertation and many other
cha! lenges as we! 1.

He provided effective leadership to the

school system and helped nurture future leaders of the
system.

I believe the school system would be better today

if he would have had the power to carry out his proposed

programs.
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